Hi Focs, (Rick, Hamish, Roger and Bo by name)
Another month draws to an inconclusive close.
I felt that Rick and I should try and put together
our final comments on our recent exchange, but
I'm just as happy to let Hamish have the last word on that.
HAMISH
<<<Fortunately our
existence and language don't quite tie us down to such an extent [q.v.
Orwell's '1984' and Newspeak] and the open-endedness can be sufficient
to
prise open the conceptual barriers. In the context of Zen, koans are
this
method, I guess. In the much more freewheeling western culture you need
books like ZAMM and Lila and www.moq.org to prise the lid off the
metaphysical cookie jar, 'cos we're not too hot on pithy aphorisms
anymore.
Why? - because language still is able to transcend both 'rationality'
and
'emotivism' I guess.>>>
But now I see that Roger has opened a new can of worms - on the 30th of
the month no less!!!
> ROG:
> I concur. The charge that a metaphysics based on 4 moral codes that
evolve
> out of each other is emotivism is not valid at all. I repeat though,
the
> charge that there is an underlying emotive assumption (ie that Dynamic
is
> more moral than static) is more serious. Our interpretation of the
MOQ must
> be able to repel this attack.
First of all Roger, I don't see any great need for the MoQ to deny its
emotivist element.
That's the point of my preemptive "Emotivism" post from 29th June
(written before Emotivism appeared in the July programme), and the
backdrop to all my posts this month.
The second thing I want to comment on is the "Dynamic over Static"
issue. I have previously noted that the way Pirsig talks about it could
be contrued as a very wordy, imprecise statement of what science calls
the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which says that systems have a natural
tendency to evolve in the direction of increasing disorder. There is
absolutely nothing at all emotivist about this. One can write the thing
out using equations that relate various energy and enthalpy terms.
The way he writes about it, I'm sure that Pirsig didn't see the parallel
between his Dynamic and "Degrees of freedom" represented by
thermodynamic entropy. Thus this "Dynamic over Static" almost turns into
a bleat of "4 legs good, 2 legs bad"!
BO tried to refine it . . .
<<<Dynamic Value is the chief postulate and good by definition. Static
Value must necessarily be "evil" from this high position yet good
the moment it tears loose from the previous static level.>>>
. . .
but that wasn't enough - this was the prelude to Roger's "Dynamic over
Static" is emotivist claim.
IMHO it will help if we pursue the thermodynamics/energy analogy. Energy
has no independant existance in physics - it is always tied up in some
"material" form, e.g. in the gravitational pull between TWO MASSES, or
in the MASS of a photon. The matter serves as a container for the
energy. (BTW, this point is the basis of quantum physics - hard to
believe it when one looks at the widespread abuse of the ":Quantum"
terminology).
Thus, we cannot have energy without matter, and (since Einstein) we know
that matter itself is a form of energy.
By analogy, Dynamic Quality cannot exist in isolation - and it can only
be evident (i.e. empirically real) in relation to static patterns. We
should all look over the old posts (here I go again) on the relationship
between DQ and SQ again, because I recall some good posts on their
interdependence was. One of the points raised was that while DQ pushes
SQ to change, it is the form of SQ that determines how DQ plays out.
Futhermore, sometimes the shape of SQ detemines which of several
alternative paths is taken (gravity determines that ran runs down the
mountain, but the shape of the mountain determines the path taken).
To restate this all succinctly, DQ animates SQ. Thus, for example,
biological patterns are more dynamic than inorganic patterns because
they are more animated, and quite possibly, social patterns are more
animated still.
This is why evolution gives rise to levels of higher complexity. It
allows greater dynamism and greater freedom. This is what Pirsig says.
This is what thermodynamics says.
Jonathan
>
> BO:
> Dynamic Value is the chief postulate and good by definition. Static
> Value must necessarily be "evil" from this high position yet good
> the moment it tears loose from the previous static level.
>
> ROG:
> A chief postulate is pretty important. A small error here can weave
itself
> throughout the entire fabric of the metaphysics. I suggest that the
support
> for this postulate be stronger than simply "because Robert Pirsig said
so." I
> am trying to change this from being an emotive postulate to one that
is more
> supportable as an intellectual pattern. Read below for more on the
issue.....
>
> ********************************
> To Dan:
>
> I HAD WRITTEN:
> The area where I am concerned the MOQ may be guilty of emotivism
arises
> with
> Pirsig's statement that DQ is superior to sq -- that dynamic freedom
is
> better than static patterns. What support does Pirsig give for this
> assumption? I can find none. Can anyone else? Is this not an
emotive
> statement? It would be one thing if he only stated that reality can
be
> divided into DQ and sq. Or if he only pointed out that the course of
> evolution has indeed been toward dynamic advance. But he doesn't stop
> there. He states that "In general, given a choice between two courses
to
> follow and all other things being equal, that choice which is more
Dynamic,
> that is, at a higher level of evolution, is more moral."
>
> PLOP! There it is! The emotive assumption of the MOQ. Or is it???
>
> DAN:
> This assumption is grounded in our American
> system of democracy and it seems a bit of
> a shame to me that Pirsig did not further pursue his thesis, for it
> seems our system of "grass root government" existed on this
> continent for hundreds and thousands and maybe even tens of
> thousands of years before the Europeans began arriving in the
> 15 and 1600s.
>
> If you want proof of Pirsig's statement, look no further than your
local
> town meeting or newspaper. Pirsig is not making an emotive
> statement at all, in my estimation.
>
> ROG:
> This is certainly an example of where Dynamic seems more moral than
static.
> Pirsig includes others. However, I would hope that such a fundamental
> postulate would have more support than just a series of supporting
cases (
> After all, I can say "mammals swim in the sea," and give supporting
examples
> of whales and dolphins, but I sure wouldn't use this as proof that "In
> general, things that swim in the sea are mammals."
>
> If Pirsig's philosophy hinges on the statement that that which is more
> dynamic is more moral, we need to ensure that this is not an emotive
> statement. It needs more support than a handfull of examples and the
empty
> assurance that "Robert feels it is true, so it is true." An emotive
> postulate would open the MOQ up to charges that it allows
biological/social
> values to consume an intellectual pattern. This would make the MOQ a
low
> quality metaphysics based on its own terms. It would be no different
than
> ethics that say:
>
> "Choices that preserve the highest degree of pattern are more moral,"
or,
>
> " That which maximizes happiness is more moral", or
>
> "That which God decrees is more moral (and I am his messenger)"
>
> I have offered the suggestion that the MOQ can escape this emotive
charge if
> we replace it with the postulate that DQ = morality = reality = direct
> experience. I believe this is implicit in Lila, but I can see where
others
> could disagree. See my other post for clarification. I also am very
open to
> any alternative solutions. What I cannot understand is how anyone can
ignore
> the issue, especially considering it that it was part of the topic of
the
> month. Everyone agrees that the MOQ's morality cannot be dismissed
based on
> the assumptions of SOM -- one of which is the assumption that morality
is
> only an emotive social issue. However, there was very little
discussion of
> whether any of the postulates of the MOQ appear emotive.
>
> DAN:
> Dynamic Quality cannot be
> conceived, only perceived. Just as soon as conceptions enter into the
> picture, Dynamic Quality becomes something else, something static and
> rigid......
>
> Dynamic Quality must be kept concept-free while morality is a concept.
> They cannot be equal, in my estimation.
>
> ROG:
> Dan, I concur that DQ cannot be equal to static, conceptualized
morality. In
> Ch 13, RMP resolves this issue for us...."Finally there is a 4th
Dynamic
> morality,which isn't a code. He supposed you could call it 'the code
of art'
> or something like that..... The morality of the Brujo in Zuni -- that
was
> Dynamic morality."
>
> On the last page of Ch 29 he further elaborates that "good" is not
> intellectual or social, "It is direct everyday experience. Through
this
> identification of pure value with pure experience the MOQ paves the
way for
> an enlarged way of looking at experience....""
>
> The terms value, good, quality, reality, experience and morality are
often
> used interchangeably in Lila (though not always). All these terms are
> pre-conceptual Perhaps it would be accurate to say they are the
"concepts of
> the inconceivable." Or as Keith once wrote, they are "placeholders to
remind
> us that the static intellectual patterns we use to describe the world
are not
> the world itself." [See one of the great MOQ exchanges of all time in
the
> Keith/Diana discussion on this issue in the summer of 1998. That
discussion,
> as is true with this one and is possibly true of ZMM to Lila, depends
upon
> the relationship of DQ to Quality. How can the undefineable Quality
of ZMM
> become undefineable DQ and defineable sq????? Is DQ the same as Q?
What is
> sq in terms of DQ?]
>
> DAN:
> We are perceivers of Dynamic
> Quality and conceivers of static quality. Perception arises very
> mysteriously, spontaneously, while conception requires the foundation
of
> social and intellectual patterns of value; that which is is static
> quality. The more we try and understand Dynamic Quality the further
away
> we get from "it". To get closer to Dynamic Quality one must let go of
> ALL static patterns of value.
>
> ROG:
> I agree with your last sentence. I would suggest that DQ is not
something
> perceived as much as it is perceiving. It is not so much something
> experienced, it is direct experience. However, this is old ground
between us
> and probably not germaine to this discusiion.
>
> DAN:
> The question then becomes: Can we attain an
> enlightened state and still be part of
> the world as we know it?
>
> Enlightenment arises when one is engaged in right practice,
> so the old adage "practice makes perfect" only applies when such
> practice is right. By constantly evaluating the preconditioned
environment in
> which we find ourselves at any time in a Dynamic fashion, (i.e.
without prior
> judgments) life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is achieved.
>
> ROG:
> OK. No argument from me on your conclusions, but if we want to build
a
> metaphysics that comes to this conclusion, we need to start with more
than an
> unfalsifiable emotive claim.
>
> But I could be wrong,
>
> Rog
>
>
> ------- End of forwarded message -------
>
>
> MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
------- End of forwarded message -------
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
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