james.mccabe (james@oranda.com)
Tue, 30 Sep 1997 03:59:19 +0100
Hi,
As a new member, I hope it's ok if I make some general remarks
on MoQ, say where I stand on some issues, and in particular give my
interpretation of the Levels of Quality. I am sorry if I am crossing
over some threads here, but what I have to say seems unified to me.
I am very fond of the Levels of Quality because they encourage
analogical thought, and they are especially useful in that they
provide a rich source of examples in which we can trace the action
of Dynamic Quality. There is a dynamic relationship between any two
adjacent levels characterised by the two functions that Maggie spoke
of: (1) a function of support and (2) a function of opposition. It's
a love-hate relationship: as if the lower level helps the higher
against its will, or is tricked into giving the higher level its
opportunity.
Each level depends absolutely on the level below it (as a whole) and
feeds off it like a parasite, or a rebellious slave turned master,
always seeking to achieve a sort of independence by broadening its
application - it liberates itself by finding alternatives and making
choices between them. (Of course I'm anthropomorphizing here, but I
do the best I can with the language I have. Language has its traps.
For instance I am sure we have all unconsciously used the
subject-object division a hundred times each in this forum. What we
really need is a new vocabulary.)
The higher quality arises from the "need" of the lower form, but then
starts to exhibit aberrations. For instance, if we say that existence
over time is the need of the inorganic level, organisms fulfill this
need
by the trick of reproduction, but it looks strange in comparison to the
values of cohesion, size, etc. otherwise dominant. Moving up a
level according to Richard Dawkins, the survival of the gene is
the ultimate value of biological evolution: but soon you get the deer
antlers that Hugo spoke of, and you need to explain things on a social
level because they seem "un-fit" on the lower level. And finally, it is
clear that a lot of intellectual behaviour appears aberrant at the
social level, even if it is finally justified.
Once the higher level is established it then turns on the lower levels
and starts to influence them - the intellect, for instance, "mediates"
the other levels means of tools both inorganic and cultural. Impulse
turns into manifestation. For example, social conflicts throw up
economic theories which begin to influence society, and whose effects
are felt right down to the inorganic spinning machine. History shows
that individual experiments (mere chance from a social perspective)
throw up inventions (e.g. the steam engine, the Web)
which had not been thought of much before they were invented - in
other words, technology drives society as much as society drives
technology, owing to the powerful if uneven development of intellect
in recent history.
Reading over Pirsig convinced me that the struggle for the independence
of intellect from society began around the time of the Greek
Cosmologists. It was the emergence of what I call "declarative thought"
from "procedural thought". Procedural thought knows of ways and means;
declarative thought knows of existence and models. The first man who
made
that remarkable leap of abstraction was the man who went from "This is
the way to do it," to "This is the way it is." Just who that was is a
matter for philosophologists.
The rational thought system of Western civilization is
very stable, with a proven record of supporting human/social needs,
but it is not so successful at representing individual emotions:
hence the need for Art. In general we are still very much in the
middle of the struggle between the social and the intellectual: for
instance it is still more common to condemn intellectual theories
because they encourage bad social practises than it is to condemn
social practises because they reflect poor judgement.
The higher level cannot altogether forget the lower level it stands
on, any more than a diplomat can permanently forget the people he is
supposed to represent. For instance, our tools have given us great
control over nature, but we could not continue this discussion without
the indulgence of the sun. Another example: our intellectual edifice
of science, mathematics, and literature has had great successes, but it
was developed in societies on just one side of the world; which is
why, I think, Diana gets a headache when Westerners talk about
Eastern society; because Western thought is not fully representative
of the social level worldwide. In relation to the development of quality
I would have to disagree with Bo when he says, "I don't think one
MORALITY can make much impact on the next higher MORALITY" (Bo's caps).
The higher values arise from the lower values and are, alas,
conditioned by them.
In considering the progress from one level to the next, it is tempting
to think of a final Ideal State, in which material, biological, and
social values would be present in their totality, but would
only be signs in a cosmic show. Theists will think of God; another try
is Hegel's Absolute - "the unity of the Subjective and Objective Idea" -
thought thinking about itself from Bertrand Russell's description. One
must also consider the possibility that levels beyond the intellectual
will evolve.
_
IMHO computers present a challenge to the Levels of Quality theory,
for here we seem to have static intellectual patterns directly
superimposed on inorganic patterns, the whole being characterised
by a notable lack of Dynamic Quality. I can't buy Magnus' ideas
about social patterns in computers, either in hardware or software,
but perhaps there will be more of a case for this idea if agents
become genuinely popular. ("Agents" are autonomous, goal-fulfilling
programs which persist over time, mostly in a state of waiting.)
Also, there is a lot of science-fiction potential in the growth of
the Internet as an intellectual superbeing.
-
Perhaps it is premature here to discuss such a tricky
concept as Dynamic Quality before settling matters about the Levels but
it would be highly interesting to see how it could be related to the
latest theories of evolution, systems theory and "emergent properties,"
and Hegel's dialectic (especially for me since I have no special
knowledge of any of these myself).
Lastly, on the current debate, the definition of definition:
definitions are essentially static intellectual patterns
which have the advantage of preserving gains, and the disadvantage of
limiting them; it's a bit like dumping shares once the price has risen
high enough. I would say that levels of quality are much more amenable
to definition than quality itself and so tentatively agree that it might
be helpful to make these definitions, providing that they are intended
as an aid for the understanding of new blood rather than a means of
circumscribing the understanding of developers. For there is
language outside of definition, and there is intellect outside of
language.
Alright, that's all I have to say for now, and I guess some things
I said are already taken for granted by you, and others will just look
ridiculous, but that's my interpretation of Lila.
James.
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