Bo
Eureka!
> This may give me an handle. You regard "grey cells" (i.e. thinking) as
> internal, but when an animal (Biology) applies its grey cells that's internal
> too, and if so it don't follow the inorg.bio/soci.intell. lines ...which is Gary's
> idea.
> Also as Pirsig says: the probability/preference (determinism/free will)
> runs right down to the inorganic level.
Right,The "thinking" that "grey cells" do, is an internal pattern of
values and this "thinking" "runs right down to the inorganic level".
"Thinking" is a bit strong let's just say that internal values help
determine, to some degree in all patterns, the preferences or
probabilities confirmable empirically while the internal values must be
confirmed by other methods. Pirsig's computer
hardware/software/voltages/flipflops/novel analogy (though technically
not accurate) indicates this when he says you will never find the novel
in the one's and zero's. But that does not mean that the "novel" does
not exist there. Just because I can't tell what your thoughts are by
looking at your brainwaves does not mean you don't have any. The same is
true for the internal patterns of value call "consciousness" When we met
on the web many years ago before I joined LS I sent you a essay I had
written titled "Novel Reality" which is now one of the earliest posted
on the MoQ website.
In it was this quote from Death of a Soul:
> Why this strange fear of human consciousness? Why this uneasiness at admitting it as a
> clear and evident fact within our human world?.... Is the consciousness of another person
> something that we should reasonably expect to SEE?.......We are plentifully aware of the
> minds of other people, but in another and more engulfing way: We share them. They are a
> part of the vital flow of life that surrounds and sustains us in the coming and going of
> family, friends, and those close to us.... Suppose, out of a moment of theoretical austerity,
> seeking to commit ourselves only to a minimal theory, we strive to consider those close to
> us "as if" they had not minds and were not conscious, but were only behaving bodies. ...to
> make the illustration as plain and grotesque as possible, you are approaching a moment of
> tenderness and passion with the woman you love, but for a moment you stop to reflect that
> theoretically you can treat her words and caresses as if there were no consciousness or mind
> behind them. That way madness lies! (Death of the Soul From Descartes to the Computer,
> William Barrett 1913-,Anchor Press/DoubleDay 1986)
If that minimalist theory is acceptable to you at the human
consciousness level then the MoQ is untenable and the discussion is
over. However if it is not acceptable then a whole new can of worms is
opened the first time someone asks, What about that dog over there? Is
he conscious? And then, What about that pioneer of quantum mechanicals
who suggested one would not even be able to start to understand the
subject unless one considered events "more like thoughts than things"?
Until all these many years later I have to admit, much to my chagrin,
that if you follow the tenants of the MoQ to their logical conclusion,
yes all empirical patterns of value must have an internal component ,
pattern, mechanicism, whatever, which dynamically chooses or determines,
to some limited degree within the constraints of their level, or else
there is no free will at all.
3WD
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