From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Mon Mar 14 2005 - 02:42:29 GMT
Hey Focusers! How do you feel about returning to some of Sam Norton's
original questions....
Sam asked:
In the context of the 19th Century Idealism which Copleston is discussing,
how is "feeling" related to the Romantic movement's conceptions, especially
Schleiermacher's understanding of it as the pre-rational 'immediate
self-consciousness' and ground of religion. (I think that they are the same
thing, and that there is the direct descent from this to Pirsig, but I
accept that this is controversial. People might want to avoid this element
for a while).
dmb says:
Take a look at what Pirsig says in his conclusions at the end of McWatt's
chapter 8, the one that has prompted nearly all of your questions. You'll
notice right away that he rejects that 19th century idealism and agrees with
Bradley so much because he is actually a mystic and not an idealist...
"As was stated in ZMM there was a time many years ago when I looked through
the pantheon of philosophers for resemblances to the MOQ. Since Bradley was
always classified as an idealist, it did not seem important to investigate
him thoroughly because the MOQ rejects the metaphysical assertion that the
fundamental reality of the world is idea.
But the description of Bradley as an idealist is completely incorrect.
Bradley's fundamental assertion is that the reality of the world is
intellectually unknowable, and that defines him as a mystic.
So It has really been a shock to see how close Bradley is to the MOQ. Both
he and the MOQ are expressing what Aldous Huxley called "The Perennial
Philosophy," which is perennial, I believe, because it happens to be true.
Bradley has given an excellent description of what the MOQ calls Dynamic
Quality and an excellent rational justification for its intellectual
acceptance. It and the MOQ can be spliced together with no difficulty into
a broader explanation of the same thing.
A singular difference is that the MOQ says the Absolute is of value, a point
Bradley may have thought so obvious it didn't need mentioning. The MOQ says
that this value is not a property of the Absolute, it is the Absolute
itself, and is a much better name for the Absolute than "Absolute."
Rhetorically, the word "absolute" conveys nothing except rigidity and
permanence and authoritarianism and remoteness. "Quality," on the other
hand conveys flexibility, impermanence, here-and-now-ness and freedom. And
it is a word everyone knows and loves and understands-even butcher shops
that take pride in their product. Beyond that the term, "value," paves the
way for an explanation of evolution that did not occur to Bradley. He
apparently avoided discussing the world of appearances except to emphasize
the need to transcend it. The MOQ returns to this world of appearances and
shows how to understand these appearances in a more constructive way."
dmb continues:
Another point he makes about the Absolute along the way, beside his joke
about Absolut being a brand of vodka, is one that raised a question. Sam
wondered why Bradley describes the Absolute as "sentient experience" only
analogically while Pirsig takes it literally. This is the same spot in the
text where Pirsig says "feeling corresponds to biological quality". And if
you look at it again I think you'll see that Pirsig is saying that the
Absolute is phenomenal, that reality literally IS sentient experience.
Bradley sort of has this idea of something beyond that and I think Pirsig is
insisting that, nope, experience is all there is. But this is hair splitting
and Bradley is very close to saying that too, most of the time. As you can
see from Pirsig's closing remarks, there are "excellent" parallels between
he and Bradley.
Sam asked:
How can we distinguish "feeling" from emotion? I have said before that I
think that the field of 'emotion' is a blind-spot in the MoQ, and Pirsig
often seems to have uncritically accepted an enlightenment bias against
emotion. But it seems to me fairly well-established now that emotions are,
at least in part, cognitive in character, so that enlightenment bias is
unsustainable. If so, in what way are "feelings" - understood as biological
Quality - to be distinguished from "emotions" - understood as, at least in
part, a pattern which operates on the intellectual level?
dmb says:
I don't about the enlightenment bias against emotion, but I'd certainly
agree that emotions have some cognitive content; they tell us how we feel
about things. I guess the debate would be over the relative value and
validity of that kind of information. But if the conversation is to
progress, as I've already mentioned, I think we have to get specific. What
emotions are you talking about here. Fear? Jealousy? Pride? Guilt? Anger?
Envy? Love? Hate? I don't how such things can be classified as intellectual
quality except if we're pointing out that emotions are based on the same
intellectual assumptions we use to interpret everything in our experience.
But if we're talking about where such things should be categorized within
the four levels of static quality, as Pirsig seems to be doing in putting
feeling at the biological level, it seems that the social level is the only
reasonable place to put that list of emotions.
But actually I think there is a reason why the MOQ seems to say so little
about emotions. I think emotions are largely generated by the desire to
maintain that egotistical self, that Ayn Randian pre-existing self, which is
rejected by the MOQ. I think this is roughly the same self that seeks
salvation and eternal life within Western theisms. It seems like one of
those incompatible elements and so trying to find these things within the
MOQ is going to lead to confusion. Even without re-reading this, I can tell
that it is not a very good explanation. But basically, if Pirsig has a bias
against emotion, it is a mystical bias and not an Enlightenment or
rationalist's bias. See? If the self is an illusion and emotions are all
about that self, then emotions can be quite the trap. They can keep us down
in the same way that vice can be a trap and keep us down, you know? We are
addicted to our egos. That isn't a medical statement, but it is literal.
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