FROM: Rog
TO: All
RE: Problems with the MOQ;
1) The levels are not defined well. As such, users of the MOQ come to wide
disparities in view points. This issue is complicated by the fact that
things are often a collection of patterns -- sometimes of varying levels.
This second issue is not a defect, but it puts even more emphasis on the
necessity of clear definitions of the levels.
2) Pirsig's rational morality does not work within levels as written. There
is no rational way to resolve same-level conflicts. This is where most of
the interesting action lies. BTW, I do believe there is a solution to this
inherent in the MOQ, I just think Pirsig missed it.
3) The rational morality doesn't consider matters of degree. For example, we
agree that a nation has more quality than a cow, but does the most inept,
corrupt, and insignificant little dictatorship have moral precedence over all
herbivores? A forestry corporation may be more moral than a log, but is it
more moral than the entire rainforest? Again, I think this is solvable within
the MOQ, but Pirsig missed it.
4) Free will -- I have had trouble with his explanation for years. The
interesting thing is that it is actually starting to grow on me now. Again
though, he could have explained it better. I believe members of this forum
have explained it better.
5) The conjecture that Indians had some huge influence on American thought is
never supported well. It reads like some type of lame political correctness.
This doesn't affect the MOQ appreciably, if at all, though.
6) RMP's definition of evolution is not in agreement with conventional
science. Evolutionary biologists do not rank humans above bacteria on any
evolutionary scale. This is not a problem if Pirsig clarifies this
discrepancy and justifies it, but he doesn't. Again, I believe it is easily
corrected by stating that evolutionary hierarchy is established by the
dynamicness of a species. On the other hand, I don't know what the process
should be to rationally rank species by this undefinable factor. If it can't
be done, then it undermines the rational morality of killing a germ to save a
man.
7) Pirsig does not explain well how levels emerge out of underlying levels.
this is critical to the metaphysics, and deserves more focus.
8)Pirsig equates quality with morality. However, his case is extremely weak.
He easily shows that morality is a type of quality, but this does not mean
that the opposite is always true (A is a subset of B does not prove the
equivalence of A and B -- giraffes are mammals, but mammals aren't all
giraffes). Pirsig doesn't say that quality is truth or quality is pleasure
or satisfaction, in fact he carefully clarifies that each of these is only a
subset of quality . Unfortunately, he doesn't follow his own advice on
morality.
9) He focuses lots on conflict, but not enough on cooperation and harmony.
This is a minor quibble.
In general, I believe that most of the problems inherent in the MOQ are ones
of ommission. I believe they are all correctable, with the minor exception
of equating morality with quality, and this is more of a distortion of old
terms than anything else.
Rog
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
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