Hello everyone
"Jonathan B. Marder" wrote:
>
> Hi Mark, Dan and all,
>
> Both Mark and Dan seem to agree with my suggestion that the MoQ is
> nothing but metaphor.
> The MoQ even has its own special name for metaphors - they are called
> "Static Patterns of Value". Note that here I depart with Dan's statement
> that
> >A metaphor is
> >an intellectual pattern of value in Robert Pirsig's MOQ.
>
> After all this time in the Lila Squad/MF/MD, I still don't fully get the
> difference between "pattern" and "INTELLECTUAL pattern". I regard the
> word "intellectual" as arrogant and superfluous, and I say therefore
> that ALL patterns are metaphors
Hi Jonathan
I made that statement almost as a matter of fact and beyond challenge.
If metaphor is not a static intellectual pattern of value in Pirsig's
MOQ, then what is it? Perhaps a static social pattern of value... for we
would seem to have no need of metaphor if there is nothing to
communicate. Still, I
believe this fits in nicely with Mark's question:
(1) How are the intellectual patterns we call metaphors
generated in MOQ terms?
Hi Mark
In MOQ terms, metaphors value preconditioned cultural agreements. In
other words, metaphors are not so much generated as they tend to
spontaneously appear when conditions are right. I
would say the MOQ has no quarrel with Jonathan's statement: "ALL
patterns are metaphors," and looking to Chapter 13 of Lila's Child:
http://members.tripod.com/~Glove_r/Child22.htm
under the section "Pirsig on Space and Time" Pirsig writes:
“The word ‘mind’ is freighted with all sorts of historic philosophical
disputation. Buddhists use it
much differently than Western idealists who use it much differently than
Western materialists. Like
the term ‘God,’ it’s best avoided. To prevent confusion, the MOQ treats
‘mind’ as the exact
equivalent of ‘static intellectual patterns’ and avoids use of the term
when possible.” (From Pirsig’s
letter to Ant, January 2nd 1998)
We could say that if all patterns are metaphors, then mind must also be
treated metaphorically and looked upon as static intellectual patterns.
Normally we might think of a metaphor as
something that's not real, but according to the MOQ, intellectual
patterns of value are every bit as real as inorganic and biological
patterns of value, even though there is a lack of physicality to
intellectual patterns of value. But we are on the same page here, it
seems.
I can see Jonathan's point about intellect being, as Pirsig says about
mind, "freighted with all sorts of historic philosophical disputation."
And maybe it's use is best avoided...
> Jonathan:
> Some of you will recall me saying that DQ isn't reality, but the
> precursor of reality. My understanding of the MoQ's ontology is that
> reality comes about when DQ is REALized as Static Patterns, i.e. as
> metaphors.
>
> OTOH, the ontology of materialism says that reality is composed of
> material things, a view criticised in an interesting article "Where
> Newton went wrong" (
> http://www.cyberlife-research.com/articles/newton.htm ) cited by Peter
> Lennox in MoQ-Discuss.
>
> In the on-line article, Steve Grand says of our materialist obsession:
> <QUOTE>
> This is reflected (or perhaps compounded) by our strangely pejorative
> use of language. For some reason "material facts" are good, while if a
> thing is "immaterial" it is irrelevant. Likewise, "tangible assets" are
> better than "intangible ones" and "substantial" means something
> positive, while "insubstantial" is derogatory. Even the word "matter"
> carries emotive baggage when we discriminate between things that matter
> and things that don't!
> But suppose we've got it all wrong. Suppose the distinction between
> matter and form is false and misleading. Suppose tables and chairs are
> made of the same "stuff" as minds, rather than the other way around.
> </QUOTE>
>
> This may lend credence to the claim that the MoQ represents an expansion
> of (materialistic) rationality.
> According to the MoQ, patterns of substance are just a subset of
> patterns of value, i.e. a special sort of metaphor greatly valued by
> scientists.
>
> That's all very fine, but DAN says:
> >The embodied metaphor of language cannot be analyzed further, for who
> is
> >it that can step outside of language to do the analyzing? Therefore, it
> >would seem any hope of uncovering a catechism of the MOQ in this
> >intellectual fashion is doomed to failure.
>
> MARK disagrees:
> >I think we can indeed analyze metaphor further, and can do
> >so 'inside of language', which was the crux of my topic
> >suggestion for this month.
Yes we can make the attempt... but:
"...It wasn't that the question wasn't answerable. It was answerable but
the answer went on and on and you never got done." (Lila, paperback page
159)
It would seem that this is what Niels Bohr was describing when he talked
of "word pictures which may not be analyzed further." As soon as a
catechism of quality is devised it becomes something other than what it
professes to be. The answer keeps going on and on; formless until
encountering form then shifting into new forms, spontaneously.
> Jonathan:
> I agree with both Dan and Mark!!!!!
> The nature of language or any other symbolic system is that it is
> infinitely extensible. One can step outside of yesterday's language into
> a shell of new language that becomes part of the language of today.
> Thus (to agree with Dan), the language we step out of is yesterday's.
> But (to agree with Mark), the language we remain inside is today's.
>
> However, when Mark continues:
> >The moral framework of the MOQ
> >better allows for the analysis of intellectual patterns in
> >terms of their origin and evolution...
> I again want to drop the "intellectual" word. By recognising the
> infinite extensibility of metaphor, we allow for evolution and emergence
> of new patterns.
>
> > (Is this not Pirsig??)
> Perhaps, but that doesn't necessarily mean that the MoQ has any
> exclusive claim on the idea. IMO, the ongoing expansion of language and
> metaphor underscores the entire human experience.
Going back to the Pirsig quote I offered above: "To prevent confusion,
the MOQ treats
‘mind’ as the exact equivalent of ‘static intellectual patterns’" it
would seem that in an effort to clarify Pirsig has actually further
confused the issues here. Normally when we say "it's all in your mind"
we are saying that the supposed is not what it seems. But the MOQ
differs in stating intellectual patterns of value are every bit as
"real" as inorganic, biological and social patterns. Mind is to be
treated as exactly equivalent to static intellectual patterns of value,
but then, of course, we are back to defining exactly what mind is.
As to the ongoing expansion of language and metaphor, I like to think of
it as more a matter of a constant renewal and regeneration. Thank you
both for your stimulating thoughts.
Dan
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
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