From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Tue Aug 19 2003 - 03:58:56 BST
Matt,
> Matt:
> We've tangled many times on this issue and I'm very appreciative of your
learning and your responses. But everytime you call materialism or
physicalism "dogmatic" I'm reminded of the Marxist who calls everything else
but his own beliefs ideology. If a philosophical position can be dogmatic,
then all philospohical positions are dogmatic. The difference would then be
between good dogma and bad dogma, good ideology and bad ideology. But
that's not what people generally mean, so here's the deal: I don't think
philosophical positions can be dogmatic. Only people can be dogmatic. And
usually only people in the flesh, talking to you. Its hard for an essay to
be dogmatic because, if the person is arguing a position, then it would be
kind of silly for her at the end of the piece to say, "But, actually, I've
been convinced by the other side." Well, why didn't you argue the other
side then?
I agree that we are all dogmatic, and in the past I have stated what my
dogmata are (though I think I've raised the game a notch by insisting that
the only good dogmata are not understandable -- like "Quality is
fundamental"). I tend to emphasize materialists' dogma, because of a
tendency of them to think that they have -- via science -- moved past it.
They are, I think, more likely to be unconscious of when they put forth a
position without being conscious of their underlying dogma. or of assuming
that it doesn't need defending. My favorite example of this is Dennett's
saying that Darwinism, because it provides an explanation of evolution
without invoking purpose gives one reason to believe in materialism. What he
ignores is that it is materialism that leads him to think that (the
appearance of) purpose needs to be explained in terms of matter. Why not the
other way around?
>
> As far as I can tell, you think the "2000 years with nothing to show"
argument doesn't wash for dogmatic reasons.
I think it because I see within the metaphysical line a philosophy that
explains more than others, and so I accept its dogma (its fundamental
principles). I reject other dogmata because I see logical problems with
them, or things they can't explain that my dogma can. (Well, there are
problems with the word "explain", but nevermind).
[Matt:] You've found your answer, in mysticism, and nobody else is ready
for it, which is what people also say about Pirsig. I think this is
asanine. (Yeah, yeah, I know. I've been using that word a lot. But the
Society for Better Vocabularies is paying me $1 everytime I use it. I don't
see the point. I mean, if they really wanted to encourage better, more
expansive vocabularies wouldn't they want me to use as many different words
as possible? All I'm doing is encouraging people to use this one word. Now
that's asanine.) Its not asanine that you're following a path of mysticism,
or people are Pirsigian. What's asanine is that you call materialists
dogmatic because they don't agree with you.
Except that I call myself dogmatic as well. I bring in the word "dogmatic"
when I see someone saying that something is true, or some method is better
than another because his or her dogma requires it, without acknowledging
that it is required.
[Matt:] The problem I've tried focusing on in our debates is that the
materialist and the mystic will _never_ convince the other by using
argumentation because the materialist and
> the mystic do not hold enough of the relevant premises (i.e. beliefs) in
common. They both beg the question over the other.
True, as long as one is referring to the interpretation of a common set of
data. What gets the mystical philosopher's goat (not the mystic, who is
above all this nasty squabbling :-) is having the corpus of reports of
mystical and religious and paranormal experience ignored. I do not mean to
imply that it is all or even mostly valid as common data, but there comes a
point where trying to dismiss it all as hallucination or delusion or fraud
becomes a delusion in itself.
>
[Matt:]> I've never seen much force in your "these guys are materialists,
and *therefore* reject appearance/reality distinctions and metaphysics"
criticism. Are you saying that if they were only coincidently materialists
you would agree with them?
Are you saying that if they weren't materialists and were rather idealists
you would agree with them? All I've got in reply is What does it matter how
these guys biographically came to their rejection of metaphysics? They
rejected it didn't they?
I am saying that if I have no experience of God, but think that God is real,
then I have to make an appearance/reality distinction. If I want to explain
why God is real and yet I have no experience of God, then I have to engage
in metaphysics. The materialist denies that God exists (or Platonic Ideas,
etc.), so rejecting appearance/reality distinctions and metaphysics is
tantamount to a belief in materialism. (Please note that I am working within
your definition of metaphysics. I still think that materialism, even one of
Rorty's sort, is best seen as a metaphysical position. A denial of God ,
like an affirmation of God, or to say that mind is brain, is an ontological
position.)
As to whether materialists are correct, I don't think one can give any
plausible interpretation of quantum mechanics without making an
appearance/reality distinction. Well, I suppose the Copenhagen
interpretation avoids it, but that amounts basically to: don't try to
interpret it.
[Matt:] And besides, materialists don't say that it is only appearances
that are real, unless you construe all people who reject the
appearance/reality distinction as saying that only appearances are real.
This, however, doesn't really happen because when you reject the
distinction, you reject the force of saying things are one side or the
other.
I understand this. My point above is that it prevents one from considering
something that clearly doesn't appear, but one considers real, a hidden
cause of what does appear.
[Matt:] Sure, appearances are reality and reality is appearances. We do
experience Quality, mind, spirit, consciousness, conscience, God, and all
the other things
> that various people have said they experience over the years. We
experience them because we talk about them. If somebody told me that they
felt the force of God, I would believe them insofar as I would think that
they really did think that they felt the force of God. The fact that I
never have, nor ever expect to, nor think even possible, does nothing to
that person's experience. The fact that I can explain his experience in
different terms, like in terms of nerves and brain activity, does nothing to
his experience of God.
Except that you can't explain any experience in those terms -- see my post
to Ian.
[Matt:] I don't think this belittles the believer, I simply think it ends
the conversation a little quicker than if he had told another believer. It
ends, not because I'm right and he's wrong, or he's right and I'm wrong, but
because we have very little in common on the topic of God. A conversation
between an atheist and a theist would be just as long, and end for exactly
the same reason, as a conversation between myself and a cricket player. I
know nothin
> g about cricket, nor do I care that much, but I do think my English
counterpart's enthusiasm for the sport is admirable and exciting. We do
have that in common: ethusiasm. We are just enthusiastic about different
things.
This is a bad analogy. I agree that it is a a matter of dueling dogmas, and
that neither side is likely to convince the other. However, the idea that
this is just a difference of opinion or enthusiasm mainly applies to your
side. Although we have partially moved beyond the days when the believer of
God thinks he has to convert you to prevent you from going to Hell (though
such people are still around), it is nevertheless the case that the
religionist has to make some attempt to convert, while the secularist is
content if he is just not bothered by the religionist. (This is not entirely
the case. Many secularists think that religion is an evil which must be
eradicated.) The need to convert comes from the (please take this
metaphorically) idea that the first thing the devil does is try to convince
the victim that he doesn't exist. My version of this is that we all need to
realize that we are insane, as being the first step in recovery.
>
> So, okay, you aren't a materialist. But materialists have good reasons
for being materialists. You just aren't hearing them, or aren't ready for
them.
Umm, since I was a materialist for many years, and am aware of the reasons
for being a materialist, and all their arguments against religion (which I
once accepted) and have continued to read materialist thinkers after ceasing
to be a materialist, I object. But I understand what you are saying.
However, I do lay tentative claim to the higher rational ground for having
seen the good reasons to be a materialist and then learning that they aren't
so good. The "tentative" is because I realize that one cannot see what the
next level of reason might lead one to.
>
> Andy said:
> What do you mean by materialism and how does Rorty fall under this
category? What data do materialist ignore? I haven't heard Rorty refer to
himself as a materialist. Is it a categorization he would agree he falls
under? How does one emerge out from under this absurd influence of a
materialist view?
>
> Matt:
> Rorty describes himself as a non-reductive physicalist. In a former, much
older, rhetorical turn, Rorty defended something called eliminative
materialism. Eliminative materialism, I think, means we can describe
everything we experience to particles bouncing in a void. The operative
word is "can". That doesn't mean we have to. Rorty has moved on from there
to argue that we shouldn't reduce anything to anything else, fundamentally.
We should simply use one set of descriptions for one purpose and another set
of descriptions for another purpose.
>
> I'm not quite sure why Scott doesn't believe him and continues to call him
a reductive materialist.
I haven't called him a reductive materialist since you pointed this essay
out to me. I may have said that I can't see that it is a difference that
makes a difference, but since this is a quarrel within the materialist camp,
I wouldn't.
- Scott
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