Hugo Fjelsted Alroe (alroe@vip.cybercity.dk)
Thu, 8 Jan 1998 23:12:02 +0100
Lars,
let me take a shot at your pursuit of the objective, and then you can say
whether it did you any good.
I think I understand your concerns. I have been working with the question
of objectivity in science, and ventured into Metaphysics of Quality partly
in order to provide a satisfying answer to this very question. And perhaps
discussing this in some detail will add one more perspective to our present
view of MoQ.
First of all, I think we have to distinguish between the objectivity of
methodology and 'objective knowledge', as the term is used by f.i. Popper,
where objective knowledge is supposed to be provided by objective methods
in inquiry. Popper was on the right path (say I ;-) on the methodology,
providing the foundation for what has later (Donald Campbell) been termed
'evolutionary epistemology'. Put shortly, characterizing science as a
Popperian sort of objective method, I would emphasize the _public_ nature
of science, involving both the openness to and concern for public critique,
and the common goal for the inquiry (the quest for truth).
This is a very general description of objectivity, which goes along with
your description. And I think it is one which is generally acceptable to
modern science.
But, even if this view avoids some of the problems of more crude views of
objectivity, there seems to be a residue of 'objectivism' hidden in our
view of objective or scientific knowledge. Saying this, I would to some
extent agree (with others on the list, I forget who) that a change of
metaphysics would not alter the results of science. But it would alter the
way we look upon scientific knowledge, and the way we use it, and as a
consequence of this it would probably alter the practice of science.
The main problem with 'objectivity' in science is a neglect or lack of
concern for the contextuality of inquiry, and subsequently for the
contextuality of knowledge.
A discussion of the issues of contextuality involves the various positions
of 'objectivism' and 'subjectivism' or relativism. These positions can be
(and this 'can be' entails a _lot_ of effort, beyond Pirsig's initial
effort, but I believe they can be) shown inadequate, but there are few
people who have avoided falling into one of those pitfalls in the process
of proving the other wrong, or at least few that are more or less well
known now. Among those are Pirsig and followers (us - in all modesty :-)
and some of the American pragmatists (Peirce, Dewey), with roots in
Aristotle (yes, I know ...) and, I have recently learned, Schelling. ( And
perhaps Bohr, Bateson, ... others?).
I believe the idea of objective knowledge has roots back to Platons world
of ideas, where the things in our world were more or less poor copies
(shadows, in the cave scenario) of the eternal, perfect ideas. I believe
this metaphysical view to be wrong. And I am afraid that Popper, whom I
value highly, had a kind of platonistic view, with his three worlds; the
real or physical world, the subjective world of our thoughts and the world
of objective knowledge (I have yet to investigate in more detail the
influence of this idea in his philosophy of science).
As an aside, this platonistic metaphysics is not uncommon among
mathematicians, and I know Roger Penrose holds a view much like Popper.
Objective knowledge, true theories, mathematics, etc., are often taken to
be true no matter where and when. We know the idea of eternally true
natural laws, for instance (well, perhaps that was more the view in the
previous century?), and Lars has given some mathematical examples.
I believe all knowledge is contextual, even in the form of scientific
theories, or mathematical systems. Scientific theories are not mere
'ideas', they refer to the lower levels of reality (in Pirsigs sense), they
evolve and they are used, by being _applied_. Theories entail a (more or
less explicit) context of application, and expectations (often in a
mathematical form) on the outcome of such applications.
Some of the major events in physics in this century can only (or so I say)
be understood in the light of some such contextual view of knowledge;
quantum mechanics, where Bohr made some headway with his complementarity
principle, and relativity theory, the interpretation of which is still (I
claim) paradoxical due to the lack of a contextual frame.
As for mathematics, I have read to little to refer to others. But as for my
own view, answering Lars' question of whether arithmetic (f.i.) is 'purely
objective', I would say that even the theory of numbers, the rules of
addition and so forth, are contextual. The context assumed here is that of
a world of 'individual things', of entities, and the rules of addition
would do you no good in adding piles of dirt - you would never get more
than one pile of dirt. Addition works fine if we keep the relevant context
of application in the back of our minds. Other parts of mathematics and
logics have other (often tacitly) assumed contexts, but they are not
_without_ context of application, and this is important when they are
applied (and when not, they may be looked upon as some form of art!?).
Interestingly, logic and mathematics is characterized by their 'detachment'
from the world, by the lack of reference, and they have become more and
more detached through history. Most notably, perhaps, is Hilberts attempt
at founding geometry without any reference to visualisation (anskuelse) of
the objects of geometry, building an entirely formal system where the
points, lines and planes might as well be thought of as chairs, tables and
glasses, as he puts it. Magnus gave a quote by Einstein on this, I think,
saying something like: Math is only true to the extent that it does not
refer to the world; and I am very uneasy about this view of mathematics.
As for more complex actions than the piling of dirt, neglecting the
contextuality of our knowledge and the implications of this contextuality
is, I believe, behind many of our present and future problems.
Mtty, Doug's salute to us, wishing us good with the idea of many truths, I
take to be a reminder of this contextuality of our knowledge, so
Many truths to you all,
Hugo
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