From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sun Nov 02 2003 - 19:13:46 GMT
-----Original Message-----
From: David MOREY [mailto:us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk]
Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2003 3:23 PM
To: moq_discuss@moq.org
Subject: Re: MD What makes an idea dangerous?
David M said:
A is attribute of B therefore it exists says pragmatist
A does not exist for pragmatists according to DMB
A is a subjective quality for a pragmatist according to DMB, not really but
either way it still exists for a pragmatist ...why does DMB get offeneded
because he thinks somethig does not exist for a pragmatist when the
pragmatist does think it exists?
dmb says:
To borrow a phrase from the boys of the flying circus, this is not an
argument, its just a contradiction. Why not address what I already said
about this very thing...
dmb had said:
Praggys might not actually say that truth and morality are only subjective
qualities, but does it really express a different idea to say they are only
attributes based on intersubjective agreement? Hardly at all. SOM stances
vary widely from materialism to idealism and everything in between. It seems
pretty clear to me that Rorty's stance is just one variation on this theme.
Maybe he doesn't call to call it ontology, but to assert that there is
nothing to be said about truth, to assert there is nothing general or useful
or philosophically interesting, and then assert that truth is a propery, a
quality, an attribute of some other thing... Well, one might as well deny
its existence.
David M said:
Guess, we got different ideas about what it means to exist. Does anyone want
to talk about what does not exist,e.g. DMB's understanding of pragmatism.
Sorry couldn't resist that one. Look DMB what qualities do you think truth
and morality have for you that they do not have for a pragmatist?
dmb says:
Is there a rule or law that REQUIRES neo-pragmatists to insult their
critics? Sure seems like it. If anything offends me,... Anyway, to get at
your question, ....Huh? What qualities do truth and morality have? I don't
understand what you're asking. My point is that Rorty and Pirsig have
different theories as to what truth is. For Rorty it is a property of
something else, of true statements. For Pirsig it is not a property of
something else. It is Rorty's own description of this theory that leads me
to the conclusion that his truth is an abstraction from particulars and not
a thing in itself, such as Pirsig's intellectual static patterns, which, by
contrast, are treated as real.
> Richard Rorty:
> "For pragmatists, "truth" is just the name of a property which all true
> statements share. ...Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said for
> this common feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that
> there is much to be said about the common feature shared by praiseworthy
> actions... They see certain acts as good ones to perform, under the
> circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and useful to say
> about what makes them all good."
Thanks,
dmb
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