Re: MD What is a living being?

From: Paul Turner (
Date: Sun Apr 27 2003 - 10:08:41 BST

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    Hi Wim

    You wrote

    'The problem is, that 'Lila' contains BOTH extremely
    simplified versions of Pirsig's MoQ, that can
    rhetorically convince people mired in Subject-Object
    Thinking AND more sophisticated versions. You've got
    to find out for yourself which is which.'

    I'm not sure which 'version of Pirsig's MoQ' I'm
    reading then! I suspect it's the simplified one?

    You wrote:

    '> My solution is to avoid saying that any'thing'
    > (including a living being)
    > 'consists of' static patterns of value. Naming
    > things depends on a
    > metaphysical division of our experience in subjects
    > and objects.'

    I would argue that naming things merely depends on
    making a metaphysical division of any kind. To me the
    MoQ is SDM, Static-Dynamic Metaphysics. A different
    (and better!) primary division of the same empirical

    Pirsig: 'There already is a metaphysics of Quality. A
    subject-object metaphysics is in fact a metaphysics in
    which the first division of Quality - the first slice
    of undivided experience - is into subjects and
    objects.' Ch 9

    You wrote:

    > name and objects are named. Names (commonly used to
    > refer to objects) can
    > also be used to refer to static patterns of value,
    > but we should try to
    > avoid confusing objects and static patterns of
    > value.'

    Agreed, the term static patterns of value reminds us
    of the primacy of value as the empirical experience of
    reality from which 'objects' are later derived.

    But if only 'subjects' name things and 'subjects' are
    only a metaphysical derivation from SOM, things can't
    be named within a MoQ as there is nothing derived to
    do so which makes static patterns of value (which are
    more metaphysically derived names ascribed to
    experiences) a violation of the MoQ from which they
    are derived.

    You wrote:
    '> A simplified MoQ reifies all patterns of value into
    > objects and categorizes
    > all objects as if they were patterns of value. In
    > this picture fits a
    > statement that apart from these objects (who 'can't
    > by themselves perceive
    > or adjust to DQ') there are subjects (living
    > beings), who can.'

    I don't see that, Lila is described by Pirsig as a
    cohesion of static patterns of Quality, why does this
    necessarily imply she is a subject or an object?

    You wrote:

    '> A more sophisticated MoQ denies the metaphysical
    > division of experience in
    > subjects and objects. Our experience (which is not a
    > distinguishable 'thing'
    > but the whole) consists of static patterns of value
    > (static quality) plus
    > the value of their progress/evolution (dynamic
    > quality).'

    Yes, we experience Quality, which is later
    metaphysically divided into unpatterned Dynamic value
    and static patterns of value. Is this what you mean?

    You wrote:

    'DQ is not
    > something 'objective'
    > which can be perceived of adjusted to by 'subjects'.
    > It just is.'

    Does perception have to be of an 'object'? Can a
    perception not be a 'dim apprehension'?




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