Roger and Foci.
You have listed these difficulties regarding the MOQ:
> 1) The levels are not defined well. As such, users of the MOQ come
> to wide disparities in view points. This issue is complicated by
> the fact that things are often a collection of patterns -- sometimes
> of varying levels. This second issue is not a defect, but it puts
> even more emphasis on the necessity of clear definitions of the
> levels
.
I highly recommend Magnus' dimensional model.In his words:
The beauty of the dimensional approach is that it absolutely
guarantees that such platypi will never happen. The definition of
a dimension is that the only way to express anything in that
dimension is to use a unit of that dimension. For example, the
only way to express time is by using a unit that expresses
time, the only way to express length is by using a length unit
and so on.
> 2) Pirsig's rational morality does not work within levels as
> written. There is no rational way to resolve same-level conflicts.
> This is where most of the interesting action lies. BTW, I do believe
> there is a solution to this inherent in the MOQ, I just think Pirsig
> missed it.
Examples of same-level conflicts ....for all levels please.
Primitive societies were tyrrannic to say the least, yet the VALUE
of banding together, hoarding/rationing against famine, regulating
hunting, grazing grounds for livestock, marriage, clean/unclean
food, sex ..every minute aspect of life .... immensely exceeded
the purely biological birth-copulation-death-existence. What you
call...most inept, corrupt etc... is social value more refined than the
modern democracy which is intellect-influenced beyond
recognition. If small backward dictatorships takes precedence over
"all herbivores" isn't relevant, as is buisness corporations vs
rainforests.
> 3) The rational morality doesn't consider matters of degree. For
> example, we agree that a nation has more quality than a cow, but
> does the most inept, corrupt, and insignificant little dictatorship
> have moral precedence over all herbivores? A forestry corporation
> may be more moral than a log, but is it more moral than the entire
> rainforest? Again, I think this is solvable within the MOQ, but
> Pirsig missed it.
> 4) Free will -- I have had trouble with his explanation for years.
> The interesting thing is that it is actually starting to grow on me
> now. Again though, he could have explained it better. I believe
> members of this forum have explained it better.
This is THE PROBLEM and I hope you have something good
cooking, we will compare notes later.
> 5) The conjecture that Indians had some huge influence on American
> thought is never supported well. It reads like some type of lame
> political correctness.
> This doesn't affect the MOQ appreciably, if at all, though.
Agreement.
> 6) RMP's definition of evolution is not in agreement with
> conventional science.
This isn't exactly news because he claims to have unified science
and creationism. None of them can fully remain the same after the
MOQ "unification".
> Evolutionary biologists do not rank humans above bacteria on
> any evolutionary scale.
There is no value in science, but I believe that even biologists
regard evolution as an advancement; that a human being is of
higher rank than a bacterium. The bone of contention is what
motivates this drift. Pirsig states that there is a dynamical pull
rather than an evolutionary push and his argumentation is most
persuasive.
> This is not a problem if Pirsig clarifies this
> discrepancy and justifies it, but he doesn't. Again, I believe it
> is easily corrected by stating that evolutionary hierarchy is
> established by the dynamicness of a species.
What "discrepancy"? That mammals are more complex than
amoebas?
> On the other hand, I don't know what
> the process should be to rationally rank species by this
> undefinable
> factor. If it can't be done, then it undermines the rational
> morality of killing a germ to save a man.
The higher value of an human organism over a germ is the Social
and Intellectual levels that it is the carrier of, not its biological
superiority...as I understand it.
> 7) Pirsig does not explain well how levels emerge out of
> underlying
> levels. this is critical to the metaphysics, and deserves more
> focus.
Doesn't he? This is the most extensively and best founded part
IMO.
> 8)Pirsig equates quality with morality. However, his case is
> extremely
> weak. He easily shows that morality is a type of quality, but this
> does not mean that the opposite is always true (A is a subset of B
> does not prove the equivalence of A and B -- giraffes are mammals,
> but mammals aren't all giraffes).
This point I have commented on before. The giraffe/mammal logic is
OK, but "quality NOT morality" eludes me. Is it for instance that
he says that truth is an intellectual value pattern, but not that all
IVPs are true?
> Pirsig doesn't say that quality is truth
> or quality is pleasure or satisfaction, in fact he carefully
> clarifies that each of these is only a subset of quality .
> Unfortunately, he doesn't follow his own advice on morality.
Pleasure and satisfaction are qualities (even in SOM!) I don't
understand the concern that patterns of value (sub-sets) are inferior.
Dynamic Quality can't be realized other than through static
patterns.The best possible quality at any given stage.
> 9) He focuses lots on conflict, but not enough on cooperation and
> harmony. This is a minor quibble.
He probably foresaw the MoQ Dicuss/Focus :-)
> In general, I believe that most of the problems inherent in the MOQ
> are ones of ommission. I believe they are all correctable, with the
> minor exception of equating morality with quality, and this is more
> of a distortion of old terms than anything else.
Morality? Is there something special about this term that makes it
different from the term 'morals'? Or is it the eternal "ethics" issue
again? You possibly mean that Quality isn't always compatible
with SOM's ethics, in which case you are rigth, but is this a charge
to be brought against the MOQ?
Still reading me Roger?
Bo
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
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