From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sat Nov 01 2003 - 22:22:35 GMT
dmb says:
> As far as characterizing Rorty's position, you agree when I say "truth and
> morality are not things in themselves, but are attributes of particular
> statements and facts". But you disagree when I say "truth and morality, in
> and of themselves, don't really exist. They are subjective qualities". As
> the author of those two sentences, let me assure that both of them were
> intended to express the same idea.
Yeah, but they sure don't:
A is attribute of B therefore it exists says pragmatist
A does not exist for pragmatists according to DMB
A is a subjective quality for a pragmatist according to DMB, not really but
either way it still exists for a pragmatist
why does DMB get offeneded because he thinks somethig does not exist for a
pragmatist
when the pragmatist does think it exists?
Guess, we got different ideas about what it means to exist. Does anyone want
to talk about what does not exist,
e.g. DMB's understanding of pragmatism. Sorry couldn't resist that one. Look
DMB what qualities do you
think truth and morality have for you that they do not have for a
pragmatist?
regards
David M (who is not bothered by pragmatists)
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Buchanan" <DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2003 9:27 PM
Subject: RE: MD What makes an idea dangerous?
> Matt, Andy and all truth seekers:
>
> Richard Rorty:
> "For pragmatists, "truth" is just the name of a property which all true
> statements share. ...Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said for
> this common feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that
> there is much to be said about the common feature shared by praiseworthy
> actions... They see certain acts as good ones to perform, under the
> circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and useful to say
> about what makes them all good."
>
> DMB interpreted the quote:
> Truth is a common feature of true statements. There is little to be said
> about this common feature, nothing general or useful. True statements and
> morally praisworthy acts are just a common features of things about which
we
> have some intersubjective agreement about truth and morality. Truth and
> morality are not things in themselves, but are attributes of particular
> statements and acts.
>
> Matt approved up to a point:
> This is all well and good. An accurate reflection of what a pragmatist
> would say. What follows in the rest of the paragraph, however, is not
what
> a pragmatist would say, nor are the consequences of his position.
>
> DMB said:
> Truth and morality, in and of themselves, don't really exist. They are
> subjective qualities.
>
> Matt replied:
> Pragmatists don't say that "truth" and "morality" do not exist. We don't
> say they are subjective qualities. You only fall into this mess if you
> accept the SOM supposition that things are either objective or subjective.
> Pragmatists steer clear of this debacle. We think the entire notion of
> "truth" and "morality" as objects that can be inquired into, in and of
> themselves, is itself an remenant of SOM thinking. We see it as a swing
> from the subjective to the objective. ...Pragmatists readily accept that
> morality and truth are as real as rocks and trees. We just don't give any
> of them any ontological status because pragmatists don't do ontology.
>
> dmb says:
> As far as characterizing Rorty's position, you agree when I say "truth and
> morality are not things in themselves, but are attributes of particular
> statements and facts". But you disagree when I say "truth and morality, in
> and of themselves, don't really exist. They are subjective qualities". As
> the author of those two sentences, let me assure that both of them were
> intended to express the same idea.
>
> Praggys might not actually say that truth and morality are only subjective
> qualities, but does it really express a different idea to say they are
only
> attributes based on intersubjective agreement? Hardly at all. SOM stances
> vary widely from materialism to idealism and everything in between. It
seems
> pretty clear to me that Rorty's stance is just one variation on this
theme.
> Maybe he doesn't call to call it ontology, but to assert that there is
> nothing to be said about truth, to assert there is nothing general or
useful
> or philosophically interesting, and then assert that truth is a propery, a
> quality, an attribute of some other thing... Well, one might as well deny
> its existence. As you might like to put it, that's how it cashes out. It
> treats truth and morality as merely subjective, which is the problem that
> got Pirsig started in the first place. How can you honestly claim that
Rorty
> paints a picture of truth as something as real as rocks and trees? How
can
> you say that without doing ontology? How can keep a traight face? ;-)
>
>
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