Bodvar Skutvik (skutvik@online.no)
Sat, 16 May 1998 17:49:03 +0100
Fri, 15 May 1998 10:13:55 +0000
Hugo Fjelsted Alroe wrote:
> Horse et al
> As I have said before ( in the first reply on this thread f.i., on which
> I got no responses) I do have another view of 'Subject-Object Metaphysics'
> than the one Horse and others have been homing in on lately.
Hugo!
Good to hear that you have survived the strike, and are back with a
long weighty piece. I did not respond to your post of 13 April,
probably because your views are so close to my own.
> We need to keep 'the Subject-Object Metaphysics', the subject of this
> thread, distinct from any one of the worldviews which Pirsig, as Horse
> has pointed out, calls '_a_ subject object metaphysics'. There is a danger
> in the speaking of Subject-Object Metaphysics as _the_ SOM, tempting us
> to conflate subject-object metaphysics with a single view, often a kind of
> 'objectivist' view, or the more subtle view of the logical positivists,
> as Horse does in the latest mail. But this looses the key to the critique
> that I think Pirsig intended.
I am not quite sure what you and Horse mean by the article
distinction. Subject/Object is the first division of SOMs and this
is very much THE - . This initial split has spawned many
lesser soms that individually may be called "a" subject/object view.
Mind-matter, psychic-physical, soul-body, culture-nature... and so
on. Is this what you two have in mind?
> I will try to present my view in a short, clear form. Page references
> are to Lila, Bantam paperback ed. 1992.
> First of all, Pirsig is not only talking of explicitly dualistic views,
> such as the Cartesian view that there are two basic forms of substance,
> mind and matter, but also seemingly monistic views such as pure idealism
> and pure materialism.
Right! This runs along the same lines as my own reply to Horse,
mainly that SOM isn't just the materialists (Logical Positivists
f.ex.) but just as much the idealists.
> And his term 'subject-object metaphysics' adresses one particular split,
> the subject-object split (e.g. ch.8, p 114), and not 'dualisms' in
> general.
Right. Dualisms can be all sorts. Even the MOQ is a dualism!
> Taking subject-object metaphysics to be about dualisms in general
> misses out on the crucial point which leads towards resolving the platypi of
> subject-object metaphysics. I believe Pirsigs philosophy is 'monistic'
> in the way that any truly evolutionary philosophy is monistic. But I am
> confident that discussing monism, dualism and pluralism in general terms
> will lead us nowhere.
There has been talk about world views as monist, dualist and
pluralist, but I must say that I have a hard time finding a monist
example (Leibnitz' "monads" perhaps? But like the 'elementary
particles' they soon opened up). Hugo points to "seemingly
monistic views" such as pure materialists and/or idealists, but these
subscribe to SOM - even if they set out to remedy it. Idealists
claim that there is only mind and that matter is REALLY mind.
Materialists do the same from the opposite end; everything is REALLY
matter, mind is the subjective reflection of its workings. But
however much they yearn for unity they can't do without the
counterpart - no wonder because they were SOMers from the outset!
Pluralisms are also hard to find. The trinity of the Christian Church
perhaps?. But that is just a dogmatic sleigh of hand. The Church
subscribes to THE SOM as much as everybody else: the mind/matter
sub-division to be exact. For a while did Phädrus of ZMM think he
had invented a trinity: Subjects, Objects and Quality, but he left
that concept in LILA. No, dualisms it is when it comes to
metaphysics.
> On subject-object metaphysics:
> The logical positivists (aka logical empiricists) are philosophers of
> science, as Pirsig points out (ch.5, p.72) in his explication of the
> opponents of metaphysiscs per se. And this rejection of the need for
> metaphysics is a main characteristic of the logical positivists, they
> see no need for talking of the ultimate nature of reality, be that material,
> ideal or something else. What is important, is positive, rational
> experience (by way of science).
> The second major opponent (which Pirsig considers the more formidable)
> of metaphysics are the mystics.
Your pointing to Pirsig's words about the mystics being the more
formidable opponents (to Quality) shows our agreement, but from here
I must set out on a trail of my own (not because what you go on to
say is opposed to my view, but because I feel that this looms over
our discussion now).
I think it is in vain to say that the MOQ is more monist or less
dualist; once you put the metaphysical dipper into the
undifferentiated "ocean" you have two. After SOM's first split you
have the subjective-objective dualism, after MOQ's you have the
dynamic-static dualism. It is what comes out of the primary cut which
count, and DQ/SQ is worlds apart from the S/O.
Well then, doesn't the MOQ end up in the same mire as the SOM: an
impregnable wall between two realities? NO! The paradoxes that SOM
creates (Examples: Mind/matter. How can a subjective thought initiate
action in an objective body? Free will. How can a body made up of
fully determined matter particles exercise freedom?) have haunted
humankind for centuries - millennia really - in some form or other,
but there is no MOQ counterpart to this problem.
I seem to remember that Horse suggested one MOQ paradox
(correct me if wrong): How can Static Patterns change if no interface
exists between DQ and SQ? This is not equal to SOM's riddle which is
that decisions takes place in one realm and are executed in the
other. The MOQ does not say that what takes place when someone
decides to bend a finger is a DYNAMIC act! It is one ore more
static level's act, and what took place in Benjamin Libet's
experiments confirm it. As Tor Nörretranders formulated it: ALL ACTS
ARE INITIATED BEFORE CONSCIOUSNESS! (0.5 second to be exact). Libet's
experiments took place in the sixties and TN wrote his book in 1985
so neither knew Pirsig's ideas, but in MOQish it would be: at a
deeper level than Intellect!.
Sincerely
Bo
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