From: skutvik@online.no
Date: Fri Feb 13 2004 - 20:38:44 GMT
Hi David M.
12 Feb. you wrote:
> I have switched to the discuss because we have gone
> off subject I feel, unless you describe this discussion as
> an example of changing the MOQ. Overall I feel that
> your concern really is about the extent of the role of
> the SO divide in the world as experienced via an MOQ
> approach. I certainly agree that whatever is useful in the SOM
> can be retained in the MOQ, but I see no problem with changing
> the language of SOM and even dropping subject and object entirely.
Dropping the S/O is neither feasible or desirable. As the
intellectual level it may stay around, it just carries no
metaphysical load any longer, while trying to start an Orwellian
"newspeak" is hopeless. We may go on about mind-matter, body-
soul and culture-nature ...etc. to our heart's delight, I have done it
for years already.
> As
> a philosophy student of 20 years this appeals to me because I am very
> aware of the SOM limitations, all around the uses of the subjects and
> objects language. I started off in the philosophy and history of
> science, spent many many years reading high German idealism, moving on
> to phenomenology and existentialism and getting a grip on
> post-modernism on the way. I wish I could use the language of those
> disciplines to deal with your questions/ problems but I don't think
> you have the background.
Through my long Colin Wilson "career" I know enough about
Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre ..you name them, but the MOQ is of
another magnitude and makes their ways of presenting "the
problem" and solving it completely outdated.
> I really recommend you read something like
> theCambridge companion to Heidegger's that may just about be
> accessible and really does a good job at explaining Heidegger's
> overcoming of the dualist (SOM) tradition. It is a deeper argument
> than Pirsig's
Deeper argument than Pirsig! You must be joking Mr Morey. ;-)
> but on very similar lines. In the philosophy of science
> there is now a very strong recognition of the problematic nature of
> the ideas of laws and objects. This is due to the falling away of
> determinism, being simply wrong as Popper says, and the more process
> based conceptual approaches where identifying separate objects rather
> than systems seems wrong headed. Popper does seem to point the way
> forward in his essay on propensities that Anthony also refers to. The
> closeness of this notion to Pirsig's static patterns is quite clear.
> You appeal to reason, but I take science as being exemplary here, and
> science is having less and less use for SOM language and categories.
> Essentially, I do not see why reason would lose anything if we dropped
> the SOM concepts entirely.
I'm happy for you not seeing any problems here, wish I could join
you.
> Heidegger's incredibly illuminating
> conception of what it is to be human aligns very closely with Pirsig's
> hints about the activities of DQ. In fact it gains significantly by
> overcoming the current blindspots of SOM. For further comments see
> below IN UPPER CASE:
> I think your fears are unfounded, at least in my conception of the
> MOQ. kind regards David M
Your praise of Paul shows that we have a totally different take of
it all.
Sincerely
Bo
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