Horse, David and squad
Horse wrote:
> If the memories were copied exactly would it not
be the case that an exact duplicate of
> the original _would_ exist in the static sense,
including the consciousness of the
> original - unless the developing human physical
structure carries with it some other form
> of additional information. This makes the
assumption that memories are the carriers of
> information regarding experience.
Right, if we can forget about DNA and just say
suppose we made a perfect biological copy, then
the social and intellectual patterns ought to be
copied perfectly too. If we don't accept that then
we're presuming the self is separate from the body.
> From that point on the experiences of the original
and > the 'copy' would diverge so there would in
fact be two originals.
Or if the original was destroyed at the same instant
as the new one was created then it would be a
perfectly good way to travel.
Horse wrote:
> I would have thought that bringing the body to life
would be a technical problem, not a
> philosophical one, although I could be wrong.
You dismiss it as if it were something that the
"technicians" can easily do. science is in any case a
branch of philosophy, at least it used to be and
certainly ought to be. Secondly the scientists can't
manage it. I know they've done a lot of amazing
things and I was watching some artificial insects on
tv few weeks ago and it was quite unnerving the
way they moved so naturally (and if anyone knows
where I can get one please let me know). But still,
that isn't life. There has to come a point, after
thousands of brilliant minds have tackled a problem
and failed, that you need to ask whether there is
something wrong with our approach. Maybe that
problem can't be solved by science. In which case
the philosophers should consider using a different
tool to understand
it.
For the problem at hand, if we just stick to sci-fi
ideas then the answers are easy enough. If you can
recreate perfect biology you can recreate the self.
The trouble is this assumes something that has
never been done and which there are good reasons
to believe may never be done.
David wrote:
>I have to say that Bruce's conclusion that the self
"lies in the >consciousness" smells like a retreat
back into SOM.
Does it. I didn't mean it to. But I think consciousness
covers all four levels, I wasn't just talking about
intellectual consciousness, I see the awareness of
the body as being just as much a part of
consciousness.
>Troy really nails it. He said, "..copying Dynamic
elements seems to
>me a contradiction of terms ... exact copies of such
things are logical
>chimeras since DQ is not static, and therfore not
copiable". Right on!
>Trying to copy something as dynamic as an
individual's intellectual
>patterns is like trying to hold water in your hands or
capture the wind
>in a box.
Which seems to imply that the self is Dynamic
Quality. Aren't we bringing the subject in the back
door again here? You can copy all the static
patterns but not the Dynamic ones. A copy of my
statics alone wouldn't be me, therefore the essence
of me is in the Dynamic quality.
>In effect our thought experiment asks, where do "I"
reside?
>Presumeably, the reference to DNA was designed
to distinquish a version
>of myself that is purely physical. It seems ask the
classic mind/body
>question, where does my consciousness reside?
But the MOQ dissolves such
>questions and reders them obsolete. To ask that is
the same as asking,
>where does quality reside? Is it in the object or is it
just subjective?
>Sound familiar? The MOQ says that quality resides
in neither subject nor
>object. Quality is more primary than subjects or
objects. Quality
>(values, morals, consciousness) is the groundstuff
of reality. We are
>composed of it. To ask where it resides is
meaningless from a MOQ
>perspective. It was invented to make these
questions go away.
Well you may have got it figured out, but most of
your argument depends on proving that the
questions are SOM (which they are) and therefore
they are wrong (probably right too), but then you
leap to the conclusion that the MOQ solves the
problem. I see all the negative arguments against
the SOM, but what positive arguments ahve you got
for the MOQ's version of the self? Maybe neither is
right.
Bruce
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