From: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Tue Aug 19 2003 - 22:23:02 BST
Scott,
Okay, so we agree that we are equally dogmatic, you just think your "dogmata" are better, or as you might say, your dogmata have "higher rational ground" (though I think your reason is poor; just because I was formally a Christian doesn't make me think that I'm a better atheist, even for having studied for long periods of time the worlds religions and many philosophies of religion).
Scott said:
My favorite example of this is Dennett's saying that Darwinism, because it provides an explanation of evolution without invoking purpose gives one reason to believe in materialism. What he ignores is that it is materialism that leads him to think that (the appearance of) purpose needs to be explained in terms of matter. Why not the other way around?
Matt:
Yeah, Dennett doesn't always say what I think he should say. He's not really the greatest of pragmatists. He provides great tools (so non-reductive physicalists think), but he's sometimes an unwilling participant in Rorty's project. I wouldn't say that Darwinism gives us a _reason_ to believe in materialism, but I would say that before Darwin it was much harder to be a thorough-going materialist. Darwin made it plausible to be a materialist. But you ask, then, the question, "Why not the other way around?" I think the answer lies in intellectual history: teleological explanations weren't working out in some of the sectors we were probing. Since Darwin, I think we have made some good intellectual progress. We tried one way, now we're trying the other way. Does that mean we shouldn't try the other way anymore? Not necessarily. Part of being in a rich, bourgeois democratic community is having the free time to explore all sorts of avenues that might not pan out. So, a
s far as I'm concerned, go ahead and explore it. I don't think the things you are proposing are a bane upon humanity, like some people like Dawkins think. I might think that they are, more or less, going to be a waste of time, but we each have our own private projects. And who knows, you might come up with a better paradigm. That's what being an ironist is all about.
Scott said:
I think [the "2000 years with nothing to show" argument doesn't wash] because I see within the metaphysical line a philosophy that explains more than others, and so I accept its dogma (its fundamental principles). I reject other dogmata because I see logical problems with them, or things they can't explain that my dogma can. (Well, there are problems with the word "explain", but nevermind).
Matt:
Yeah, as you can probably guess, those are the same reasons I accept the "2000 years with nothing to show" argument: it explains more. You place your bets with one horse, I with another.
Scott said:
there comes a point where trying to dismiss it all as hallucination or delusion or fraud becomes a delusion in itself.
Matt:
Ah, well, after one gives up the appearance/reality distinction, the point to be made is, "Well, a person has to pick one delusion over another," and the question becomes, "Which one do you choose?" Pragmatists don't think you can lift yourself out of delusion, you simply have to choose the delusion that works best. That's why they don't call it delusion, they simply call it a person's "final vocabulary" or one's "web of beliefs and desires".
Scott said:
My point above is that it prevents one from considering something that clearly doesn't appear, but one considers real, a hidden cause of what does appear.
Matt:
This, to me, doesn't make sense because I already eschew the appreance/reality distinction. If you consider it to be real, then it appears. We may not sense the mind or God, they don't appear to us, but because people consider them real and talk about them and use them in causal accounts of what is occuring in the world, then they "appear" in as much sense of the word as is sufficient. The deal for scientists who believe in God is that bringing God into the causal explanation often doesn't work out as well. We haven't gotten as much out of our God-explanations as we've wanted as we have out of our material-explanations. At this point, you might say something to the effect of, "that's because you are already assuming a materialist standpoint." Intellectual history ain't that easy. Dewey suggests that we think of intellectual progress as a means-end continuum, that its a muddy mess of our means changing and then our ends and our ends changing and then our means. We can
give some historical accounts of why we started to try and find material-explanations as opposed to God ones, but there is a lot of individual psyche and cultural zeitgeist explanations involved. We can only retroactively explain why we went one direction rather than another. At the time great shifts in the intellectual landscape occur, it often isn't clear whether the shift is a good one or not. The losers certainly didn't think so, and the winners were simply betting. It doesn't look like betting after they've won, but that's only because our means and ends have already changed sufficiently. I don't think you can really predict these things.
Matt said:
The fact that I can explain his experience in different terms, like in terms of nerves and brain activity, does nothing to his experience of God.
Scott said:
Except that you can't explain any experience in those terms -- see my post to Ian.
Matt:
I read it again, but I still can't really see the problem. But I think I found a way of answering in Dennett, when I was reading the first part of his new book Freedom Evolves. I don't have it with me, so I can't really paraphrase that well, but it has to do with moving from the "design level" to the "intentional level." I think Dennett's argument would be that information isn't transfered at the design level, the level where photons hit electrons. Information is only transfered when you step farther back, when it becomes more complex, to the intentional level. It is only these larger units that can be seen to exchange information. The basis for Dennett's argument comes out of his work with computers. It was really interesting when I read it and only now that I'm having to spit it back out do I think I'm getting it.
Matt said:
I don't think [the fact that I can explain the believer's belief in God in different terms, like in terms of nerves and brain activity] belittles the believer, I simply think it ends the conversation a little quicker than if he had told another believer. It ends, not because I'm right and he's wrong, or he's right and I'm wrong, but because we have very little in common on the topic of God. A conversation between an atheist and a theist would be just as long, and end for exactly the same reason, as a conversation between myself and a cricket player. I know nothing about cricket, nor do I care that much, but I do think my English counterpart's enthusiasm for the sport is admirable and exciting. We do have that in common: ethusiasm. We are just enthusiastic about different things.
Scott said:
This is a bad analogy. I agree that it is a a matter of dueling dogmas, and that neither side is likely to convince the other. However, the idea that this is just a difference of opinion or enthusiasm mainly applies to your side. Although we have partially moved beyond the days when the believer of God thinks he has to convert you to prevent you from going to Hell (though such people are still around), it is nevertheless the case that the religionist has to make some attempt to convert, while the secularist is content if he is just not bothered by the religionist. (This is not entirely the case. Many secularists think that religion is an evil which must be eradicated.) The need to convert comes from the (please take this metaphorically) idea that the first thing the devil does is try to convince the victim that he doesn't exist. My version of this is that we all need to realize that we are insane, as being the first step in recovery.
Matt:
Ever since I wrote that analogy, the more and more I like it. And I still think it works perfectly. The reason is that, for some things, people wish they had more conversation partners. I don't think there is anything wrong with evangelism. Its simply the desire of some people to get other people excited about what excites them, like an English professor's desire to get his students excited about Milton. True, this description is a redescription into my terms of what the evangelist is doing, but I think it captures it. The evangelist thinks that the non-believer's soul is on the balance, but that simply describes his own motivation in his own terms. The cricket player may also think (foolishly to some) that the non-player's soul hangs in the balance. People have all sorts of motivations for trying to convince people, but the effect is that people want other people to talk to them about what they think is important. And when they convince somebody to talk to them abo
ut it, they've effectively convinced them that it is important, too. I think it is important to talk about politics. I think Americans are, by and large, too afraid and unwilling to talk about politics (there is a lot of data to suggest this). You might call me a political evangelist. Well, the people I'm trying to convince (like my sister) are annoyed by my advances. My sister is apolitical just as I am atheist. I have good reasons for trying to convince people who are apolitical, but they just aren't hearing them, seeing them, ready for them. They aren't convinced that what I'm trying to convince them of is important.
In this way, I don't think the atheist need make any ontological claims. A pragmatist redefintion of atheism is "the desire to not talk about God and/or the belief that there isn't much point in it." That's it. I just don't want to talk about God. And if I do, I don't see much point in it, outside of in a pyschological and sociological manner. Because I believe out linguistic practices are bound too tightly around what we do to be unwound, I think that the determination of what social practices we continue and what beliefs we continue to have can be described in terms of conversations we should or shouldn't continue to have.
Scott said:
I do lay tentative claim to the higher rational ground for having seen the good reasons to be a materialist and then learning that they aren't so good. The "tentative" is because I realize that one cannot see what the next level of reason might lead one to.
Matt:
As I alluded to before, I think this is a poor claim. Just because you once believed certain propositions but are no longer convinced by those propositions doesn't mean you've attained "higher rational ground." The believer who fell could claim the exact same ground, simply because he was once convinced by certain propositions and now he doesn't. He could just as easily say that he "learned" that mysticism isn't as good as materialism. Now, there is a case to be made, since you once believed, that you now know your enemy perhaps better than others, but I don't think this counts as "higher rational ground." That would mean that to be the best mystic or materialist you would have to first be a materialist or mystic, respectively. That would mean that the person who's wishy-washy and changes his opinion every week is at a much higher level of rational ground then the rest of us who don't change there opinions as quickly. Rather than this, I think it simply sufficient to
be well read in the relevant material.
Matt
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