RE: MD Pirsig the postmodernist?

From: Kevin (kevin@xap.com)
Date: Mon Mar 17 2003 - 19:28:15 GMT

  • Next message: Platt Holden: "Re: MD Pirsig the postmodernist?"

    Platt, to Matt:

    >These "other people" deciding what you should think is what gets me. It

    >makes the "Emperor's New Clothes" story the criteria for what's real.
    >
    > > This is why pragmatists replace
    > > the Tribunal of Reason with a Tribunal of People. Only other people

    > > are involved in judging our beliefs and actions.
    >
    >See what I mean? You, the individual, are incapable of knowing what to
    >believe and how to act. Only others can tell you, paving the way for
    >Big Brother and the Brave New World.
    >
    >Thanks Matt. You've made my case.
    >
    >Platt

    Johnny:
    I don't think Matt has a problem believing what he believes. It would
    be
    mighty hard to avoid that. What he's talking about those times that
    really
    matter: when people disagree about what is true. How does one confirm
    what
    they believe to be true execpt by confirming it with other people? We
    are
    talking to other people right now, aren't we? And please, if you are
    not
    wearing clothes, at least say you are wearing clothes and we'll go along

    with that.

    Kevin:
    Thanks, Johnny. I think Platt knows perfectly well (and Matt EE's post
    made perfectly clear) the difference between self-justified belief and
    when we attempt to justify them to others (for settling arguments,
    finding agreement or making conversation).

    I suspect Platt is just being a bit obtuse and can't help but play
    Devil's Advocate:-)

    I think Pirsig's "fence straddling" between post-modern and
    post-post-modern or modern (depending on which direction you see it) is
    entirely centered on this problem of personal justification vs. public
    justification.

    Pirsig has a strong mystic voice when he talks about personal beliefs
    and judgments. Many here find this part of his message most compelling.
    Knowing the things that no one can tell you, and other such acts of
    intuition/revelation. I think it's safe to say that it's the mystics who
    got most turned on by ZMM.

    But Pirsig can't stand the idea of being stuck not being able to justify
    those personal belief/judgments to anyone else. He's worried that he'll
    be stuck with "nothing to say" when the Gestapo comes. Justifiable to be
    sure. Most people react to mysticism and post-modernism with a twinge of
    defensiveness. What can you expect when the rug has been pulled out from
    under them? Pirsig clearly wants to overcome this perception and leave
    us with something concrete. Something to stop the Gestapo other than,
    "can't we discuss this and come to some kind of arrangement?".

    Pirsig wants to say to the Gestapo, "It's obvious you're wrong and here
    is why."

    Some of us think that no matter how hard Pirsig tries to construct some
    formal metaphysical system for making such a statement (and proving it),
    he never gets past the position of "If you thought like I did, you'd see
    this is wrong."

    Without accepting his redescriptions of Reality, his system of Patterns,
    his feelings about ineffable Dynamic Quality, there is nothing to say to
    the Gestapo. I happen to think this is why many of us who read Pirsig
    and find it so compelling are immediately drawn to the idea of
    "converting others" or "making a real difference". It's sprung up here
    in the forum several times in the last few months. Why? Because if we
    can get everyone to think like we do (provided we can finally settle on
    one interpretation of the difference between Social and Intellectual:=),
    we can finally justify ourselves to everyone else in a formal,
    systematic, foundational, air-tight way. That would help us solve real
    problems. But it's not the metaphysics that are solving the problems,
    it's people. And getting people to all think along similar lines will
    obviously make moral problems easier to solve.

    After all, if we didn't think differently, the Gestapo wouldn't be at
    our door would they?

    Now before Platt distorts this observation to say that I'm advocating
    "mob thinking" or that the way to save yourself is to don a swastika,
    let me clarify that I'm merely pointing out that metaphysics won't save
    us from tyranny. Being "right" or "better" won't keep a mob from
    lynching you.

    So what do we do about the Gestapo beating on our door? I humbly submit
    that at that point, no form of argumentation (no matter how
    metaphysically sound or logically constructed) is going to save you.
    Condemn them all you want. Personally, when the Gestapo comes for me,
    I'll be reaching for a weapon (and I don't mean my well-worn copy of
    LILA).

    No philosophy is armor against tyranny. This is not a short-coming of
    pragmatism or post-modernism or anything else. Historically, no
    philosophy has stopped tyranny. In fact, most philosophical movements
    have been used as justification for some form of tyranny or another
    (even Buddhism). The same Knock-down argument that is supposed to stop
    the Gestapo, is just as often the argument used to kick down your door.

    -Kevin

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