Doug Renselle (renselle@on-net.net)
Tue, 18 Nov 1997 03:02:52 +0100
To The Lila Squad (TLS),
Allow me to spend a little more time on this one question.
I will use the following mnemonics in the discussion below:
FAQ - Frequently Asked Questions
MoQ - Metaphysics of Quality
MoQese - A local language used to express the MoQ
MoQite - A practitioner of MoQ (Platt's mnemonic)
O, Os - Object, Objects
S, Ss - Subject, Subjects
SOM - Subject-Object Metaphysics
SOMese - A local language used to express the SOM
SOMite - A practitioner of SOM
SPoV - Static (/Stable) Patterns of Value
SQ - Static Quality
In my recent post responding to some of Diana's FAQ definitions I tried
to show why the answer to the question, "Does Lila have Quality?" is
emphatically, "No!"
However, we must think about this question more carefully than I did in
that post.
First let's recall that for purposes of discussion we must deal with at
least two contexts, each of which has their own reality: the SOM
context which we call SOM-land, and the MoQ context which we call
MoQ-land.
Let's ask the question using appropriate syntax and grammar in each of
these two contexts:
Context is SOM-land:
Note that the SOMites always spell Quality lower case. SOMites state
the question with the assumption that Quality properties are in and
possessed by things. SOMites subordinate Quality to objects.
As shown below, different perspectives give different answers. (SOMites
see this as paradox. MoQites see this as many truths (from which we
infer many contexts - see my post to Magnus and TLS, entitled, 'LS Re:
The four levels,' dated: 15Oct97).)
"Does Lila have quality?"
1. Rigel's local SOM-land answer - 'No!'
2. Phaedrus' MoQese answer transcribed for SOM-land - 'Yes!'
3. MoQ-land answer in SOM-land - 'No!'
For #1 we recognize that Rigel's (SOM) perspective is that the entity
Lila 'possesses' no quality properties (see page 38, hardbound Bantam).
For #2 we know that Phaedrus views Lila as a child of Quality, therefore
a SPoV, an instance of SQ. (Transcribed: I.e., he swapped Lila and
quality.)
For #3 we technically know that in MoQ no 'thing' (nothing) has Quality,
so the answer is unambiguously 'No!.'
Clearly, we see a few differences in how you answer depending on your
personal metaphysics. (E.g., SOMites believe that properties are IN
things. MoQites believe properties are interrelationships among things
we call SPoVs.)
[One very interesting aside: Do you recall that at the end of Lila,
Rigel seeks affirmation from Phaedrus that Lila Blewitt 'has quality?'
Could this be a SOMite, a SOM-lander reaching out for a new way of
thinking? Perhaps Rigel could help Lila and love her if she 'had
quality?']
Context is MoQ-land:
Note that MoQites spell Quality with capital Q. For an MoQite, things
are in Quality, therefore Quality cannot be in a thing. Things are
SPoVs born of Quality. SPoVs via the four SQ categories subsume and
unify SOM-land's Ss and Os in Quality.
"Does Quality have Lila?"
4. A SOMite's answer - Whoops! No answer! Just a stare and
concomitant confusion. Here is how you detect a SOMite! After some
delay you probably hear - 'No!'
5. An MoQite's answer - 'Yes!' (without hesitation)
A true SOMite does not know MoQ-land. Some of them don't even know
SOM-land, but practice there because that is where most of Western
culture lives. (Many Eastern cultures practice ontologies closer to MoQ
than to SOM.)
An MoQite intuits many truths and adapts to SOM-land and MoQ-land.
Hope this is helpful to you in understanding the answer to the FAQ about
Lila and Quality.
Mtty,
Doug Renselle.
-- " But quantum theory has destroyed the idea that only properties located in external physical objects have reality."Robert M. Pirsig, page 14 in his paper "Subjects, Objects, Data and Values," presented at the Einstein Meets Magritte conference, Fall 1995.
-- post message - mailto:skwok@spark.net.hk unsubscribe/queries - mailto:diana@asiantravel.com homepage - http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Forum/4670
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