Hi Wavedave
On 29 July you wrote:
> But Bo, Gary is not suggesting Quality is not the basic groundstuff of
> reality just within the realms of static values an internal/external
> split is useful.
Does he merely regard it as "useful"? (Do you Gary?) To me it sounds as it
takes on the ominous SOM flavour.
> Nor would I guess is he suggests that one realm is
> more "real" than the other. I'm sure you recall Pirsig's comment to
> McWatt some time ago (which I can't lay my hand on right now) in which
> he said in effect that the theory or hypothesis, "that there is an
> external world out there" was a good (useful) one. Does this not imply
> a corollary theory or hypothesis, that there is an internal world?
Good! Definitely. To the degree of me wanting it to occupy a "goodness"
level of it's own. Intellect is the VALUE of the S/O (internal external) divide!!
But your phrase "does this not ...etc." sounds as if you mean outside the
static sequence. If the dynamic/static divide replaces the S/O one and
internal/external is another form of subjective/objective then it cannot be re-
introduced in the MOQ in its old capacity.
> In trying to find the quote refered to I ran across this on the
> website article by McWatt:
> > Pirsig has this to say about probability and preference:
> > "When the distinction between them is examined an interesting fact
> > appears. Preference is always supposed to be subjective. It exists
> > only at the intellectual and social levels. At the biological
> > level it becomes controversial as to whether animals such as cats
> > have a preference or if they function according to Skinnerian
> > stimulus-and-response probability. And at the atomic level it is
> > assumed that only probability exists."
Yes, Pirsig's way of integrating the S/O in the MOQ (Subjective=social and
intellectual. Objective=inorganic and biological) has its virtue as
demonstrated here.
> > "The MOQ puts an end to this ancient freewill vs. determinism
> > controversy by showing that both preference and probability are
> > subsets of value. As the distinction between subject and object
> > becomes relatively unimportant in the MOQ, so does the distinction
> > between probability and preference. There is no basic difference
> > between mind and matter with regard to free will, only a
> > difference in degree of freedom. Subatomic forces can express
> > limited preferences too."
> > (letter from Robert Pirsig to Anthony McWatt, May 3rd, 1997)
> The old "B values precondition A" You value, prefer, grey pants. Yet
> every birthday your wife gives you a blue pair. In order not to hurt
> her feelings you never tell her that you prefer grey ones. Yet if you
> finally expressed this preference, this internal pattern of value, to
> her and magically next birthday a grey pair showed up would this not
> suggest, empirically, some sort of an internal/external
> split/connection?
> Moving on to a more heretical proposition to get your (oops their not
> your's, that would be internal) grey cells in an uproar.
This may give me an handle. You regard "grey cells" (i.e. thinking) as
internal, but when an animal (Biology) applies its grey cells that's internal
too, and if so it don't follow the inorg.bio/soci.intell. lines ...which is Gary's
idea.
Also as Pirsig says: the probability/preference (determinism/free will)
runs right down to the inorganic level.
> As you know
> I've worked on trying to correlate Pirsig's and Wilber's (Mr
> Internal/External) work. One of the problems is Pirsig assigns O to
> the two lower levels, S to the two upper which does not jive with
> Wilber's four quadrant system. But I've recently spotted another
> difference that is more troubling, the one/many or individual/group
> issue. All of Pirsig's levels, except social, seem to include patterns
> which are both one and many, individual and groups.
Wonder how you regard the levels? At the inorganic what is "one"? An
atom, an electron, a quark or their wave aspect? And "many"? Molecules?
Composite material?
> However social is
> about patterns of groups or groups of groups.Or many/many values,
> instead of one/many.
Social value is about escaping the biological strictures, the group takes
precedence over the biological individual. This value spawns social
constellations, but the many/many aspect is as irrelevant as the one/many
at the inorganic level. Forget about Wilber he just messes up the beauty of
the MOQ.
> What Wilber does is treat group values as
> separate subsets or quadrants of evolving patterns removing "social"
> per se as one distinct or descrete evolving level. So while Jonathan
> suggests removing the intellectual level. I see the value in removing
> the social level in Pirsig's scheme when comparing it with Wilber in
> as much as Wilber devotes half his four quadrant scheme to collective,
> group, or social type values.
Well, you know my opinion on Wilber.
Bo
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