JOHN:
To now move in the reverse direction, is it not at least possible that there
may be some 'things' which we do experience as existing, but function like
the word 'the' as a component of our ordering of experience, without value?
If so, it seems a fundamental statement of Pirsig's metaphysics is flawed.
To
me it seems the word "the" is itself sufficient refutation. It may well be
that a whole class of mathematical and logical terms, for example, are of
this type. Or can you explain for me how I might distinguish the values of
seventeen and eighteen respectively?
AVID:
John I think who you are arguing with is David Hume and not with Pirsig.
Hume argues this 1:1 ratio between experience and objects in the world. As
part of SOM Hume diverts the attention from what is to what is experienced.
You however
A. put you experiencer before the experienced, which is not MoQ anymore.
B. you ask for the experienced to be direct [a word, a number, a chair], and
this goes well with SOM [the existence of objects is standing alone], but
not with MoQ [the existence of things is quality dependant]. I know it
sounds strange at first, but knowing the cultural immune system, we have to
observe it like lightening a candle in a strong wind.
SPQ [static pattern of quality] is something that is theory dependant as
well as quality dependent.
It reminds me that Popper gave his pupils an exercise to view a pencil
scientifically. They couldn't. They needed a theory.
"the" "17" "+" are entities meaningful [and experimental only in a
theoretical context. Your ability to ACT in relation to a theory allows you
experience the action [as value] and the results [as value].
ROGER:
Seventeen only exists in relation to the other numbers that we have agreed
within our culture. In the same sense, physics has found that the basic
forces that compose 'matter' are similarly only interrelationships. What
you
see as some kind of flaw is what I see as the strength of the MOQ.
Avid:
It is enlightening to see that theoretical beings [as part of a SPQ] such as
"matter" seem almost natural to us ONCE WE ACCEPT THEIR UNDERLYING THEORY.
If we go back to Lange [In his "History of Materialism"], we can see that
Lange meant his "matter" to be an "Idealistic term", something as
experincable weak as "The" or as "17".
It took some dogmatic thinking of the late 19 century and the beginning of
ours to make the term 'matter' experiencable, forgetting that there is no
'matter' without the theory it is based on.
and don't forget to be gentle
Avid
icq 6598359
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