ROGER AGREES THAT FREE WILL IS ESSENTIAL TO THIS MONTH'S TOPIC
Rich gets right to the heart of this month's topic when he writes:
>Two sides of our questions present themselves here. One is analyzing
>Knowledge & Moral Action, the other deals with Will & Moral Action.
>Looking for the foundations of any high-quality position, I would first
>suggest that the question of free will in relation to the MOQ be worked out.
>Pirsig says that a person is free to the extent he follows Dynamic Quality,
>but determined to the extent that static patterns of value control his
>actions. This, and many other passages, unequivocably indicate an implied
>"Self" which is distinct both from DQ & sq. It seems to me at the time being
>that this Self is that which is Experience .......
>Let's not forget, that until someone shows better otherwise, the MOQ
>states clearly that there is no "I", nothing, at the primary empirical
>leading edge of reality. Just - somehow - unmediated, undivided,
>undifferentiated, aesthetically continuous Experience. This must be kept in
>mind when considering the ramifications of different possible/preferential
>positions on this matter of Knowledge and Free Will, and the conceptual term
>"righteousness".
The self, the "Little Editor" that Pirsig explains as a collection of
patterns does not exist as a separate centralized entity behind our eyes.
This is a fiction that is abstracted from patterns of experience.
Consciousness is not one Cartesian theatre, it is an emergent fantasy around
a collection of patterns. Daniel Dennett and Minsky have been saying
something similar to this for years. And remember the Zombie article from
December? Science is showing again that Pirsig is right, and that patterns of
value (often conflicting patterns)combine and wrestle over attention and
behavior, and that Free Will is something we make up after the patterns
'decide' what to do. The complexity of pattern interactions certainly is not
deterministic, but Free Will is a tag-along concept to that of an independent
subject.
I believe that Free Will is a platypus of the MOQ. When RMP states that "To
the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's
behavior is free." I think he makes two mistakes. First, he is tossing out
his own definition of "one" as a collection of patterns. Last year, Diana
wrote something along the lines of....When we say "Free Will" we mean
"subject free will." I think she makes a good distinction. On page 229 of
Lila, RMP clarifies that this "autonomous homunculus" this "Cartesian me", is
"completely ridiculous" and an "impossible fiction." But on page 180, this
fiction is cosidered a separate entity that can follow DQ.
I think that to be consistent within the metaphysics, we should clarify that
"independent subjects" is a contradiction in terms. Our behavior can be non
deterministic because reality is non deterministic. Our behavior is
influenced by thousands of competing patterns of all 4 levels, and as such
is not deterministic (complexity theory). But introducing Free Will into the
MOQ only obscures. By the way, when RMP states that only living beings can
follow DQ, I think he contradicts the metaphysics as well.
The second fundamental concern with Pirsig's definition of Free Will is that
it hinges upon "the extent that one follows". Who or what exactly wills or
chooses to follow DQ? Can you choose to follow/not follow it? Or do you
follow/not follow it deterministically? Introducing DQ does not settle the
Free Will controversy, it just adds a new step in the process.
Free will is an SOM term that Pirsig should have thrown out as a fiction
along with the independent self.
So to answer the month's topic, The answer is that "learning about right" is
just one pattern of influence or value that affects behavior. Other patterns
can counteract this pattern and overwhelm it. So the answer is 'NO".
Roger
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
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