Re: MD Mysticism and the appearance/reality distinction

From: Matt the Enraged Endorphin (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Wed Apr 09 2003 - 04:51:40 BST

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    Scott,

    I'm with you on, "Physicalists are betting one way, while I am betting
    another, and this choice of bet does affect one's actions," but not, "the
    only program that I can see resulting from taking the physicalist bet is to
    urge one on to actually look for that description of 'our actions in
    micro-structural terms', which is to say, finding that reduction of the one
    language to the other." I don't see why urging to look for
    micro-structural terms means reducing macro-structural terms to
    micro. Physiologists don't have to think that what they are finding out is
    how things really work, they can be thought of as simply doing what
    physiologists do. As far as I can see, Rorty and Davidson see them as two
    different language games, one or the other of which may someday become
    obsolete, depending on whose side of the bet history chooses (though, as
    Rorty thinks, neither side will ever become completely obsolete).

    The other thing I would add is that neither Rorty or Davidson are
    empiricists. They don't take "non-empirical" claims as being necessarily
    metaphysical. In the language game that Rorty and Davidson play, there is
    a phenomena, a table or mind, and then we can generate descriptions of that
    causal impression. All of those descriptions we generate are descriptions
    of the same phenomena. But none of these descriptions is the "right" or
    "true" description. This is because we've already discarded the
    appearance/reality distinction. All of the descriptions are internal to
    the language games they are contained in, the background assumptions from
    which they gain meaning. The descriptions do not "get at" the phenomena in
    question. They are merely ways in which we cope with the phenomena. If
    this is an appearance of an appearance/reality distinction, then I suggest
    that the reality is that this appearance is a trivial occurence, one that
    is, by pragmatist lights, philosophically uninteresting, just as the
    pragmatic distinction between the ego (which is in some circles a
    disputable concept) and the tiger is uninteresting, because the pertinent
    claim, that this is how reality _really_ is, doesn't exist.

    Matt

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