Hi 3wd, Platt, Scott, Bo, John B,
Thanks 3wd. Exactly. The internal/external splitt is
important at the varying stable static patterns that
make up each level of the MOQ. The Internal/External
divide is very significant when you view the world
from the perspective of a single human being. For each
of us as we experience the world certain aspects of
the 3 levels of MOQ [Inorganic, Organic, Social] are
external to us. The level of Q-Intelect is experienced
as internal to us.
I beleive it is clear that:
feelings,
emotions,
sensations,
dreams
thoughts= both the reflective and the non-reflective
type [a reference to Scott's use of the colloqlial
term "monkey mind".]
These are all experienced as 'internal' to us. What
does not seem to be fully agreed upon is if these all
are Q-Intellect or Orgainic or? I consider all these
as making up each one of our own personal "Internal
Reality". And what I mean is that all of the above
are experienced personally and privately.
gary
--- 3dwavedave <dlt44@ipa.net> wrote:
> Bo, Gary, Scott, All
>
> On July 29th Bo said,
>
> > The good man Gary is inventing the
> internal/external
> > gunpowder over and over while Scott points to the
> fact that this issue was
> > brought to absurdity by Kant. It went like this:
> Berkeley showed that
> > qualities are internal and quantities external,
> but with Kant even the "filters"
> > (time, space, ..etc) that made the external
> quantities meaningful were
> > subjective (qualities) too!!!!. This is only a
> nudge away from saying that
> > quality is all there is, but the time wasn't ripe
> in the eighteen fifties ... hardly
> > in the nineteen fifties.
>
> But Bo, Gary is not suggesting Quality is not the
> basic groundstuff of
> reality just within the realms of static values an
> internal/external
> split is useful. Nor would I guess is he suggests
> that one realm is more
> "real" than the other. I'm sure you recall Pirsig's
> comment to McWatt
> some time ago (which I can't lay my hand on right
> now) in which he said
> in effect that the theory or hypothesis, "that there
> is an external
> world out there" was a good (useful) one. Does this
> not imply a
> corollary theory or hypothesis, that there is an
> internal world?
>
> In trying to find the quote refered to I ran across
> this on the website
> article by McWatt:
>
> > Pirsig has this to say about probability and
> preference:
> >
> > "When the distinction between them is examined
> an interesting fact appears. Preference
> > is always supposed to be subjective. It exists
> only at the intellectual and social levels. At
> > the biological level it becomes controversial as
> to whether animals such as cats have a
> > preference or if they function according to
> Skinnerian stimulus-and-response
> > probability. And at the atomic level it is
> assumed that only probability exists."
> >
> > "The MOQ puts an end to this ancient freewill
> vs. determinism controversy by showing
> > that both preference and probability are subsets
> of value. As the distinction between
> > subject and object becomes relatively
> unimportant in the MOQ, so does the distinction
> > between probability and preference. There is no
> basic difference between mind and
> > matter with regard to free will, only a
> difference in degree of freedom. Subatomic
> > forces can express limited preferences too."
> >
> > (letter from Robert Pirsig to Anthony McWatt,
> May 3rd, 1997)
>
> The old "B values precondition A" You value, prefer,
> grey pants. Yet
> every birthday your wife gives you a blue pair. In
> order not to hurt her
> feelings you never tell her that you prefer grey
> ones. Yet if you
> finally expressed this preference, this internal
> pattern of value, to
> her and magically next birthday a grey pair showed
> up would this not
> suggest, empirically, some sort of an
> internal/external split/connection?
>
> Moving on to a more heretical proposition to get
> your (oops their not
> your's, that would be internal) grey cells in an
> uproar. As you know
> I've worked on trying to correlate Pirsig's and
> Wilber's (Mr
> Internal/External) work. One of the problems is
> Pirsig assigns O to the
> two lower levels, S to the two upper which does not
> jive with Wilber's
> four quadrant system. But I've recently spotted
> another difference that
> is more troubling, the one/many or individual/group
> issue. All of
> Pirsig's levels, except social, seem to include
> patterns which are both
> one and many, individual and groups. However social
> is about patterns of
> groups or groups of groups.Or many/many values,
> instead of one/many.
> What Wilber does is treat group values as separate
> subsets or quadrants
> of evolving patterns removing "social" per se as one
> distinct or
> descrete evolving level. So while Jonathan suggests
> removing the
> intellectual level. I see the value in removing the
> social level in
> Pirsig's scheme when comparing it with Wilber in as
> much as Wilber
> devotes half his four quadrant scheme to collective,
> group, or social
> type values.
>
> 3WD
>
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