Greetings,
DAVID:
For the purposes of clarification:
My analysis did describe mysticism 'per se' and not the mystical experience. In reading it again I
fail to see your objection David. Equally I did not say that mysticism IS a subset of materialism, I
said that in MoQ terms there is no problem in seeing it that way, which is a completely different
thing. Thirdly Pirsig does not seek to eliminate matter. "Matter is contained in static intellectual
patterns," (Lila pg 185 Black Swan edition 1991). Pirsig contends that both the materialist and
idealist schools are correct but they are subsumed within an overall Quality. There is no mileage in
refuting matter within ANY METAPHYSICS never mind just the MoQ, except in a very trivial sense (as I
described in my previous posting). Lastly, you are right to say that Pirsig often explicitly
compares the MoQ to mysticism, but, as I have never heard of anything being effectively compared to
itself, I would suggest that this detracts from your thesis rather than adds to it.
BO:
I'm not sure what happened with 'sci.phil.meta,' either I missed your reply or you missed mine. Who
knows?
Your summation of materialism and idealism is close to mine but with important differences. Idealism
does not claim that matter is an illusion (at least no more than the MoQ does) and materialism does
not claim that mind is an illusion (ditto) and equally neither has to see itself as primary if
primary is understood in the temporal sense. It is consistent (though not necessary and also quite
unlikely) to claim that they arose together. If primary is understood in the sense of 'most
important' then the use of the word in this context is still debatable - for example, a materialist
might think mind more important in the sense that if he didn't have one then he couldn't understand
matter.
The important point about any non-trivial and coherent materialism is that matter can exist on its
own while mind must also have a physical aspect. In other words every phenomena MUST have a physical
aspect but in addition MAY have a mental aspect. A coherent idealism must hold the reverse to be
true otherwise it can easily be shown to be false and/or trivial. As an example, a materialist would
claim that an emotion such as love (no I must resist) IS a mental phenomena but that it cannot exist
without its physical side, id est, the physical brain.
This is entirely consistent with the more hierarchical MoQ in the sense that the it sees more
evolved patterns of value as requiring support from the lower levels. Without the hard disk for
example this e-mail would not exist. There is therefore no conflict between a coherent materialism
(as Pirsig states quite clearly) and the MoQ.
Mysticism can be seen as a subset of materialism in the sense that it is an approach to
understanding which can be accounted for as a mental event dependant upon a material body. It is
also a method by which further understanding of the material world can be gained, as with
superstring theory, and so can be incorporated within the materialist world view. I merely wanted to
point out that they are not oppositional as some people claim them to be. You are right Bo to point
out that mysticism and idealism are not synonymous as my summation was in some danger of implying.
KEN:
I have no argument with you Ken and agree with the thrust of your thinking. An explanation of
mysticism using the 'family resemblances' method is the only way to go about such things because, as
you rightly point out, each mystic will have his/her own impressions of what mysticism is and I
would add that he/she will find it difficult to communicate them in an unmystical way without
committing a solecism. The solution would seem to be, at the start of a conversation with a mystic,
to present your own explanation of mysticism and invite them to agree with it. If they don't then it
would seem sensible to require them to furnish you with an alternative definition for you to
address. As with most religious people you will soon find that they either continually shift the
ground thereafter (in which case you are quite within your rights to ask them to think their
position through properly before you next respond) or their position collapses due to the
limitations of language (from their point of view) or the limitations in their ability to express
themselves (probably your and my point of view). This is not a criticism of the value of mysticism,
merely a recognition of the tension between the experiential aspect of humanity and analytical
linguistics. Hence (I presume) Pirsig's use of rhetoric and the novel form, interdigitating analogy
and storyline with empiricism and analysis.
I'm pleased that my earlier explanation was of use to you Ken and thank you for your thanks, and
thanks to others for their welcome back.
(KEN: Pirsig talks about Quality being empirical about a page into chapter 8 of Lila, if I remember
correctly.)
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
<mailto:struan@clara.net>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch - 'Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals')
homepage - http://www.moq.org
queries - mailto:moq@moq.org
unsubscribe - mailto:majordomo@moq.org with UNSUBSCRIBE MOQ_DISCUSS in
body of email
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:02:48 BST