Re: MD On Faith

From: Mark Steven Heyman (markheyman@infoproconsulting.com)
Date: Wed Oct 27 2004 - 05:01:43 BST

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    Hi Erin,
    It's true that you have direct access to your own experiences, but
    not to the experiences of others. You know when you are thirsty, but
    you can't be sure that someone else is thirsty just because they say
    so. Rational empiricism does not claim that everything anyone SAYS
    they've experienced must be true. People make mistakes; people are
    deceived; people lie.

    So, say, when someone tells you they've witnessed a resurrection,
    this doesn't mean that it's possible to bring dead people back to
    life, and a rational empiricist philosophy is by no means committed
    to such an idea. The report of a resurrection does not constitute
    empirical evidence of a resurrection. Rather, it might be a starting
    point for further rational and empirical investigation, which would
    include the real empirical evidence of of what happens to human
    bodies after death, and the logical argument, supported by empirical
    evidence, that its impossible to reactivate a human brain after the
    brain has physically disintegrated.

    Let me just leave it here for now, and see what you think.

    Best,
    Mark Steven Heyman (msh)
    --
    InfoPro Consulting - The Professional Information Processors
    Custom Software Solutions for Windows, PDAs, and the Web Since 1983
    Web Site: http://www.infoproconsulting.com

    "Thought is only a flash between two long nights, but this flash is
    everything." -- Henri Poincare'

    On 26 Oct 2004 at 18:20, Erin wrote:
    Simon Magson <twix_570@hotmail.com> wrote:
        ERIN: >You used the example of being thirsty and drinking (drinking
        is
    >observable, your being thirsty isn't
        
        SM: Everybody knows when they are thirsty, it is completely
        observable by
        anyone.
        ERIN: I would say everyone experiences thirst. It is not observable
        though. For example, a young kid at a party is he drinking because
        he is thirsty or from peer pressure, I don't know because I can not
        observe his thirst.
    SM: Philosophy should start with these simple observations and not
    some
    physiological theory resulting from a chain of deductions. Thirst,
    like
    hunger, pain, heavy, light, hard, soft are all present and immediate
    in the
    real world from which we develop our rhetoric and start
    philosophising.
    ERIN: again the difference one really is observable and the other is
    reasoned about. It is a reasonable assumption that when somebody
    drinks he it is because he is experiencing thirst. (but i still
    think it is the drinking that is being observed not the thirst)

    ERIN: >The actions that stem from values are observable but values
    are not so
    >don't feel comfortable with "value is empirical" statement.

    SM: The lack of comfort you are describing is itself an empirical
    value. It
    seems you have been conditioned to perceive value in, and ascribe
    existence
    to, only that which you can see.

    ERIN: The lack of comfort is when a definition is stretched so far
    that it is being used in situations that isalmost theopposite of
    the meaning and so the word loses all meaning. NO, I am not
    conditioned to perceive value to only what I can see, I am
    "conditioned" to using the dictionary meanings and applyingthe word
    empirical to which is observable (not only see, but hear, touch,
    taste, etc. JUST SO IT ISOBSERVABLE). I do experience values that
    are not observable but ***I*** don't label them as "empirical",

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