From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Tue Jul 19 2005 - 21:53:01 BST
Sam,
>Take a stone - a particular static pattern of materials and chemicals which
>can be described in inorganic terms. Now take a house - a particular
>pattern
>of stones (or bricks or whatever) - which has been organised and structured
>by human preference. (In other words, a human response to Quality drives
>the
>shaping and agglomeration of the stones). It seems to me that we can take
>'idea' (or manipulable symbol etc) in the same way as a stone, and that for
>the ideas or stones to actually do anything (eg be taken up into a
>geometrical proof) there needs to be some reference to a human response to
>quality.
Paul: Yes, but a human *is* inorganic, biological, social and intellectual
patterns. Thus it is correct to say that the intellectual patterns respond.
>Equations don't solve themselves, human beings (or computers) do
>the solving.
Paul: Yes, but, again, a human being *is* the intellectual patterns.
>When you say that 'generalised propositional truths' do some organising, I
>am wondering: how? In what way can a proposition organise anything? Are the
>sentences in the books on my shelves secretly plotting together for that
>glorious day when the tyranny of human beings is overcome and the
>propositions can leap free from their imprisonment on the printed page?
Paul: Uh, yeah, that's what I mean....
Please.
>It seems to me that the response to Quality, the organising, comes through
>the human being. Which brings us to Rorty, which I thought was great. I
>would say that the 'web of beliefs' - quibbling a bit with 'belief' but let
>that slide for a moment - might correspond to the mind which is responding
>to Quality, and which is organising various other beliefs in the light of
>that response. In other words, there is an agglomeration of ideas which
>then
>assesses other ideas in terms of how they fit with what is already present
>(and which might over time completely replace what is already present) but
>in either case there is a particular pattern which is responsible for the
>accepting or rejecting of ideas. There is no self separate from the
>self-reweaving web (in Rorty's language) - but there is still precisely
>that
>self-reweaving web which can do the work of responding to Quality (and
>which
>is distinguishable from the 'generalised propositional truths' which are
>the
>equivalent of the stones, not the house, let alone the architect or
>builder).
>
>In your explanation so far, it's precisely that self-reweaving web which I
>can't see a place for. Hence my question.
Paul: Hang on, I used that quote to answer your question then you repeat it
back to me and tell me my answer has no place for it!
The self-reweaving web which responds to Quality *is* the intellectual
patterns of value. Humans *are*, along with the other patterns,
intellectual patterns of value, they don't *have* them. Generalised
propositional truths are intellectual patterns. Generalised propositional
truths are in the web of belief, so I can't see what the issue is. All I'm
adding is that there are some intellectual patterns in this web of belief
which justify a significant amount of other intellectual patterns. From
Aristotelian logic, the tetralemma, the number system, algebra, geometrical
axioms through to evolution, cosmology, "nothing can travel faster than the
speed of light," and "everything is value," there are propositional truths
which hold webs together, decide what is part of the web and what isn't -
they organise knowledge. They are the roots from which branches grow. They
are the definitive beliefs of paradigms. When they go, much of the web goes
with it.
>On a related point, your reference to Quinean material reminded me of
>Wittgenstein's On Certainty:
>
>"I prefer the (Quinean?) term "web of beliefs" because it seems less
>inflexible but says pretty much the same thing. In these webs, the
>generalised propositional truths are "central" and the slowest to change
>whilst the beliefs at the "edge" of the web may change quickly and often."
>
>Some beliefs are part of our forms of life, they are not intellectually
>derived or driven. " The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it
>learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system
>of
>what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and
>some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not
>because
>it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what
>lies around it." (§144)
>
>In Wittgenstein's conception the generalised propositional truths are those
>which are superficial (ie less rooted in self and world) and come later
>(they are *abstracted* from the life), it is the natural forms of life
>(animal life) in which our language is embedded which are substantial
>(which
>have 'depth').
Paul: Okay, well maybe she learns the general propositional truths later
but the beliefs she learns first may still be organised around those general
truths regardless.
>"I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its
>correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness.
>No:
>it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and
>false" (§94)
Paul: Yes, I agree, but the inherited background *is* the social and
intellectual patterns (the web of belief) which one learns through the usual
cultural processes and the general propositional truths are an integral part
of that intellectual web.
Regards
Paul
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