diana@hongkong.com
Tue, 9 Feb 1999 (to Rob Stillwell)
snip.....
> The way you put it there's a contradiction, but I think your SOM assumption
> is not quite right. As I understand it, the SOM says that there are two
> realms of reality: subjects who know things and objects which are known
> things. That's basically what Descartes said. So "I" can only be either
> psychic or physical. But the SOM later went on to decide that ony the
> physical is real. And finally it comes to the bizarre conclusion that the
> psychic is actually a feature of the physical, as well as possibly being
> separate from it.
Diana makes the very same observation (that Rob only addresses the
materialist SOM) as I do in my reply.
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Mon, 08 Feb 1999, Rob Stillwell wrote:
snip.....
> Now on to my second tidbit. I am afraid of going on a limb here.
> Although I thought of this, I am unsure if I believe it myself. I
> have tried to *prove* that consciousness is necessarily beyond SO
> matter....
Rob and Lila Squad.
Thanks for a most interesting post. The Penfield findings most people
have heard of I guess, but they are no less intriguing for that
reason. It reminds me of Benjamin Libet's experiments on exposed
brains, that revealed even graver problems for the usual picture of a
subject (SOM) mind inside our skulls monitoring objective reality and
overseeing our actions.
Can I interpret your interpretation of Penfield (if we take SOM as
the starting point!) as psycho-physical parallelism? Which means that
each and every sensation/emotion/memory/idea... etc have a physical
side to it? It's a conviction that he shares with Spinoza for
instance, and nothing that the MOQ objects to. No doubt about
thoughts having neural counterparts. It's the old voltage/magnetic
orientations versus the "novel" in a computer
No, SOM's problem is that if reality is split along the
subject-object axis (of which the psycho-physical is one variant)
there must be an isthmus connecting the two; the subject (mind) must
have a line of command to the object (body). When "I" decide to bend
a finger "my" will must make it across the mind/matter chasm, or when
I take a drink the alcohol must make it back to my mind to alter my
mood, and such a connection is not found and never will be, because
the SOM principally forbids it.
The fact that this is done a million billion trillion times each
day contradicts the SOM, and scientists like Penfield
and Libet and everyone concludes that there is no such barrier.
Struan Hellier brought a splendid well-founded argument backed
by Roger Sperry (him with the split-brain theory) that the
mind-matter division is artificial (Hellier concluded that the MOQ
was an "ugly complication), but no sooner have they said that before
they are up to their necks in the SOM mire, simply because that is
the metaphysical platform from which they view reality.
They believe that one aspect of a metaphysics can be "modified"
without the platform becoming unstable; and when they feel it
wobbling they stop and hastens to recant and fabricate some "new"
SOM-based theory of where mind is located or a "quantum mind" (the
safe haven for obscurists) or whatever. Everybody will understand
that my position is that those hailed as "almost" MOQ are the
greatest obstacles because they cover up the real issue.
Now, to your line of argument
> Step 1. There exists an unique, solitary, indivisible entity
> called "I".
Yes, this is the normal feeling and taken as a proof for
consciousness/mind in the SOM sense.
> This is where we step out of SOM. Be not a scientist but an
> experiencer. Take a deep breath. Ask yourself, "Did I feel
> that?". Count backwards from 10 to 1 and ask yourself. "Did I think
> that". That is the "I" am referring to. There are billions of
> possible experiences, but all relate to a solitary "I". The "one"
> that feels ones breath is the "one" that hears ones thoughts. That
> is why we refer to someone as some "one".
Out of SOM? This is so to say the proof of step 1. But it is no
proof. It is really only in "hearing one's thoughts" that the
"I"-identity is highlighted. Sensing a pain or a pleasure is not
possible simultaneously with focusing on self, you have to do a
little split second shift there, but we don't pay any attention to
that exercise.
> Step 2. SOM assumption. Reality is only made of matter and energy.
This is only the materialist SOM, its idealist side is just as
important, so if your reasoning is to prove that "consciousness" is
beyond matter, it is just as easily proved that it is not mind either.
> Step 3. "I" must somehow be defined in terms of matter and energy.
> (From 1 and 2).
> Step 4. A tiny unit of matter and energy does not contain (define)
> "I".
> It is would be absurd to think of "I" as a tiny molecule of matter
> and energy. Otherwise, it would be possible for a tiny molecule to
> be removed from my body and "I" would be removed. People do not
> lose consciousness, control of their body, or die if a tiny molecule
> is extracted from or naturally expelled by their body. What was
> once life-giving oxygen in my brain has likely been exhaled.
> Step 5. "I" can only be identified/defined by a macro system
> (recipe) of matter and energy not specific to any part.
> If "I" am not a tiny part of the body, "I" must be some synergetic
> collection of tiny parts. For example, "I" might have been created
> by (and defined as) a collection of oxygen, DNA, blood, and proteins
> fused together within a temperature range. "I" am defined by some
> recipe of "life" that scientists may -- or may not -- one day
> uncover.
> Step 6. Anything only defined as a recipe can be reproduced.
> Because "I" am not specific to any tiny part, "I" am reproducible.
> Hypothetically, one could collect all the molecules of my body as
> they were sweated, excremented, etc, arrange them properly and add
> some form of energy to reconstruct a perfect clone of me at some
> previous time.
> Step 7. Step 6. Contradicts step 1.
> There is only "I". Even if we could make perfect clones, each would
> have his/her own experiences. Therefore, the definition of each
> must allow for uniqueness. Because of the contradiction,
> materialism fails!! Assume that "I" could be something unique and
> beyond matter, and the contradiction disappears.
Yes.....but the Quality position is: "There is only experience"
and if that can be equalled to "I", fine. Uniqueness? Pain
hurts, pleasure attracts. The social need for sharing love and for
giving enthralls us all, as does the good feeling of a well
formulated argument or a mathematical equation (I believe, it's not
my field :-)). The uniqueness? Well, possibly does biological pain
not hurt equally to a soldier knowing it will secure his leaving the
war as a civilian in a dentist chair, but that is because dynamic
quality (circumstances) in one case makes higher Q-levels override
lower.
> If anyone can, please find the logical flaw. It makes complete
> sense to me, but the implications are so profound that I must have
> missed something!
No, no contradictions, it does a good job of refuting the materialist
SOM, but as I see it the idealist SOM is the greatest obstacle. And
we must focus on the real issue lest we turn into easy pray for the
MOQ hunters.
Finally re. the cloning issue itself. I don't think it's a "blow" to
the MOQ if a perfect machine (like Calvin and Hobbes cardboard
box) could do a teleportation. My only objection is to Horse's idea
that a higher level (intellect) can be extracted and grafted on to
another inorganic/biological/social experience.
Bodvar
MOQ Online - http://www.moq.org
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