From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Sat Mar 12 2005 - 18:17:50 GMT
Hi Wim, DMB,
Catching up on your two posts here. Wim first.
> You also wrote:
> 'My point is that [the word "experience" when understood as "primary
> discernment of value"] is ... doing something different to what the word
> "experience" normally does.'
>
> Are you sure? Isn't "primary discernment" THE meaning of "experience" as
> used in empiricism? See also Pirsig's comparison of his MoQ with James'
> "radical empiricism" at the end of 'Lila' chapter 29. At least James'
> radical empiricism strips the SOM ("objective") baggage off the term
> "experience" (according to Pirsig).
Er, no, not so far as I understand it. I think there is all the difference
in the world between 'discernment' and 'experience', not least that the
former necessarily refers to a relationship. I agree that Pirsig is wanting
to strip away the 'objective' assumptions of this language, but what I am
questioning is whether it is legitimate to do so, ie, whether in broadening
the use of the term in the way he wants, he hasn't in fact denuded it of all
specific content. Matt has said more about this before, but let me give you
an example.
I say "I am a great footballer". My friends say "but you never play!". And I
say "But I play it out in my mind, and in my imagination there is no greater
striker of a dead ball than me". And they say "but that's not football" -
and I say "it is in my philosophy". Something essential to the nature of
football has been lost in its transition from the open grassy field to the
realms of my imagination. And whilst that transition might work from all
sorts of other perspectives, it would be misleading to simply accept my
mental imaginings as 'football' without further ado.
In the same way, it seems to me that Pirsig is using the language of
empiricism whilst trying to jettison something essential to its normal use,
ie a reliance on sensed experience (understood as equivalent to the
biological level in the MoQ). The normal language of empiricism uses the
language of experience in a way that maps neatly onto the biological level
(ie evidence that comes in via the senses). Whereas the MoQ must use it in
an analogous sense, not a literal sense - and it is the literal sense which
has given empiricism its historical sense.
Which leads us back to the question: what is 'sensation' in the MoQ, how do
we 'sense' value. I am starting to suspect that it is a metaphor that has
lost its home, and that, just as my claiming that my imaginative endeavours
qualify as football, this is language idling, gone on holiday.
> Finally you asked:
> 'So you are saying that you can have a full description of blushing
> without
> reference to the biological components?'
>
> No, a blushing cannot be fully explained without describing the ability to
> blush and I wrote that the ability to blush IS explained by a biological
> pattern of value.
> Blushing is in my interpretation not a manifestion at the biological level
> (in biological patterns of value) of emotions at the social or
> intellectual
> level. Just as interpreting black dots on a white computer screen as your
> ideas doesn't lead me to think that your ideas are changing inorganic
> patterns of value, interpreting blushing as a symbol for shame (at the
> intellectual level) or as an indication of a status problem (at the social
> level) doesn't mean that shame and status problems can change biological
> (DNA configured) patterns of value. The higher levels apply lower level
> patterns of value; they don't 'manifest' themselves in lower level
> patterns
> of value.
That sounds reasonable.
dmb confesses to being naughty:
> I do not own the book and have not read it. Never said otherwise. There is
> no way to prove it to anyone, but I can honestly tell you that the idea
> came
> first, then the search began, then I read the review, which only confirmed
> the original hunch.
I believe you.
> Suspicious of your assertion that "intentional" emotions
> are about the world, rather about the way our intentions effect the way we
> feel about the world, I went and asked Mr. Google and was happy to find a
> relevant quote from her book so quickly. However, I should have mentioned
> the reviewer or used a different term than he did or both. So I'd have to
> say that you've Correctly inpunged my integrity and no apology is
> required.
> But the point remains even while my integrity lies in tatters...
I think you've misunderstood the way that 'intentional' is used in this
context. I think it means that there is a necessary reference from the
emotion to the 'state of play' externally, not that there is some that we
are wanting to do with that state of the world (which is how 'intention' is
used in normal speech).
> dmb says:
> The point
> here is to show that Nussbaum is talking about static reality, the reality
> that is full of loves and hates, goods and evils, heros and villians. The
> primary empirical reality is prior to all that static sorting and sifting.
I'm not sure that this is a legitimate move in the argument. We're
necessarily talking about the understanding of various static patterns, the
levels, and how and where emotions fit or don't fit in those static
categories. To start bringing in talk of the primary empirical reality is
like removing the ball from the game. Yeah, let's agree that it's all
ultimately maya and illusion, but having agreed on that can we get back to a
bit of static sorting and latching?
We mentioned time - I think that does deserve a topic in its own right, so
I'll not say more about it here.
You said:
> I have to add that my hunch about Nussbaum was at least partly based on
> theme I detect throughout your posts. I don't just mean lately. It seems
> that you have tried to re-introduce the ego-self into the MOQ in various
> ways. Your eudaimonic MOQ, with its emphasis on "human flourishing", is an
> example. Also, if its not too much of a stretch, your concern that the
> worst
> thing about 9/11. Your distaste for the idea that DQ is a God without
> concerns for human affairs. There are other examples too. It seems that
> this
> wish to put that concept of the self back into the MOQ has been quite
> persistent. As I see it, its the same square peg in various forms and it
> never fits, no matter what the angle of attack happens to be. Maybe there
> is
> a good reason for that and it helps to explain why I could confirm my
> hunch
> in a matter of minutes.
It is absolutely the case that the realm of individuality is my big
disagreement with Mr P, in that the Buddhist tradition he buys into says
it's all an illusion, and I don't think it is. But I don't equate
individuality with the ego-self. Most of what you say about the ego-self I
agree with completely, I just think there's something about the individual
that can be characterised in terms of fourth level patterns and which leads
to a better understanding of the fourth level than 'intellectual'. But
that's a whole other issue.
But talking about themes running through posts - isn't it a bit odd that
your understanding of religion presumes the reality of individual choice,
but denies it any philosophical status, whereas my understanding of religion
emphasises the group and communal nature, but gives individuality a high
degree of philosophical status? Just a thought....
Sam
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_focus/
MF Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_focus follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/mf/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon Mar 14 2005 - 02:09:55 GMT