ROG RESPONDS TO BO AND DAN AND WONDERS
WHAT HAPPENNED TO THE REST OF THE GANG?
First To Bo:
BO:
About the levels I use the dimension analogy: everything has a
position inside the moral dimensions of the MOQ just like
everything has its place respective to the space dimensions.
Everything shifts, one moment a long arrow in one value direction
the next a "porcupine" of arrows in all directions. I don't know why
some want it written in detail. The more general the better.
ROG:
Hmmmm. Should a moral map's quality be measured on its generalness? Perhaps
if the lack of specificity is related to the corresponding unspecificness of
reality, or if the terrain is so dynamic that a general map is more useful
(less inaccurate?) than a detailed one.
On the other hand, it could just be that the map was poorly drawn. Or that it
needs additional refinements in order to become more specific. Or perhaps
it is just a bad map. Considering this is the topic for the month, I hope we
have each answered this to our satisfaction.
As for your suggestion that dimensional arrows clarify the MOQ, I have some
questions.... Where can we see the specifics of this system (sorry if I am
retracing old ground)? Is it a handy-dandy tool that explains the MOQ level
hierarchy better? Is it something that is intended to clarify existing
writings by Pirsig, or is it an extension into new ground (such as SOLAQI)?
BO:
Roger made a guest appearance the 22th. Why so late in the
month with such a weighty post?
ROG:
Sorry. I am not active in the discussions, though I try to browse. In this
case, I felt that after 22 days everyone was missing the key emotive problem.
The problem isn't that the MOQ is an emotive metaphysics, it is that the MOQ
can apparently be charged with establishing an emotive statement as the
foundation of its metaphysics. To avoid confusion, let me clarify that I
don't believe this attack is valid. However, my suggested resolution is
controversial. Regardless, we cannot just sweep this issue under the rug.
BO:
The emotivism charge against the
MOQ is fabricated by the furious Intellect(SOM) that refuses to be
taken down to a sub-system of another metaphysics and by
honouring it we stoop to its level.
ROG:
I concur. The charge that a metaphysics based on 4 moral codes that evolve
out of each other is emotivism is not valid at all. I repeat though, the
charge that there is an underlying emotive assumption (ie that Dynamic is
more moral than static) is more serious. Our interpretation of the MOQ must
be able to repel this attack.
BO:
Dynamic Value is the chief postulate and good by definition. Static
Value must necessarily be "evil" from this high position yet good
the moment it tears loose from the previous static level.
ROG:
A chief postulate is pretty important. A small error here can weave itself
throughout the entire fabric of the metaphysics. I suggest that the support
for this postulate be stronger than simply "because Robert Pirsig said so." I
am trying to change this from being an emotive postulate to one that is more
supportable as an intellectual pattern. Read below for more on the issue.....
********************************
To Dan:
I HAD WRITTEN:
The area where I am concerned the MOQ may be guilty of emotivism arises
with
Pirsig's statement that DQ is superior to sq -- that dynamic freedom is
better than static patterns. What support does Pirsig give for this
assumption? I can find none. Can anyone else? Is this not an emotive
statement? It would be one thing if he only stated that reality can be
divided into DQ and sq. Or if he only pointed out that the course of
evolution has indeed been toward dynamic advance. But he doesn't stop
there. He states that "In general, given a choice between two courses to
follow and all other things being equal, that choice which is more Dynamic,
that is, at a higher level of evolution, is more moral."
PLOP! There it is! The emotive assumption of the MOQ. Or is it???
DAN:
This assumption is grounded in our American
system of democracy and it seems a bit of
a shame to me that Pirsig did not further pursue his thesis, for it
seems our system of "grass root government" existed on this
continent for hundreds and thousands and maybe even tens of
thousands of years before the Europeans began arriving in the
15 and 1600s.
If you want proof of Pirsig's statement, look no further than your local
town meeting or newspaper. Pirsig is not making an emotive
statement at all, in my estimation.
ROG:
This is certainly an example of where Dynamic seems more moral than static.
Pirsig includes others. However, I would hope that such a fundamental
postulate would have more support than just a series of supporting cases (
After all, I can say "mammals swim in the sea," and give supporting examples
of whales and dolphins, but I sure wouldn't use this as proof that "In
general, things that swim in the sea are mammals."
If Pirsig's philosophy hinges on the statement that that which is more
dynamic is more moral, we need to ensure that this is not an emotive
statement. It needs more support than a handfull of examples and the empty
assurance that "Robert feels it is true, so it is true." An emotive
postulate would open the MOQ up to charges that it allows biological/social
values to consume an intellectual pattern. This would make the MOQ a low
quality metaphysics based on its own terms. It would be no different than
ethics that say:
"Choices that preserve the highest degree of pattern are more moral," or,
" That which maximizes happiness is more moral", or
"That which God decrees is more moral (and I am his messenger)"
I have offered the suggestion that the MOQ can escape this emotive charge if
we replace it with the postulate that DQ = morality = reality = direct
experience. I believe this is implicit in Lila, but I can see where others
could disagree. See my other post for clarification. I also am very open to
any alternative solutions. What I cannot understand is how anyone can ignore
the issue, especially considering it that it was part of the topic of the
month. Everyone agrees that the MOQ's morality cannot be dismissed based on
the assumptions of SOM -- one of which is the assumption that morality is
only an emotive social issue. However, there was very little discussion of
whether any of the postulates of the MOQ appear emotive.
DAN:
Dynamic Quality cannot be
conceived, only perceived. Just as soon as conceptions enter into the
picture, Dynamic Quality becomes something else, something static and
rigid......
Dynamic Quality must be kept concept-free while morality is a concept.
They cannot be equal, in my estimation.
ROG:
Dan, I concur that DQ cannot be equal to static, conceptualized morality. In
Ch 13, RMP resolves this issue for us...."Finally there is a 4th Dynamic
morality,which isn't a code. He supposed you could call it 'the code of art'
or something like that..... The morality of the Brujo in Zuni -- that was
Dynamic morality."
On the last page of Ch 29 he further elaborates that "good" is not
intellectual or social, "It is direct everyday experience. Through this
identification of pure value with pure experience the MOQ paves the way for
an enlarged way of looking at experience....""
The terms value, good, quality, reality, experience and morality are often
used interchangeably in Lila (though not always). All these terms are
pre-conceptual Perhaps it would be accurate to say they are the "concepts of
the inconceivable." Or as Keith once wrote, they are "placeholders to remind
us that the static intellectual patterns we use to describe the world are not
the world itself." [See one of the great MOQ exchanges of all time in the
Keith/Diana discussion on this issue in the summer of 1998. That discussion,
as is true with this one and is possibly true of ZMM to Lila, depends upon
the relationship of DQ to Quality. How can the undefineable Quality of ZMM
become undefineable DQ and defineable sq????? Is DQ the same as Q? What is
sq in terms of DQ?]
DAN:
We are perceivers of Dynamic
Quality and conceivers of static quality. Perception arises very
mysteriously, spontaneously, while conception requires the foundation of
social and intellectual patterns of value; that which is is static
quality. The more we try and understand Dynamic Quality the further away
we get from "it". To get closer to Dynamic Quality one must let go of
ALL static patterns of value.
ROG:
I agree with your last sentence. I would suggest that DQ is not something
perceived as much as it is perceiving. It is not so much something
experienced, it is direct experience. However, this is old ground between us
and probably not germaine to this discusiion.
DAN:
The question then becomes: Can we attain an
enlightened state and still be part of
the world as we know it?
Enlightenment arises when one is engaged in right practice,
so the old adage "practice makes perfect" only applies when such
practice is right. By constantly evaluating the preconditioned environment in
which we find ourselves at any time in a Dynamic fashion, (i.e. without prior
judgments) life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is achieved.
ROG:
OK. No argument from me on your conclusions, but if we want to build a
metaphysics that comes to this conclusion, we need to start with more than an
unfalsifiable emotive claim.
But I could be wrong,
Rog
------- End of forwarded message -------
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