From: abahn@comcast.net
Date: Tue Aug 19 2003 - 20:06:54 BST
Scott, Steve, and anyone else interested,
I want to give an answer to Scott's post on Darwin and Consciousness, but I fear
I am too stupid. Maybe I am just a materialist. I still don't know what this
means. Although, I am deathly afraid of this ambiguous term. It is being slung
around as an insult. As if only ignoramuses would be materialists and I don't
want to be an ignoramus. But I don't know how to stop being a materialist
because I don't know what it means to be one. I am reminded of the day I
realized "liberal" was an accusation. At least I knew I was a liberal. I
agreed with conservatives that communism was not a good thing. I even enjoyed
all the perquisites that came with being a member of a society that benefited
from free markets. I just wanted to make the world a better place. Then
everyone starts saying I am just being a "liberal." As if this is a bad thing.
So I have to go through this long process, along with all the rest of us
"liberals", trying to come to grips with this new negative connotation of the
word "liberal."
But, now I fear I am a materialist. And this is also a bad thing. Is it going
to be another fifteen more years of self-analysis? Am I going to have to defend
why I am not a materialist. And then say, well I geuss I am a materialist, but
this is really not such a bad thing. Or maybe I will join the anti-materialists
and start condemning all the remaining materialists. "Come on you whackers,
pull you fricken heads out of your arses. Enough with your materialist B.S. We
don't do that anymore!"
I guess I will just have to wait and see how it all plays out and in the
meantime see if I can get my mind wrapped around how this word is being used.
Scott said: I would also ask, why is an explanation that avoids purpose better
than one that doesn't? Other than, of course, a prior commitment to a mindless
materialism. Purpose obviously exists.
Andy: Well, purpose doesn't obviously exist to me. But right now I am still
under the influence of mindless materialism. An explanation that avoids purpose
is better if it can explain better. I think some Darwinian ideas explain some
things better than other ideas out there-such as creationism. Does this mean
these Darwin ideas explain everything? Nobody asserts such a thing.
Scott: Matter (which I would define as that which the senses can perceive)
doesn't obviously exist outside the mind, or rather, it "obviously" (naively)
exists, but analysis raises doubts. What we perceive is produced in the act of
perception: we see trees, not photons. So why do materialists try to provide an
explanation of how perception works in terms of what perception produces?.
Andy: If I only knew what you meant when you say materialists. Are these any
individuals who acknowledge the contributions of Darwin to evolutionary
sciences? To biology? I think there have been many attempts at explaining how
perception works and all of them leave something wanting. There is a mystery
there. But mystery doesn't necessarily mean we will never find a satisfactory
explanation. An explanation helping us navigate through the world. We don't
need to assign every unanswered question or mystery under the heading of
mysticism. I know this is not what you are implying, but your arguments so far
remain a mystery to me.
Scott: Here's the argument (taken from a Jan. 10 post):
Consciousness, or even sentience, *cannot* evolve out of non-consciousness. To
see the problem, take the normally accepted view of how visual perception works:
light bounces off an object, stimulates the rods and cones in the eye, which
stimulate nerve cells, and (much complexity later) we say "I see the tree". The
materialist is forced to conclude that all that nerve cell agitation is the
seeing of a tree. But this is impossible, if one assumes that space and time are
the context in which all that is necessary to explain perception occurs.
Andy: I wouldn't make that assumption. I am unsure of how to go about
explaining perception. We look for patterns in the world around us. Our
evolutionary history has programmed which patterns we should pay particular
attention to. Subatomic particles (electrons and protons) are theorized for
explaining things we see in the world around us, such as trees. We further
theorize properties for these particles. But matching these properties with
something as complex as perception can be tricky business indeed. Perhaps, we
need to look at perception differently - from another angle.
Scott: To see this, ask how the excitation of one electron being hit by one
photon can have any *connection* to any other electron that is being, or has
been hit by another photon. For this to happen a signal must pass from the first
to the second, but that signal cannot carry any additional information than that
of a single photon. So unless we assume an electron has memory, and can
distinguish between one photon and another, there can be no greater experience
than that which an electron experiences on absorbing a photon (or any other
single interaction it can undergo, like being annihilated by a positron.).
Andy: Yes-tricky business. Here is the problem. The whole is greater than the
sum of the parts. And, we cannot directly perceive electrons and protons
because they are only theorized. But, in the world of what we do observe and
perceive directly we do see cases where the sum of the parts does not explain
the whole. In complexity theory these are often termed holarchies. One theory
explaining this phenomenon does use *connections* and the relationships between
parts for explaining this. And this has produced remarkable results in the
studies of neurology, brain science, ecosystems, economies, traffic system,
electric grids, computer science, the cognitive science and so on.
Scott: This argumentation applies at whatever level of granularity one tries to
think it through. One nerve cell excites others. But unless the nerve cell
itself has memory and is sentient, it cannot make distinctions or note
similarity. But how can it if it has parts (separated in space). One or more of
these parts must be responsible for holding a piece of the memory, but then that
piece has to be combined with others....
Andy: The relationships between nerve cells. Graph theory and network theory
in mathematics offer plausible explanations.
Scott: There is one out, and that is depending on quantum non-locality. But
note that doing so says that reality is fundamentally non-spatio-temporal, that
*all* spatio-temporal experience arises out of eternity. So teleology just means
causation in a different temporal direction, and Darwinism becomes irrelevant.
Andy: You definitely lost me here. How did we go from perception to wondering
about the nature of reality. This is why we should be following Rorty and
looking for useful theories that enable us to cope instead of explaining the
fundamental nature of reality. You know-looking for that all encompassing
theory that explains what it is really like "out there." This theory doesn't
exist. And if it did it would do nothing for us in enabling us to cope. It
would be a useless theory. Other than providing the weak-minded with a sense of
comfort.
Scott: I've been considering whether an appeal to fields (e.g., the
electromagnetic field) could provide another out. I don't see it. For one thing,
fields are just mathematical models to describe the results of action at a
distance. That is, there is action at a distance, and that is basically saying
that space and/or time is transcended. So if we say these fields are real in
themselves, and that perhaps consciousness is a very complicated nexus of
fields, well, aren't we saying that fields transcend space and time?
Andy: Fields were a useful theory in physics in the 19th century. It was a
theory to help explain the movements of large objects in frictionless space.
Calculus is based on the mathematics of fields. They explain some phenomena
well and are useless for explaining other things we see around us. Thus fields
are not really relevant to modern physics.
Scott: The question, then, is this still materialism, or are the goal posts
being moved?
Andy: Uh-oh, materialism again. I don't know the answer to this question. What
would be the result of either option?
Scott: In any case, we would be saying that the electromagnetic field arising
from one moving electron has to be conscious. Otherwise, adding and combining
fields together won't add up to qualia.
Andy: Consciousness is not the only thing physics and scientific theory has not
adequately explained. You can use the same reasoning to argue why all of
science is wrong because none of it gives an adequate explanation of movement or
causation. Mysteries. I am all-right with mystery and uncertainty. We need
useful theories. Not all encompassing theories that explain everything.
Theories that help us get from here to there. Is there purpose in this. Yes,
we have local and immediate goals but I am not sure it is very useful to think
that the purpose of the universe is to achieve consciousness (however, you may
define that) or intelligence or complexity...
Scott: It (my argument) is that spacetime separation means that there can be no
larger awareness than that of the smallest unit of matter or signal one knows about.
Andy: and then we can spend a lot of time defining awareness and spacetime. I
am unsure what you are really implying here and how it makes Darwin implausible.
I think awareness or consciousness exists in the connections between objects.
Or it exists in the type of program or computation which we are running.
Natural selection chooses better programs. Organisms have a will to power.
Individuals search for patterns in the chaos and try and organize them. Through
the evolutionary process we have gained a history which informs of quality in
these patterns. These are all just theories. I use them to cope. I pull out a
different one when I need a new explanation for something I am unsure about.
And Steve Said:
Randomness is a Platypus in SOM. The MOQ has a place for it only as an
intellectual pattern of value that presupposes an observer to infer a pattern or
the lack of one. It would be an oxymoron to call randomness an inorganic pattern
since randomness means the lack of a pattern so I don't think you can say chance
is "at work in the world."
Andy: Randomness does not mean lack of a pattern, it means lack of a
recognizable pattern. I challenge you to find anyone who has found a precise
meaning of random. Who can look at any pattern and say whether it is random or
not. Whether a pattern exists or not with any certainty. It depends on how a
pattern is perceived. So, is randomness a feature of what is being perceived or
what is doing the perceiving? This is not relevant to chance at work in the
world, at least not obviously, but I think it is something you should consider
when arguing against Darwinism. Organizing patterns out of chaos, this, it
seems to me is the essence of natural selection. How this organizing is being
done is another matter.
Thanks
Andy
A true war story is never moral. It does not instruct, nor encourage virtue,
nor suggest models of proper human behavior, nor restrain men from doing the
things they have always done. If a story seems moral, do not believe it. If at
the end of a war story you feel uplifted, or if you feel that some small bit of
rectitude has been salvaged from the larger waste, then you have been the victim
of a very old and terrible lie.
--Tim O'Brien
> Ian,
>
> > Scott, you said ...
> > If you keep the randomness, then it is very difficult to see why natural
> > selection would move things toward greater complexity. Amoebae are better
> > survivors than dinosaurs, etc. Complexity adds more things that can go
> > wrong, and so reduces the odds of survival (ask any computer programmer).
> >
> > Ian says ...
> > Difficulty is no proof of falsity.
>
> I did not say the difficulty proves Darwinism false. I said it makes it
> implausible. I do in addition, though, consider Darwinism impossible as an
> explanation for the existence of consciousness, but did not give my reason.
> It is given below. I've presented it a couple of times in this forum, but no
> one has given an argument as to why it is not valid. (I do not assume it is
> unassailable, just that no one so far has assailed it). Nor has anything
> I've read in Dennett or Rorty or anywhere else addressed the problem it
> raises. If you know of a response, I'd like to know.
>
> I would also ask, why is an explanation that avoids purpose better than one
> that doesn't? Other than, of course, a prior commitment to a mindless
> materialism. Purpose obviously exists. Matter (which I would define as that
> which the senses can perceive) doesn't obviously exist outside the mind, or
> rather, it "obviously" (naively) exists, but analysis raises doubts. What we
> perceive is produced in the act of perception: we see trees, not photons. So
> why do materialists try to provide an explanation of how perception works in
> terms of what perception produces?.
>
> - Scott
>
> Here's the argument (taken from a Jan. 10 post):
>
> Consciousness, or even sentience, *cannot*
> evolve out of non-consciousness. To see the problem, take the normally
> accepted view of how visual perception works: light bounces off an object,
> stimulates the rods and cones in the eye, which stimulate nerve cells, and
> (much complexity later) we say "I see the tree". The materialist is forced
> to conclude that all that nerve cell agitation is the seeing of a tree. But
> this is impossible, if one assumes that space and time are the context in
> which all that is necessary to explain perception occurs.
>
> To see this, ask how the excitation of one electron being hit by one photon
> can have any *connection* to any other electron that is being, or has been
> hit by another photon. For this to happen a signal must pass from the first
> to the second, but that signal cannot carry any additional information than
> that of a single photon. So unless we assume an electron has memory, and can
> distinguish between one photon and another, there can be no greater
> experience than that which an electron experiences on absorbing a photon (or
> any other single interaction it can undergo, like being annihilated by a
> positron.).
>
> This argumentation applies at whatever level of granularity one tries to
> think it through. One nerve cell excites others. But unless the nerve cell
> itself has memory and is sentient, it cannot make distinctions or note
> similarity. But how can it if it has parts (separated in space). One or more
> of these parts must be responsible for holding a piece of the memory, but
> then that piece has to be combined with others....
>
> There is one out, and that is depending on quantum non-locality. But note
> that doing so says that reality is fundamentally non-spatio-temporal, that
> *all* spatio-temporal experience arises out of eternity. So teleology just
> means causation in a different temporal direction, and Darwinism becomes
> irrelevant.
>
> [Added now:]
> I've been considering whether an appeal to fields (e.g., the electromagnetic
> field) could provide another out. I don't see it. For one thing, fields are
> just mathematical models to describe the results of action at a distance.
> That is, there is action at a distance, and that is basically saying that
> space and/or time is transcended. So if we say these fields are real in
> themselves, and that perhaps consciousness is a very complicated nexus of
> fields, well, aren't we saying that fields transcend space and time? The
> question, then, is this still materialism, or are the goal posts being
> moved?
>
> In any case, we would be saying that the electromagnetic field arising from
> one moving electron has to be conscious. Otherwise, adding and combining
> fields together won't add up to qualia.
>
> By the way, I am familiar with Dennett's and Hofstadter's "systems" response
> to Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment. This is not the same. It (my
> argument) is that spacetime separation means that there can be no larger
> awareness than that of the smallest unit of matter or signal one knows
> about.
>
>
>
>
>
>
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