Donald T Palmgren (lonewolf@utkux.utcc.utk.edu)
Tue, 19 May 1998 07:15:47 +0100
Hi gang.
First, I want to thank Fintan for the most unusual post I've seen
yet. I liked it. I wonder if you only write like that at something-awfull
AM or if you're always like that... But I really, really liked
it. :)
Second, I want to strongly thank Theo for helping to clear up the
monism, dualism, pluralism thing. Metaphysics is about, what does it mean
to "exist." What does something have to have/be to exist? The point of
these is to say that:
Monism: everything that exists has X trait
Dualism: everything that is exists has either X or Y
Pluralism: it can be A,B,C,D...
So w/ MoQ:
Everything that exists has quality. To "exist" means to have value. So if
you ask, "Does fluber REALLY exist?" you want to know if it has value.
It is a definite, strong monism. The TYPE of value can be
characterised as either type-A or type-B (DQ and SQ), but that does NOT
make MoQ a dualism.
A comperable example: In modern physics, to "exist" means to be
made of matter or energy, but since E=mc2, these are the same thing, just
appearing in two distinct states. And since (w/ general relativity)
mass/energy are determined to be functions of time-space... To "exist"
(physically -- that is, in physics) means to be in/of time-space. This is
the direction *The Tao of Physics* goes in arguing that physics is a
monism akin to Taoism. Anyway...
On Mon, 18 May 1998, Diana McPartlin wrote:
>
> The subject-object metaphysics is the assumption that reality is divided
> into two separate and irreducible realms of subject and object. The
> subject being that which experiences and the object being that which is
> experienced. From this assumption arises the idea that there is a
> subjective reality experienced by each individual and an objective
> reality which exists independent of any individual.
>
I think the key terms here are "seperate" and "irriducable" in the
first sentence. You're saying: to really exist you must be either one of
two things: X or Y. X and Y are not derived from one-another and cannot
be reduced to any common trait (Z). But everything that really counts as
existing can be reduced to trait X, Y or some combination of both.
O-kay, strong dualism here.
So that is actualy qualifier #1 to see if something counts as a
SOM (because, as I've said, to ask "what is X?" is to ask,"How do you pick
it out? How do you know an X when you see one?")
#1 To be a SOM you must be a dulism.
Now, there is a second qualifier in Diana's deffinition because
she says what X and Y are: subject and object. She uses the
(philosophically) familer definition of these words: knower and known.
To really exists means you are either something known, or you are
what's doing the knowing.
Now, since knower and known are defined ONLY recipricoly (you
can't have a knower that knows nothing and you can'y have a known object
that isn't known by anyone), we can, again see that this is a strong
dualism -- "strong" in the sense that BOTH X and Y (knower and known) must
be present in order to have an event. (They are, in an ontological sense,
seperate from from one another, but are, in another sense, inseperable.
Confused? I am.)
Pirsig does talk about subjects and objects, and he does say (in
the SODV paper on the Forum, in fact) that experience (in other words,
reality) is the result of these two interacting... BUT he does not say
that they are "seperate and irreducable" but rather, that they have a
common trait and souce: quality.
So, you can tell if a metaphysicsl theory is SOM if
1) It's (ontologically speaking) a dualism.
2) It says that everything can be reduced to either something which
knows or something known, but that knower and known can not be reduced to
each other, or (to say the same) shown to be the same thing.
Now, I like that a lot. It's (I hope) clear, consise, and you can
stick it on one of Platt's index cards. It's a real handy way to tell
when you've got a SOM...
... and I can feel tremmors in the force already comming from Magnus.
That's also very narrow. If that's what P means by SOM then, as
Theo said, the MoQ has a lot of presidence and allies in taking issue w/
the SOM position. Spinoza, the German Idealists, maybe the process
philosophers like A.N. Whitehead... And that's just in the West. When we
look East we see that SOM is very rare --Nonexistant! Eastern "philosophy"
is all about colapsing the S-O of "natural consciousness" to achieve the
state on at-one-ment, *tat twam assi* (that thou art) says the Upanishad
(which is about as old as Plato). So Pirsig's philosophy is a lot like Zen
Buddhism. And it is then (Bo) a lot like the New Age stuff -- except where
they go "hocus pocus/mumbo jumbo" Pirsig is clear, articualate and exact.
So then, is Pirsig attacking a straw man? What do you think,
Diana? It's your deffinition I'm using.
Alternativly to Diana's definition:
Magnus has suggested that SOM=logocentracism. Well that's my word,
but basically it means, the beliefe in A SINGLE, absolute, TRUTH. Now if
that's the case (first I'd wonder why he calls it "SOM" then, since the
term would then be misleading) then Pirsig is considerably more radical
than Diana's Pirsig... but Pirsig still has SOME company w/ the
postmodernist and maybe the existintialist and the pragmatists. Now
they're all proposing different philosophical systems (I'm not saying that
these things =the MoQ), but they have a common "foe."
Personaly I think that Pirsig does throw out logocentracism, but I
don't think that's what he means by "SOM."
Then there's Horse's idea, which I wish I could do more justice,
but a major qualifier for a SOM, in Horse's oppinion, seems to be an
unconscious, UNEXAMINED assumption. Is that right?
Basically you're taking the two qualifiers derived from Diana's
definition and adding a third: That the strong dualism of S and O is
unexamined? (I'm asking.)
But then you, Horse, and Bo both indicate that SOM also includes
"so-called" monisms of materalism and idealism. That is definately
contradictory to Diana's definition.
First, I wonder what the "so-called" means. I hope that after
Theo's and my clarification of the monism-dualism distinction you can see
that a monism is possible.
"All things are Buddha things."
"All is Braman."
"All is *anatman* [w/o Self]."
In other words a Idealist Monism collapses the S-O distinctin to
show that the knower and known are the same thing. I call it "the
know(er/n)." You could call it the undiferentiated, the Tao, Quality, God
or what-have-you.
I want to again re-stress my distinction between S-O consciousness
(or "natural consciousness") and SOM. Does everyone get that? S-O
consciousness is the natural state we live in -- I-This. SOM is a
metaphysical system -- a literary, philosophiocal, intellectual
enterprise. That's why something like Zen Buddhism is a consciousness
changing tool and German Idealism is (at least in this sense) not. Noboby
ever reached Nirvana by reading Fichte or Hegel... or Pirsig!!
That direct, ACTUAL changing of consciouness is what is generaly
called mysticism. The mystic colapses, for himself, the S-O/I-This
distinction, but does not intellectualy or philosophically examine and put
into words, using logic and rigger, what he has done. The metaphysitian,
like Fichte, does not give us that direct experience but insted gives us
an intellectual, logical, framework that is cominicable and (idealy)
persuasive.
I bring this up because I want to ask, which is Pirsig attacking:
S-O consciousness or SOM (a catagory of philosophical theories)?
I'm going to shut-up now, even though one other thing really stuck
out in recent posts. Bo, in one of his last couple of posts implyed that
intellectual patterns = consciousness. I think that's horably off, but
I'll give Bo a chance to re-think. Doesn't Pirsig indicate that
Intellectual patterns = logical, rigerous, systematic thinking, like
science and philosophy. When he talks about the 20th century being the
age of intellect asserting it's domminance over society, I don't think he
means cvonsciousness or sentience, does he? What he means is a system of
proof that is independent of the social status of the individual offering
the proof (a very Enlightenment ideal).
TTFN (ta-ta for now)
Donny
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