Re: MD Primary Reality

From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Wed Jun 15 2005 - 14:44:07 BST

  • Next message: Michael Hamilton: "Re: MD Primary Reality"

    Matt et al,

    Matt said (to Bo):
    A summary of the position that I believe all four of us [Matt, Paul, Ant,
    and DMB] stand in/with/as: What we call "mind" is better refered to as a
    collection of static intellectual patterns. A person does not _have_
    intellectual patterns, we _are_ intellectual patterns. A "person" is a
    particular amalgamation of static intellectual patterns, the vast majority
    of which we share with other people.

    Scott:
    I've said this sort of thing myself at one time, but it doesn't work. It is,
    in fact, the Theravadin view of the self, which Nagarjuna challenged. It
    doesn't work because it ignores the continuity over the set of static
    intellectual patterns (also, it leaves unsettled where to locate the source
    of new patterns). So while it doesn't make sense to call the self a
    container of the set of static patterns, it also doesn't make sense to say
    the self *is* the set of static patterns. When I wake up in the morning, I
    need to "place" myself, that is, remember where I am, what I have to today,
    possibly even my name. All of these are beliefs, but they make no sense
    without the setting called "me". Now this is what Rorty would call an
    intuition that, in his opinion, we should get rid of, but while I agree that
    the intuition that this 'setting called "me"' should not be assumed to be an
    independent thing (a container, for example), it is also not the beliefs
    that are gathered. In short, it is one of the poles of a contradictory
    identity (the other being the beliefs). Each is not the other, but each
    constitutes the other. What you four (and Pirsig) are doing is taking one
    pole of a polarity as true, making the other pole "just an appearance", and
    that fails.

    This error arises in the MOQ because of Pirsig's conflation of the
    mind/matter meaning of S/O (S/)[1]) with the intentionality meaning (what I
    call S/O[2]). The first can be dissolved because all the S[1] can be treated
    as O[2]. But S[2] is still left dangling, which is why the MOQ, and
    materialist pragmatism, are inadequate and incoherent.

    - Scott

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