From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Mon May 02 2005 - 19:35:51 BST
Hi Platt:
I haven't forgotten you; but your current preoccupation with consciousness
levels and pre-semiotic arguments is beyond the scope of my thesis, as well
as my understanding, so I contribute anything meaningful to those
discussions.
However, I was intrigued by your latest perspective on Quality relative to
my impression that Pirsig had posited a "universal" Quality:
> You have misinterpreted Pirsig's premise. He doesn't say Quality exists
> independently of conscious sensibility. He says Quality is experience,
> meaning that valuistic judgment are intrinsic to experience, i.e. values
> are not something separate from conscious sensibility as you suggest.
If this is Pirsig's actual position (I haven't seen it stated this way),
then I stand corrected. That would of course make Experience = Quality the
primary existential reality. It would also support Ian's "triplet" concept:
"subject-experience-object".
(You should check the note I've just dashed off to Ian, which discusses my
objections to that concept.)
I reviewed the entire Vitzthum speech and noted with interest his statement
of the mystery of proprietary consciousness which he is confident will
eventually be "reducible" by scientific materialism:
"From a countless plethora of dumb, electrical relay switches and settings
emerges the amazing phenomenon we call human consciousness and
intentionality -- the ability to think about things, to feel a range of
emotions, and to realize one's self as a subjective entity distinct from the
rest of the world.
"How can this happen? How can something oblivious of the world become
conscious of the world? Though theoretical neuroscience is still in its
infancy, furiously boiling with new ideas, some likely answers are emerging
from the steam. One promising theory is that networks of neurons in the
brain consist of subsidiary groups of neurons or even individual neurons
that serve as the axes of a multi-dimensional system of coordinates that can
mathematically translate one kind of value to another kind of value."
It just goes to show that there's nothing more self-serving to the scientist
than coming up with a "mechanized" concept -- even if the subject is human
consciousness!
I do think you are doing a disservice to Mr. Pirsig, though, by quoting an
atheistic materialist perspective of reality to support the credibility of
his MoQ. For me, it places the level of Quality at a "new low".
> So for me and some others, Pirsig's thesis is highly credible, or, to use
> his vernacular, "a high quality intellectual pattern."
I'll be interested in your comments on my latest post to Ian.
Essentially yours,
Ham
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