From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Fri May 20 2005 - 17:18:50 BST
Platt --
> Here we have an opportunity to discuss the assumptions on which
> our mindsets are built which, I think, is a good thing. For me, anyway,
> it's enjoyable. And who knows, I might learn something. :-)
Sure, I'll engage in "thought experiments". In fact, that's what philosophy
usually
amounts to.
Platt (previously):
> > Why adopt the assumption that existence itself is a force for good?
> > Because existence in which value (quality) is subtracted would be
> > empirically unrecognizable.
I don't understand the logic here, hence your point eludes me. You seem to
have a very sanguine view of existence, as if its purpose was to bless life
with
goodness. Yet, the MD is saturated with charges of greed, deceit, cruelty,
tyranny, suffering, etc. I don't think you can make a case for the
intrinsic goodness
of existence. In your particular lexicon, what is evil, bad, or immoral is
sugar-coated by the connotation "low quality". Quality in the MoQ (as in
common understanding) is used as a measure of goodness. In your unpolarized
value scale, "bad" is simply "less good", and "evil" tends to disappear at
the bottom of your value scale. But this artificial barometer is a
distortion of human
feelings; and it's deceitful because we all sense our existential condition
between the extremes. Do you reject the notion of good and evil?
More importantly, I see existence as a "reduction" of a Primary Source in
which man is the dynamic agent ("force"). In fact, it has occurred to me
only
recently that SQ and DQ as used in the MoQ are paradoxically reversed. That
is, if DQ is the ontological foundation for a multi-level existence, it is
the "static" unchanging source, while the historical and evolutionary
patterns in the relational world are the "dynamic" events. In Essentialism,
as well as Platonism, Buddhism and most monotheistic worldviews, man is the
"dynamic" agent of an unmoved mover. Perhaps you can enlighten me as to why
Pirsig chose Dynamic Quality to identify the unitary Whole, and Static
Quality for its dynamic constituents.
> "Quality" is all about morality.
> The two concepts are inseparable. Something is high quality if
> it's right or good, both moral judgments.
> Something is low quality if it's wrong or bad,
> both moral judgments.
You've defined "good" and "bad" as moral judgments, as I do. Since man does
the judging, I fail to see how you place such evaluations outside the realm
of S/O metaphysics.
> And that existence, that primary empirical reality, is bursting with
> morality -- with values of good, bad, indifferent, but mostly good, like
> "It's good to exist" and "It's good to evolve towards something better."
Why "mostly good". Doesn't that challenge the Yin-yang balance of opposites
which is fundamental to Taoism (and, they tell me, the MoQ)?
> There's nothing illusory
> about the stable aspects, the consistent patterns of value that make up
> what most people call the "objective world." The "self" (the individual)
> is no more illusory than you are.
How do you know that I'm not illusory? ;-)
Personally, I believe the objective world is the most illusory of all -- and
that includes my individuated Self.
Mark said:
> > Objectivists see individuals as absolutely distinct from one
> > another; the FRH [fully realized human] understands that all
> > humans share a common humanity, and that any perceived
> > difference between individuals is a cultural illusion.
It's just this kind of thinking which has convinced me that MoQ followers,
if not the author himself, are pedaling a collectivist ideology largely
based on the secular humanist principles of Rousseau, Hume and Dewey. The
individual is virtually absent from this philosophy. He is a "pattern" of
nature, a shared intellect, a socio-political anomaly whose contributions
are always discussed in the collective sense. To me, this is a rejection of
the individual locus, and a violation of my immutability principle.
Ham asked:
> > How can one become enlightened to the purpose of existence when the MoQ
> > regards the individual as "a cultural illusion"?
> >
> > If I accept your assumption that Quality is existence --
> > I assume that "existence" to you means reality --
> > then Quality is the primary empirical reality, as Pirsig has stated.
Platt replied:
> Yes. And that existence, that primary empirical reality, is bursting with
> morality -- with values of good, bad, indifferent, but mostly good, like
> "It's good to exist" and "It's good to evolve towards something better."
What you're describing, I think, is "purposiveness" as it is designed into
the
universe. Bergson and other vitalists refer to this as *entelechy* -- the
teleological objective of the Designer which has nothing to do with
"goodness" or morality as such. You wouldn't describe the relationship of
mechanical parts that go into the making of a watch as a "moral"
arrangement. The parts are designed to work together for an intended
result. You might regard the watch's purpose as "good" on principle, but
there is no morality implied in the design itself.
Of course, Pirsig rejects the concept of a Designer, so he ascribes
morality, erroneously, to the material universe.
Platt asks:
> A stupid question no doubt, but how can we recognize Essence if it's non-
> empirical?
No, it's a good question. I believe man is equipped with the intellectual
resources to deal with the enigma of existence intuitively. Our
sensibilities reveal Value in the finite experienced world. Intuitively we
know that the values we sense are not caused by the things we experience,
but that they represent the "congruence" of our proprietary awareness and
its object. (In that sense, Value is the copula of S/O.) But reason and
intuition can lead to an understanding that the empirical manifestation of
Value has an essential source, just as all created things presuppose a
Creator. A major obstacle in that understanding is the refusal to
acknowledge a Primary Source. As I've said before, neither Quality nor
Value can qualify as the Primary Source, because they are both contingent
upon relations, i.e., the observing subject vs. the perceived object.
Platt says:
> Don't think the humanist ideology is implicit in the MoQ. Can you explain
> why you think so? Just by denying the God of religion doesn't ipso facto
> mean someone buys humanism.
It isn't the "God of religion" that leads me to this conclusion, although
the rejection of a primary source is certainly a factor. My longtime friend
Scot, a retired biochemistry professor, has some first-hand insight on the
political persuasion of the teaching fraternity, particularly in
institutions of higher learning. Suffice it to say, it's common knowledge
in academia that the liberal arts (e.g., English professors) represent the
heaviest concentration of leftist influence in the population at large. (I
recall the actual percentage as being well above 90%. I can dig out a
recent survey to that effect, if you want it.)
But, in addition to the fact that several MoQers have expressed their belief
that the individual is a "cultural illusion" -- meaning a byproduct of
biological, intellectual and sociological patterns -- here's a section of
Anthony's thesis which supports my claim:
__________________________________________________________
Rorty and Pirsig both proclaim themselves as modern advocates of American
pragmatism. ...Rorty (1989, p.xiii) asserts that it's impossible that a
philosophy 'would let us hold self-creation and justice, private perfection
and human solidarity, in a single vision.' Though this reconciliation of
the public and the private realms is, undoubtedly, not without difficulties,
Orwell (1944) argues that positions similar to Rorty's are unsafe to hold:
"A very dangerous fallacy. is to believe that under a dictatorial government
you can be free inside. Quite a number of people console themselves with
this thought, now that totalitarianism in one form or another is visibly on
the up-grade in every part of the world. The greatest mistake is to imagine
that the human being is an autonomous individual. ..."
It seems, therefore, that the public/private distinction must be reconciled,
at least partially, to prevent Orwell's 'very dangerous' fallacy coming into
being.
To some extent, the credibility of Rorty's argument is an issue of
foundationalism; concerning the extent we should rely on static frameworks
such as metaphysical systems to order our experience. As the MOQ is a
'contradiction in terms' (Pirsig's words) in being a metaphysics wherein a
Western scientific theory is combined with the mystic notion of 'nothingness
', it seems that Pirsig is attempting a pragmatic balance (the 'middle way'
?) between modernist absolutes and post-modernist relativism. [McWatt 2.11.
THE MOQ & POST-MODERNISM]
_______________________________________________________
Isn't "attempting a pragmatic balance", as Ant charitably calls it, really
an equivocation on the fundamental autonomy of the individual? How can one
equivocate Orwell's assertion that "The greatest mistake is to imagine that
the human being is an autonomous individual."? Does the presumed
multi-level origin of the human being in any way reduce him to a collective
organism? Certainly this belief is shared by your compatriots. That's not
a Buddhist-inspired concept; it's pure leftist collectivism.
As always, I appreciate your willingness to discuss our basic differences,
Platt. But this rebuttal is already too long, and there must be other posts
on the MD that require my attention. I'm still interested in your
justification for Mr. Pirsig's apparent juxtaposition of the DQ and SQ
metaphors.
Best regards,
Ham
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