From: abahn@comcast.net
Date: Thu Sep 04 2003 - 14:42:56 BST
Scott,
After another morning walk with the dog (it is where I do my best thinking--I
think), I had another thought.
I asked: "How does Sheldrake avoid this cunumdrum?"
You answered: "That I don't know, but from what I've understood he doesn't need
to explain consciousness. Only materialists do, or the whole Darwinist world
view falls apart."
Andy: Well, as I admitted before, I am still unsure how you are using this term
materialist. Two points thoughgh, first: Sheldrake, as I remember (it has been
a long time), uses his perceptions and experience to explain some things that he
thought Darwinian theory did a poor job answering. Thus, he proposed these
fields specific to each specie that they can tap into. However, subsequent
theorists showed that Darwinian theory answered Sheldrake's examples just fine.
Now, I am not up to date on Sheldrake and I am sure I got some of this wrong,
but the point is he was using the products of his perception to analyze his
perceptions. ANd he proposed a theory. He was using a scientific methodology .
Second, Darwinian theory does not try and explain consciousness. This is your
pet project. Now if you are going to use explaining consciousness as your
criteria for "right" theories, than you are going to have to throw a lot more
out than Darwin. Newtonian physics, SHeldrake, Einstien's relativity, Quantum
physics, and all of science as we know it. Darwinian theory explains many
things and cosciousness is not one of them. It explains the vast diversity of
life and quite well also. However, it does a litttle "bootstrapping" of its own
by starting with simple single cell organisms, our common anscestors. Darwin
theory has nothing to say about how consciousness develops out of the inorganic.
It doesn't even try. So your attempt at throwing out "the whole Darwinist
world view" just doesn't make any sense. At least for the reasons you give.
Thanks again,
Andy
> Andy,
>
> (I know, you asked David, but I can't resist)
>
>
> > Hi David,
> >
> > Since I am having such a difficult time understanding Scott, could you
> please
> > explain to me how something as obscure as "trying to explain perception
> through
> > the products of perception" can throw any favorable light on the work of
> > SHeldrake over the other conventional "materialist" explanations? If we
> are not
> > allowed to explain experience through what we experience, then what are we
> left
> > with?
>
> Nothing. Mu. Consciousness is self-contradictory, so the only logic for
> talking about consciousness is the logic of contradictory identity. So the
> more sensible thing is to assume consciousness as a given, and not something
> that could have evolved out of non-conscious processes. This is, of course,
> the same move that Pirsig made with Quality.
>
> > How does Sheldrake avoid this cunumdrum?
>
> That I don't know, but from what I've understood he doesn't need to explain
> consciousness. Only materialists do, or the whole Darwinist world view falls
> apart.
>
> - Scott
>
>
>
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