MD Contradictions

From: Ant McWatt (antmcwatt@hotmail.co.uk)
Date: Wed Apr 06 2005 - 02:38:58 BST

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    Matt,

    Firstly, thanks for explaining what you meant by “natural kind” in the
    philosophical context. I have now gone through your “Philosophology” essay
    and made various comments. I highly doubt anything I’ve written will
    surprise you but maybe one or two comments will be of use.

    I think the “Philosophology” paper is a well written one though it is
    essentially misleading and disingenuous. This is because it tends to
    replace Pirsig’s real views about the philosophy-philosophology distinction
    with a more extreme anti-academic strawman which is easier to knock down.
    This strawman is largely created by the selective editing of the Pirsig’s
    quotes used throughout this essay to make him appear more extreme. For
    instance, Pirsig didn’t leave Benares University just because he was tired
    of the professor “blithely expounding on the illusory nature of the world”
    (as you state in your paper) but rather because of the professor’s more
    controversial statement that the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
    Nagasaki (and the carnage they created) was illusory. The full quote from
    ZMM (Chapter 12) reads:

    “But one day in the classroom the professor of philosophy was blithely
    expounding on the illusory nature of the world for what seemed the fiftieth
    time and Phædrus raised his hand and asked coldly if it was believed that
    the atomic bombs that had dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were illusory.
    The professor smiled and said yes. That was the end of the exchange.”

    “Within the traditions of Indian philosophy that answer may have been
    correct, but for Phædrus and for anyone else who reads newspapers regularly
    and is concerned with such things as mass destruction of human beings that
    answer was hopelessly inadequate. He left the classroom, left India and gave
    up.”

    The quotes from Chapter 26 of LILA (where Pirsig introduces the
    philosophy-philosophology distinction) suffer especially heavily from this
    Stalinist re-editing. I don’t know why you bothered to do this as anyone
    referring to LILA while reading your essay (as I did) would quickly see this
    re-editing and realise that your portrayal of Pirsig was highly distorted.

    As regards your contention that Pirsig requires “an ahistorical sense (i.e.
    “natural kind”) of philosophy” to maintain his philosophy-philosophology
    distinction the philosophical tradition of the Far East indicates that the
    study of the Western canon is not a necessary pre-requisite to construct an
    analysis of the perennial problems of philosophy (such as the nature of the
    self). Moreover, these problems can arise from the contemplation of nature,
    the general human condition and what the arts and modern sciences indicate.
    The latter can also suffice as the indicators for showing when philosophical
    problems have been solved (as in the evidence provided by quantum mechanics
    regarding the Buddhist notion of the self) without requiring reference to
    traditional Western philosophy.

    Tellingly, you also provide evidence yourself in (footnote 15 of) the
    “Philosophology” essay that prior study of traditional Western philosophers
    can actually hinder (rather than help) a student’s philosophical
    development:

    -------------------------------------------------------

    David Hall provides anecdotal evidence from his own classroom experience in
    teaching Rorty's later philosophy. “I was truly surprised to discover how
    accessible these [later] essays turned out to be to my students, many of
    whom were taking their first course in philosophy. I believe that this was
    so in part because the philosophically naïve are less likely to suffer from
    what Richard Bernstein calls ‘Cartesian Anxiety….' Ironically, therefore,
    the ‘nonphilosophical' … will find Rorty's message somewhat easier to
    grasp.” (Hall, “Richard Rorty”, p. 4)

    “Cartesian Anxiety” is Bernstein's name for the fear one experiences when
    faced with this “grand and seductive Either/Or” situation: “Either there is
    some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we
    cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with
    intellectual and moral chaos.” (Bernstein, “Beyond Objectivism and
    Relativism”, p. 18) This is the type of fear one might have after
    experiencing something analogous to the 17th Century's Skeptical Crisis or
    after reading [Descartes’] “Discourse on Method”.

    -------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the philosopher-philosophology distinction is certainly not
    original with Pirsig nor is it a particularly new one. For instance, the
    distinction is also noted by J.M. Spier on page one of “An Introduction to
    Christian Philosophy” (originally published in 1954):

    ‘Before we can enter into an examination of the philosophical system before
    us, we must answer the question: “What is philosophy?” The word philosophy
    is commonly employed in a dual sense. It can denote the result of
    philosophic activity, and it is in this sense that one speaks of the
    philosophy of Plato and Kant. In this case one refers to their
    philosophical system, which still exists though these men have long since
    ceased to be active philosophically [i.e. philosophology]. Philosophy can
    also designate philosophic activity itself, the act of philosophizing, which
    is a human activity bound to our temporal life. We shall employ the term in
    its second sense.’

    The fact this is on page one of Spier's book indicates that he thought the
    philosopher-philosophologist distinction was an important one to make.
    Moreover, I highly doubt that he was the first philosopher to make this
    distinction.

    Finally, though you don’t mention this, I guess the underlying reason that
    you are so concerned with the philosopher-philosophologist distinction is
    because Rorty essentially perceives himself as being a philosophologist.
    For instance, note this remark of Rorty’s from this 1995 interview:

    “I don't think I have any original ideas. I think that all I do is pick up
    bits of Derrida and bits of Dewey and put them next to each other and bits
    of Davidson and bits of Wittgenstein and stuff like that. It's just a talent
    for bricolage, rather than any originality. If you don't have an original
    mind, you comment on people who do.”

    “A Talent for Bricolage: An Interview with Richard Rorty” by Joshua Knobe,
    “The Dualist”, Issue 2, 1995, pp.56-71

    (also found at: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/rorty03.htm)

    I suppose therefore that you think the philosopher-philosophologist
    distinction must be dismantled to prevent Rorty (as a philosophologist)
    being considered as being in a derivative and secondary class to Robert
    Pirsig and other (original) philosophers. However, isn’t your project of
    trying to undermine the philosopher-philosophologist distinction rather
    inane as you can’t really believe that Rorty is as unoriginal as he might
    modestly seem to claim?

    Best wishes,

    Anthony.

    www.anthonymcwatt.co.uk

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