From: sqsqcoherence@netscape.net
Date: Wed Feb 16 2005 - 20:47:34 GMT
Hi all,
B: Does it do what Pirsig wants it to do? That is, in the MoQ, DQ is
primary, and this is "felt" (think of the baby before S/O thinking) - but if
DQ is the source from which other levels are derived, is that derivation
direct (so we have DQ -> Intellectual level) or is that derivation indirect
(so we have DQ -> biological level -> Intellectual level)? So far as I had
understood it, the levels have independent "access" to DQ, but my concern is
that Pirsig is making the biological level primary to our understandings,
hence the quote that he thinks is so good from Copleston: "the experience in
question can be regarded as an obscure, virtual knowledge of reality which
is the 'presupposition' of metaphysics and which the metaphysician tries to
recapture at a higher level."
Mark 16-02-05: I've already answered this question.
Let me put it like this, the pre-intellectual understanding would seem to be
equated with biological quality. If so, then there is no independent access
of the intellectual level to DQ.
Mark 16-02-05: I have already answered this question.
D: We need to distinguish "emotion" from "feeling'
Mark 16-02-05: I've already answered this question: They are at different levels of Biological evolution.
What is interesting, however, is that there are undoubted biological
manifestations of these emotions - think of blushing with shame. So that
might be classified as the biological manifestation (consequence) of a
social pattern. Then with the intellectual satisfaction of solving a
problem, which will also have physiological correlates (euphoria etc), that
would be the biological manifestation of an intellectual pattern (or, more
precisely, a change in an intellectual pattern - DQ).
Mark 16-02-05: Blushing is a reaction to the 'other'. The other may be a mate or an enimy, etc. Blushing is essentially Biological pattern which social patterns may dominate.
This suggests to me that if we are to take on board an equation of "feeling"
with biological Quality, then we need to use "emotion" as a broader term,
transferable across the upper three levels. So there might be a biological
emotion of lust or fear which produces biological feelings; and a social
emotion of pride or humiliation which produces biological feelings; and an
intellectual emotion of satisfaction or aesthetic appreciation which also
produces biological feelings. In each case what is primary is the emotion
(an effect produced by the interaction between different patterns of each
level) with the biological quality following on afterwards.
Mark 16-02-05: The phrase, 'Coherence in and across levels' springs to mind.
I don't think the above should be all that contentious. What might be,
however, is this expansion of point D to connect with point B. That is, if
I, in my reading, come across something new which allows an increase in my
understanding, and I feel pleasure from this, does this pleasure not flow
from the intellectual patterns of my understanding? Which is a mundane
demonstration of the secondary quality of biological patterns, at least in
this example.
Mark 16-02-05: You are now answering yourself Sam. You have just demonstrated that DQ acts directly at the Intellectual level. "Does it do what Pirsig wants it to do? That is, in the MoQ, DQ is primary, and this is "felt" (think of the baby before S/O thinking) - but if
DQ is the source from which other levels are derived, is that derivation
direct (so we have DQ -> Intellectual level) or is that derivation indirect (so we have DQ -> biological level -> Intellectual level)"?
And therefore, there must be independent access of
intellectual patterns to DQ, and our awareness is not ultimately dependent
on biological patterns.
Mark 16-02-05: Bravo.
That is, our primary awareness of value, of good or bad, is not equivalent
to "feeling" understood as biological Quality. So if we are to stick with
the definition of "feeling" as biological Quality, we must be careful to use
some other term when describing our primary discernments of value. And
therefore when, after Copleston says "We may very well ask, however, what
Bradley means by saying that reality is spiritual, and how this statement is
compatible with describing reality as sentient experience. And to answer
these questions we must recall his theory of an immediate basic
feeling-experience or sentient experience in which the distinction between
subject and object, with the consequent sundering of ideal content from that
of which it is predicated, has not yet emerged" and Pirsig asserts [[This is
Dynamic Quality.]], we must respectfully disagree. For DQ is not only
accessed by "feelings".
Mark 16-02-05: But this is an analogy for that which is then used at a 'higher level' by the metaphysician.
Which is a long way of saying that our "experience" of Quality must not be
equated with the biological level. Quite how we are to then understand
"experience", precisely as something *distinguished* from biological
Quality, I don't know. But I'm sure we can have fun talking about it.
Sam
Mark 16-02-05: Speak for yourself.
ALl the best,
Mark
__________________________________________________________________
Switch to Netscape Internet Service.
As low as $9.95 a month -- Sign up today at http://isp.netscape.com/register
Netscape. Just the Net You Need.
New! Netscape Toolbar for Internet Explorer
Search from anywhere on the Web and block those annoying pop-ups.
Download now at http://channels.netscape.com/ns/search/install.jsp
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_focus/
MF Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_focus follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/mf/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Feb 16 2005 - 20:50:30 GMT