From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Fri Jan 28 2005 - 19:18:15 GMT
Hi Paul (and Matt, DMB, anyone listening in)
> With respect to your question, "Is Pirsig doing something different with
> "experience" than the Western empirical tradition?" These statements
> come to mind:
>
> "The Metaphysics of Quality says pure experience is value. Experience
> which is not valued is not experienced. The two are the same." [LILA
> p418]
Yes, this is 'redescription'- what was 'experience' is now 'value', and
"The two are the same" (and as value is Quality, presumably experience is
Quality?). Does the redescription leave functional identity intact? In other
words, is the 'mechanics' of what is done with 'experience' the same as what
is done with 'value' - with the obvious difference that 'value' includes
more? In other words, is Pirsig still using 'value' in the way that James
used 'experience' (and the various people before James but after Locke). I
suspect he does - but I need to think more about it to show how.
> So, evidently Pirsig thinks he's doing something different to the
> western empiricist tradition (i.e. value is empirical experience, which
> SOM denies, and is neither subjective nor objective, which SOM denies)
> and is aware of the problems with the term.
Let me put the question like this: is the MoQ a 'paradigm shift' compared to
previous empiricisms, or is it more a development like 'normal science', so
whilst it represents a development and a change, it's still working on the
same railway tracks as what has gone before. The strong impression that I'm
left with is that - in a number of identifiable ways - Pirsig is still
working within a Jamesian framework. I'm thinking specifically of: 1. a
rhetoric of foundationalism (eg when he talks about developing a metaphysics
which includes value in a way that scientists can't reject; this exactly
parallels James, and Schleiermacher, so it seems); 2. the understanding of
mysticism (as something rare and privileged); 3. the role of mysticism
within the MoQ (as providing an indubitable starting point); 4. the rhetoric
of empiricism, which we've talked about, which include some fairly explicit
references and borrowings, around the notions of pure experience and DQ.
So when you say:
> So, as with Northrop, according to the MOQ the primary empirical
> process, or experience, is ineffable. Strictly speaking, the pure
> empiricist is the philosophic mystic, but neither denies that experience
> occurs. The theories we build up about this experience are always part
> of the static patterns of intellect. The MOQ categorises itself as a
> static intellectual pattern and in this respect, i.e., from a static
> point of view, it agrees with the anatomical explanation of sense
> experience.
>
> Finally, with respect to the MOQ statement that "all legitimate human
> knowledge arises from the senses," I think that this is contrasting
> empiricism with rationalism which, as I'm sure you know, privileges the
> use of reason over experience as the basis for legitimate knowledge.
I think: fine, great, I agree with all of this as a characterisation of what
Pirsig is trying to do. I then say: this is a development within the
Jamesian strand, which shares significant structural presuppositions, and,
most importantly, though this is the bit I've talked about least, I think
those very presuppositions are dismantled by Wittgenstein, amongst others.
The whole context within which what you say above makes sense is one where
knowledge is seen to be "at stake", and so as a move within this game, a
starting point is established (the indubitability of Quality) and a
metaphysics and epistemology is then built up from that starting point.
I think the problem which I struggle with - and which Matt clearly also
struggles with - is, as he pointed out, the rhetoric of 'the best philosophy
I know' or the hyperbolic claims of Pirsig overthrowing Western philosophy.
I just don't think that holds up, but to demonstrate that (especially in
this forum) seems a Sisyphean task. If you compare the MoQ to Wittgenstein's
reconceiving of philosophy, for example, then the continuities between the
MoQ and other twentieth century philosophies are much more strongly apparent
than the discontinuities. Which isn't to say that Pirsig isn't doing high
Quality work, and like MSH I particularly find the differentiation of the
levels helpful, it is to deny, however, that his more high-blown rhetorical
claims on behalf of the MoQ can be substantiated.
Regards
Sam
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