Bo,
skutvik@online.no wrote:
[Bo:]"Feeling" is a terrible imprecise term and
occurs in all Indo-European languages it seems.
Sensation and emotion should be held separate. As I
see it the former is the biological "expression"
while the latter is the social one. ('Interaction'
and 'reason' the inorganic and intellectual)
[Scott:]Yes, it is imprecise, but there are difficulties with "emotion"
as well. Fear, it seems to me, can be biological or social. (I suspect
this is an old topic on this forum, so bear with me.)
[Scott prev:]A feeling of satisfaction at
solving a mathematical puzzle is intellectual.
[Bo:] Hmmm ....A feeling of satisfaction is an emotion and as such
social. We must not get too lofty regarding the q-intellect and forget
it's social origin, a stone ager (a social focussed existence) would be
as satisfied by thinking out a new designs for a pitfall as Archimedes
"eureka" experience. No, intellectual VALUE is not "symbolic logic" or
algebra or anything, but the value of dividing what is objective from
subjective. Something you point out below.
[Scott:]This doesn't seem right to me. I agree about the VALUE, but not
that a "eureka" experience is social (it may be partially on occasion,
as in "Wait'll I tell so-and-so what I just figured out", but there is
more to it than that.) Same problem with aesthetic delight, so again I
suspect this is an oft-discussed problem. Perhaps we need a new word? Or
can we just use "aesthetic", ignoring its etymology?
[And from your other post]
[Scott prev:]Now I should confess that I don't think the MOQ as
delineated in LILA has completely eliminated the mind/matter platypus
(but since it is primarily an inquiry into morals, that is excusable).
However, I would agree that the DQ/sq split is a step in the right
direction, while resurrecting the subject/object split as a metaphysical
founding principle is a mistake.
[Bo:]Don't spoil it dear Scott :-) The MoQ HAS eliminated the
mind/matter platypus if understood correctly.
[Scott:] I noticed in my last reading of LILA that Pirsig brings up
several platypi, including mind/matter, but doesn't bring up the One and
the Many, and so doesn't explicitly dissolve it. He does (implicitly)
rename it, however, as DQ/sq. So what I see as lacking is to show how
SOM beliefs keep us from understanding their proper relationship.
Coleridge and others make the important point that we must distinguish
without dividing, and I think this is the way forward. If we stop at
just dividing DQ from sq, the mind/matter platypus is still around,
asking how does the Many become One (in perception and cognition -- or
is it a case of the One becoming Many?). Perhaps we have to come to
understand that this is the wrong question to ask, or maybe we are
reduced to waiting for transcendence for the Answer. Which may be the
case. On the other hand, I think I would like to look deeper into James'
radical empiricism to see how he deals with it, if he does.
- Scott
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