Hi Jonathan and Squad
You wrote:
> The statement is not an exact quote or paraphrase, but here some exact
> quoutes which reinforce my interpretation:-
>
> From ZAMM (Chapter 20):-
> "... ANY intellectually conceived object is ALWAYS in the past and
> therefore UNREAL. Reality is always the moment of vision BEFORE the
> intellectuallization takes place. THERE IS NO OTHER REALITY. This
> preintellectual reality is what Paedrus felt he had properly indetified
> as Quality. Since all intellectually identifiable things must emerge
> FROM this preintellectual reality, uantity is the PARENT, the SOURCE of
> all subjects and objects."
> [capitalized words emphasized by italics in the original text]
>
> From Lila (Chapter 5)
> "...Whether the stove in the cause of the low quality or whether
> possibly something else is the cause is not yet absolutely certain. It
> is the primary empirical reality from which such things as stoves and
> heat and oaths are later intellectually constructed."
>
> There are probably other relevant passages in the two books. Now I'm
> waiting for Magnus or someone else to say that I've twisted or
> misinterpreted Pirsig's words.
>
Sure, I don't see him saying that this pre-intellectual experience
is
DQ and the post-intellectualized version is SQ. My interpretation
is that the pre-intellectual experience (in the hot stove example)
is biological SQ (BiPoVs), and the post-intellectual version is
intellectual patterns representing those BiPoVs.
What I'm trying to get through is that intellectualized
representations
of something is just as real as that something it represents. It is
completely different, it mustn't be confused with the pattern it
represents, but it is just as real. You've never bought that, right?
Then how come anyone on the Squad like me can engage you
in such energetic conversations, ain't those real? It's not like I
force the keys on your keyboard to suddenly bite your fingers
to make you uncomfortable. It's the intellectual patterns that
makes you feel whatever you feel.
> Sorry Magnus, but the "multidimensional" argument you invented seems to
> confuse things. Pirsig called his 4 pattern types "levels". Levels STACK
> UP along a SINGLE axis (though each level spreads along the
> perpendicular axes).
> If Pirsig had intended a four-dimensional MoQ, he would never have
> described them as levels. Naturally, Magnus is entitled to invent his
> own MoQ, but I regard his "four-dimensional" MoQ as a gross departure
> (far more radical than anything I ever suggested.
>
Actually, the dimension analogy is Bo's. I might have taken it to
the
extreme, but I think it fits very well with Pirsig's description of
the levels.
He describes them in the lines of dependent but completely
different.
About the hierarchical chocolate stuff from sci.phil.meta, I can see
that you have a scientific reductionist approach to this problem.
You think that everything is composed of smaller things that
together makes up the whole, and in a sense, that is correct.
Everything *is* ultimately composed of inorganic patterns. But
it makes no sense describing the taste of chocolate in terms
of molecule percentages or the plot of Lila in terms of dark spots
on the pages of a book.
You mentioned the hot stove example, why do we talk about
biological discomfort and not the inorganic version. According
to, what I perceive as, your reductionist approach, wouldn't it
be more scientific and equally accurate to talk about inorganic
heat causing cells to send pain signals to the brain, which we
in turn interprets as discomfort. Such talk leads to assumptions
about the inorganic version being objective and the biological
version being subjective, which in turn says that we just
interprets the heat as discomfort, there's nothing real about it.
No, we talk about the biological version because it is the most
primary reality we experience on a hot stove. If anyone say
something mean to you, you describe that in terms of the
intellectual patterns he/she said, not in terms of the airwaves
producing the inorganic sound.
I guess you might see everything in a reductionist way and
get away with it, science have been doing it for centuries. But
to expand our knowledge, I think we have to open up our 'minds'
for the MoQ idea that there are other types of real things than
particles and forces of nature. I think, no I bet, it's the only way
we can ever hope to explain this month's topic.
> Organize THEMSELVES? Why the extra word Magnus? I might have said
> "become organized", but Magnus is displaying an obsession with who DOES
> the organizing, and WHOM is the object of that organization. What sort
> of metaphysics needs that distinction Magnus?
>
The distinction is necessary to point out that each level is only
involved in
quality events of its own level. The atoms involved in the hot stove
example
are not concerned with the biological discomfort, the are acting
according
to their morality, what's good for them, the forces of nature.
> JONATHAN
> >> [intellect] seems to be off to the side -
> >> looking across. It's an abstraction of the [other] 3 levels
> >> [that] together constitute MATTER. They are
> >> the
> >> OBJECT for Intellect which sits as MIND and SUBJECT. To
> >> regard this division as a primary metaphysical division is SOM.
> >
> >You're doing it again! You squeeze four dimensions into two. Have
> >you ever seen a four-dimensional cube?
>
> No, I started with Pirsig's 4 levels stacked along ONE-dimension, and I
> have now moved Intellect along a SECOND sideways dimension. Had this
> been a discussion among the followers of Magnus Berg, perhaps his
> objection might be valid.
>
I guess it's a step forward, you have at least realized that
intellectual
patterns are different from the rest. One down, three to go.
> >> But, you will note that in the 3-tier scheme, Intellect is excluded
> as a
> >> level because it has no empirical reality.
> >
> >No empirical reality???
> >
>
> Intellect is not directly accessible via the 5 senses, the normal
> definition of empiricism (Pirsig's comments in Chapter 8 of Lila
> notwithstanding).
>
I don't have Lila here so I don't know which comment you refer
to but of course I see that intellect is not directly accessible
via the 5 senses. That is part of the MoQ extension of reality.
It says that intellectual patterns is also real. I see that I'm
repeating myself over and over again but you force me to.
> >First, what are you reading right now? It's probably characters formed
> on
> >a screen by illuminating it in a certain pattern. We can describe the
> >inorganic representation of what you see with physics, but you're not
> >interested in that, you're interested (I hope :) in the intellectual
> >patterns I communicate to you using those inorganic patterns.
> >
>
> But all patterns are intellectualizations. If you read my previous post
> more carefully, you will see that I can regard your words as Social
> pattern - which allow us to SHARE (social word) a COMMON (social word)
> world-view.
>
Yeah, and I can regard any intellectual pattern as any kind of
pattern
because they're all dependent on lower levels.
> Correction. Diana's exact words were:-
> "*I* [my emphasis] keep getting into circles of reasoning that never
> reach a conclusion."
>
> Magnus changed this to "*you* keep getting into circles ..."
> Does this reflect a lack of modesty? Probably, since Magnus implies that
> it is *he* who has the "correct view of the levels".
>
I never claimed to be modest but since you ask, I meant "you" as in
me, you, anyone.
> I agree with Diana that *we* (at least Diana and myself) tend to reason
> in circles until we are shaken out of it by "pattern breakers". That to
> me is the whole point of this discussion group. Otherwise, I could
> figure it out all on my own!
>
Great! So, let me try to break your patterns and I trust you'll have
a go at mine.
Magnus
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