From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Sun Jan 23 2005 - 20:47:21 GMT
Hi Sam
Sam said:
The key question is whether the language of 'experience' - whether pure
or not - is not also something which is (consciously or unconsciously)
relying upon SOM assumptions. That is, when Pirsig uses the language of
empiricism, is he able to avoid the 'inheritance' that would otherwise
come his way through the feeding in to his system from Eastern thought
(and native american, presumably)? So specifically, the question I most
want to ask is, when Pirsig says "The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes
to what is called empiricism. It claims that all legitimate human
knowledge arises from the senses or by thinking about what the senses
provide" how does he avoid all the baggage that has historically gone
with use of language like 'empiricism', 'legitimate human knowledge',
'the senses'? The word "experience", in particular, is put to a very
specific philosophical use in the Western empirical tradition, and if
Pirsig is trying to do something _different_ with it, then he needs to
be careful about saying "The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to what
is called empiricism." It just seems to me that there is a very strong
_prima facie_ case to say that he's doing exactly what William James was
trying to do, just with more Zen (and much better novels).
Paul:
I'm spending a lot of time away from home at the moment so here is a
quick response to your question in case I can't get back to you for a
while.
With respect to your question, "Is Pirsig doing something different with
"experience" than the Western empirical tradition?" These statements
come to mind:
"The Metaphysics of Quality says pure experience is value. Experience
which is not valued is not experienced. The two are the same." [LILA
p418]
"[T]he low value that can be derived from sitting on a hot stove is
obviously an experience EVEN THOUGH IT IS NOT AN OBJECT and EVEN THOUGH
IT IS NOT SUBJECTIVE." [LILA p113, my caps]
"I think the trouble is with the word, "experience." It is...commonly
used as a subject-object relationship. This relationship is usually
considered the basis of philosophic empiricism and experimental
scientific knowledge.
In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is between a
preexisting object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no pre-existing
subject or object....So in the MOQ experience comes first, everything
else comes later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to scientific
empiricism, which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects, is not
really so pure." [LILA'S CHILD p548]
So, evidently Pirsig thinks he's doing something different to the
western empiricist tradition (i.e. value is empirical experience, which
SOM denies, and is neither subjective nor objective, which SOM denies)
and is aware of the problems with the term. It may be of interest to you
that I recently received this response to a question about experience in
the MOQ. My question was: In the MOQ, is experience Dynamic Quality,
static quality, or both?
----------------------------------------------------
Pirsig: "Both, but it's also an SOM word that implies an experiencer and
thing experienced, so it's not the best word to use within the MOQ."
----------------------------------------------------
Personally, I don't see any problems as long as the use of the term is
qualified. Whatever else we may speculate on, I think one has to accept
that something is occurring and experience seems to me to be a good word
for it. Of course, this is the very thing you are questioning.
I also asked about the statement in LILA that you quote above. Here is
the exchange:
-----------------------------------------------------
Paul: If empirical experience begins with the senses, and the senses are
biological patterns, are biological patterns necessary for empirical
experience? If so, does this contradict the MOQ statement that nothing
exists prior to experience?
Pirsig: In the MOQ empirical experience begins with Quality which
generates intellectual patterns. One of these intellectual patterns is
named 'senses,' but this pattern is derived from the study of anatomy
and is not primary in the actual empirical process.
Paul: The only issue I see is with statements such as: "The Metaphysics
of Quality subscribes to what is called empiricism. It claims that all
legitimate human knowledge arises from the senses or by thinking about
what the senses provide." This seems to reveal a basic assumption that
senses are primary in the actual empirical process.
Pirsig: The MOQ agrees that the senses are primary in an anatomical
explanation of [the] empirical process. So the statement in Lila seems
correct to me. But at the cutting edge of the actual Dynamic empirical
moment these anatomical explanations are nowhere to be found.
-----------------------------------------------------
So, as with Northrop, according to the MOQ the primary empirical
process, or experience, is ineffable. Strictly speaking, the pure
empiricist is the philosophic mystic, but neither denies that experience
occurs. The theories we build up about this experience are always part
of the static patterns of intellect. The MOQ categorises itself as a
static intellectual pattern and in this respect, i.e., from a static
point of view, it agrees with the anatomical explanation of sense
experience.
Finally, with respect to the MOQ statement that "all legitimate human
knowledge arises from the senses," I think that this is contrasting
empiricism with rationalism which, as I'm sure you know, privileges the
use of reason over experience as the basis for legitimate knowledge.
Regards
Paul
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