Re: MD generalised propositional truths

From: Scott Roberts (jse885@cox.net)
Date: Sun Jul 24 2005 - 20:57:58 BST

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    Paul,

    Paul said (to David):
    Once the Sophists were pushed aside the intellectual dream has always seemed
    to have been the attempt to build one perfect web but I think Pirsig (and
    many others) have shown that firstly, each web is built on a particular
    social base, and secondly, that there are many competing webs and this is
    good in an evolutionary context. Even as individuals I don't think we have
    one consistent web of beliefs.

    Scott:
    While what I have to say here will sound like Platt's usual objection (is
    "there are many competing webs" an absolute truth?), there is a slight but
    important difference, which I hope becomes clear in the following.

    Even if it has been the case that each web is built on a particular social
    base, is that still true? We now have the case that a person from culture A
    can say "My belief X stems from my being raised in culture A", and another
    person from a different culture B can say "My belief Y stems from my being
    raised in culture B". This means that with the
    pragmatist/linguistic/postmodern turn both persons have transcended in the
    same way the state of being bound to a particular social base. Could this
    not, then, be the basis for building that long-sought perfect web?
    Obviously, there is a long way to go, even among those who have made that
    turn, but the first step is to recognize that that turn *is* the basis.

    Practically everything I have been proposing in this forum has been to flesh
    out that basis. Part of that is to point out that, though there are frequent
    calls for defining such terms as 'consciousness' or 'self', that it can't be
    done. The reason it cannot be done is that any attempt runs into the logic
    of contradictory identity. Instead, one must just get used to using such
    terms without definition, and the LCI has the pragmatic virtue of preventing
    the aligning on one side the usual dualisms. Another part is to point out
    that the basic terms for this basis, along with quality and consciousness,
    and also undefinable, are 'definition', 'language', 'pattern', 'word',
    'intellect', and so on. Granted, you do not agree with me that such terms
    should also be seen as the basis for metaphysics (as in "what is really
    going on at all levels"), yet I think there could be agreement that they
    provide a basis for philosophizing.

    Pragmatism rejects foundationalism, but what I am saying is that that
    attitude can be turned into a practical and universal foundation: that the
    intellect creates by challenging existing foundations, and building new
    ones.

    So I would disagree in part with your statement "there are many competing
    webs and this is good in an evolutionary context." Such is our current
    state, but suppose almost everyone comes to agree with it. Then we will have
    truly started the intellectual level.

    - Scott

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