Greetings,
BO:
"But don't you see how vulnerable the mind/matter interpretation of MOQ makes it? (For instance: The
MOQ an intellectual pattern in here, compared to the corresponding patterns out there?? I had almost
wanted Struan to home in on it). It's very well in an closed circle where nobody wants to be rude,
but the Quality Metaphysics has a world-shaking ability if its tenets are understood. Think of it;
the first time the dreaded subject-object, mind-matter, inside-outside spell is broken. This is the
essence of the Quality idea, and it must not be compromised."
Let us have a look at that arch-SOM'ist, logical positivist and falsely supposed denier of all
value, A.J. Ayer. I choose logical positivism on the grounds that it is probably the last
philosophical position most people here would think might draw similar conclusions to the MoQ. This
first quotation is merely interesting, it is the second that is so illuminating.
1)
"We are all brought up to understand a form of language in which the perception of physical objects
is treated as the standard case. But this is a contingent fact: it is surely not inconceivable that
there should be a language in which the sense-experiences were described by the use of purely
qualitative expressions which carried no reference to the appearances of physical objects." (The
Problem of Knowledge, 1956, Penguin, pg111)
2)
"Accordingly, it does not greatly matter whether we say that the objects which figure in it (Ayer's
Logical Positivism) are theoretical constructions or whether, in line with common sense, we prefer
to say that they are independently real. The ground for saying that they are not constructions is
that the references to them cannot be eliminated in favour of references to sense-data. The grounds
for saying that they are constructions is that it is only through their relationship to our
sense-experiences that a meaning is given to what we say about them." (Ibid pg132).
You see, Bo, the, "dreaded subject-object, mind-matter, inside-outside spell," has been broken
precisely four million times before. It does not greatly matter to 20th century philosophy whether
there is an, 'out there,' or an, 'in here.' Everybody and their grandmother knows that there is no
either/or situation here and those same people all agree that reality is in the relationship between
observed and observer. Perhaps at one time this was, 'world-shaking,' but now it is little more than
mildly interesting.
Again, Ayer, that recipient of so much misunderstanding on this forum, had this to say - and please
bear in mind quotation 1), lest the language should appear to detract from the point;
"If, for example, this carpet looks blue to me it is because light of a certain wavelength is being
transmitted from it to my eyes, from which impulses pass along the appropriate nerve fibres to my
brain. In a different light . . . it might appear to me a different colour . . . But to infer from
this that we do not perceive things as they really are, that, for example, the physical object
which I refer to as 'this carpet' is not really blue, is to make the assumption that if a thing's
appearing to have a certain property is caused, in part, by outside factors, then it does not really
have it. Stated generally this assumption is obviously false. Thus, part of the cause of the
carpet's now appearing blue to me may be that it has been dyed: but no one would regard this causal
dependence upon a dying machine as a reason for concluding that the carpet was not really blue."
(Ibid pg93-94).
We can see from this that Ayer is happy to define the reality of what the carpet is by the
relationship he holds with it. Thus the carpet IS blue, and, by extension, is a carpet, because, and
only because, of a RELATIONSHIP between two DEPENDENT entities (for want of a better word)
When I read:
PLATT:
> Whatever it’s nature, most seem to agree with Justin Binktmons who
> wrote that there is “… a distinction between Reality and the mind’s
> perception of reality.” As to the question of whether patterns also
> exist “out there,” there’s some disagreement.
<snip>
> Peter Lennox says, “… the patterns we perceive are subjective
> impressions of some other, objective reality.”
I have to say that I hope most don't agree with these sentiments. This is a naive realism which will
find no support anywhere within the philosophical field. Yes, I concede, it may be a, 'man in the
street,' common sense view, but it is one of which any reader of Pirsig, or any modern philosophy,
should be disabused.
When I read:
PLATT:
>"Roger says, “… reality or experience
> exists, but it (is) by no means is independent of us.”
> Horse says, “We are created by reality as much as we create it.”
I have to agree completely. But for goodness sake, nobody in academia is going to be impressed by
such (to them) self-evident, almost platitudinous observations. To describe Pirsig's reiteration of
the ending of the subject/object dichotomy as, 'world-shaking,' is, frankly, risible and these
continued attempts to re-invent Western philosophy as resting on some naive, simplistic, either/or
metaphysical position will gain no credence whatsoever.
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:struan@clara.co.uk>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
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