all,
> - Describe 'object' in terms of MOQ; which are its static parts, and which are its dynamic parts ?
> - Describe 'subject' in terms of MOQ; which are its static parts, and which are its dynamic parts ?
> - Describe the relation between subject and object in terms of MOQ, and show why the object-subject split is denied by MOQ.
Last statement first:
> "What the Metaphysics of Quality would do is take this separate category,
> Quality, and show how it contains within itself both subjects and
> objects....Quality is the primary empirical reality of the world..." pg. 76
The MoQ does not deny the subject-object split. It just asserts that it
is not the best or the primary split. In both Lila and his SODV paper
Pirsig relates SOM to the MoQ this way:
> " A conventional subject-object metaphysics uses the same four static patterns
> as the Metaphysics of Quality, dividing them into two groups of two;
> inorganic-biological patterns called "matter" and social-intellectual patterns
> called "mind". But this division is the source of the problem. When a subject-
> object metaphysics regards matter and mind as eternally separate and eternally
> unlike, it creates a platypus [paradox] bigger that the solar system" Lila-pp 153
What is often overlooked is that it SOM, not Pirsig or the MoQ, that
divides these four divisions with the top two as subjective and the
bottom two as objective. While it has been argued ad nauseum that "SOM"
is also Pirsig creation, a strawman. I don't believe you will find where
he tries to reconcile the
"relation between subject and object in terms of MOQ."
If we start here,
> " Dynamic Quality is a stream of quality events going on for ever and ever,
> always the cutting edge of the present. But in the wake of the of this cutting
> edge are static patterns of value." S.O.D.V. pp 12.
that prior to, or at these events there are no splits, subject and
object or any other divisions. Based on that and in reference to the
first two questions I think the only way describe the dynamic in
relation to subject and object is that only the one, or union of
(subject/object) experience dynamically. Or in other terms dynamic
events split or create the subject and the object.
But do they split as suggested above? And would that be consistent with
the MoQ ?
It fairly obvious from the second quote that Pirsig doesn't think so in
that this arrangement '"creates a platypus [paradox] bigger that the
solar system"
I have proposed, based on primarily on Wilbur's work, that the most
appropriate MoQ subject/object split is right down the middle of all the
static levels. That all static patterns of value can be viewed as having
an objective and subjective component. Or as Wilbur put it an internal
component,which is only subject to interpretion by an observer but
experienced and known only by the subject. And the external component
which is subject to empirical verification.
3WD
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
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