From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sat Dec 11 2004 - 22:40:52 GMT
Sam and all MOQers:
Sam Norton wrote:
Schleiermacher's influence on the way in which mysticism was studied was
huge, and his conception
dominated academic studies of the question from his own time until very
recently. The academic
studies built up through the nineteenth century all shared an acceptance of
the Kantian problematic,
i.e. that division between the 'phenomenal' and the 'noumenal', and viewed
mystical understandings
as in some way bypassing the normal constraints of intellect, in order to
access reality directly.
Hence Rudolf Otto, for example, whose 'numinous' is the same as Kant's
transcendent realm.
dmb says:
I could have jumped in before this point but picked this late one out of
mercy for the readers. There are two main objections that spring to mind.
The first one concerns mixing Kant's epistemology with the assertions of
mysticism. I think you have confused or conflated some ideas that can't
rightly be compared. For example, when Kant used the word transcendent to
describe the categories of the mind, he was NOT refering to the ineffable,
undivided mystical reality so much as the pre-given filters of perception.
They are transcendent in the sense that they're concieved as existing prior
to experience in the same way eyes exist before we actually use them to look
at stuff. The transcendental categories are like the various settings on a
pasta maker that gives shape to the blob of dough. And so the distinction
between Kant's phenomenal and noumenal is just a particular form of
subject-object metaphysics. As I understand intellectual history, Kant marks
the shift from Modern to Postmodern with this move. The mirror of nature has
taken a serious hit insofar as we do not reflect objective reality, but
rather shape it with our perceptions, but Kant's categories have been
replaced by a much rich view of these so-called filters. Matt K will be glad
to tell you all about how the "inguistic turn" is the discovery of the huge
effect of culture and language on our perceptions. In fact, the more extreme
postmoderns will assert that there is nothing else except these filters.
Kant has been thoroughly out-Kanted. The second objection is that mysticism
has to do with your idea of a "modern synthesis"...
Sam wrote:
It is William James' version of mysticism, derived from Schleiermacher,
which has dominated the 20th
century investigations, and for my purposes here I would point out that, in
this understanding - let
us call it the "Modern synthesis" - mystical experience is rare, private and
experiential; those who
enjoy such experiences are spiritually significant and blessed; but they are
the inheritors of the
great spiritual teachers of the past, and they have access to the common
root which supports all the
different religious traditions of the world.
dmb says:
We have language and concepts available to us that didn't exist in the past,
but I'm quite certain that philosophical mysticism existed LOOOOONG before
Schleiermacher. Socrates spoke of that "divine madness" and the new
testament is littered with references to it. I could dig up a gazillion
ancient descriptions of the mystical experience and you'd still recognize it
as the same experience we talk about today. Its only natural that we use
modern language to discuss it today.
Sam raised some Philosophical problems:
- the problem of 'essentialism', that is, the assumption that there is a
'common core' underlying all the different manifestations of mystical
experience. This is an inheritance from the Cartesian program, seeking a
reductive explanation of phenomena. If you accept, e.g., the Wittgensteinian
notion of 'family resemblance' then it becomes problematic to insist upon a
common core lying underneath difference;
dmb says:
I don't see how essentialism, Cartesianism or reductionism enters into the
equation. The assertion is simply that people have reported and described
the same experience and that they have done so regardless of their
particular culture, time and place. This is simply recognizing a pattern.
The only thing that can be reasonable in dispute is the meaning of these
reports. Nothing needs to be assumed. One reads account after account and
notices a common theme. Recognition of this common core is a conclusion, a
point of view based on evidence, not an assumptiom.
Sam said:
- in discussing the ineffable characteristics of mystical experience, the
expression
'non-conceptual' (and equivalents) are being used to stand for conceptual
terms. Put differently, if
a mystical experience has some impact upon a person's understanding then it
must be 'ascribable' to
that person, by themselves or another, and so the insistence on
'non-conceptuality' is
self-contradicting;
dmb says:
I don't quite follow the reasoning here. But if I had to guess, you're
troubled by a seemingly inconsistent assertion that a mystical experience is
both ineffable and noetic, that it is beyond concepts and it imparts
knowledge at the same time. Is that about right? As I understand it, this is
only a problem is we are claiming that the knowledge we gain from such an
experience is conceptual, but its not conceptual. This is why we usually
talk about it in metaphors or in terms of what it is NOT. And you may recall
my explanations concerning epistemological pluralism. In those terms we
would say that concepts are seen with the eye of the mind rather than with
the eye of flesh and that the eye of contemplation is a third kind that is
neither. This 3rd one is the eye with which we "see" in a mystical
experience. So the apparent conflict here disappears when we say that the
knowlege gained from a mystical experience cannot be expressed in concepts,
but we do it anyway.
Sam said:
- the "Modern synthesis" depends upon an individualist epistemology, again
deriving from Descartes,
which makes what happens to a particular ego central. If this is rejected
(which it generally has
been) then, once more, the synthesis breaks down.
dmb says:
Well, no. Let us not forget that one of the central assertions of
philosophical mysticism is that ego-consciousness is dissolved in the
experience. Except for the fact that people have both ego and mystical
experiences, the mystical conception of self is quite opposite from
Descartes'. That's the source of the isolated lonliness that Pirsig is
trying to get rid of.
Sam quoted - The French church historian Henri de Lubac:
"The links of Denis, the first and most influential of
the great mystical theologians, with Neoplatonism are undeniable. But
precisely that which, for
Denis himself, constitutes mysticism, is not what these experiences which he
describes my have in
common with, for example, those of Plotinus. It is, on the contrary, their
position at the
intersection of a whole specifically Christian spiritual tradition of
scriptural interpretation and
the ecclesiastical experience of the liturgy, the eucharistic liturgy. His
mystical theology, as he
understands it himself, is his manner of recognising the Christ, at the
breaking of bread, in all
the scriptures."
dmb says:
If I understand this at all, Lubac is saying that mysticism is not about the
experiences reported by people like Plotinus. He's saying mysticism is,
instead, reading the bible and participating in rituals? This is where
Pirsig's comments about shutting out the light come in. His assertion is
that myth and ritual serve as a static portrait of DQ, but that the problem
comes in when those static portraits are not seen as such, are not used to
guide the practicioner toward an experince of their own but are instead seen
as the point and purpose of religion in themselves. This seems to be the
crime of which Lubac is guilty. As I understand it, Lubac doesn't understand
that such rituals are vehicles of transformation and his misunderstanding
has lead him to worship a stationary car with no wheels rather than use it
to go some place. This is the attitude that has put the churches up on
blocks in the front yard. This is what makes the churches broken down and
obsolete. They don't function as vehicles and do not even understand that
they should.
Sam said:
- As more research has been done directly on the Christian mystical
tradition, it has become more
and more clear that not only are the Christian mystics themselves not
interested in their own
'experiences' (understood as private, ineffable, noetic etc), but that their
precise arguments are
to undermine and critique the emphasis upon such exotic experiences, as a
snare and spiritual
delusion, leading to the vices of self-absorption and Titanism.
dmb asks:
Delusion, self-absorption and Titanism? Please explain.
Sam wrote:
If the academic community is right in rejecting the Kantian problematic, and
therefore the 'Modern synthesis' understanding of mysticism - and the
grounds for doing so are really quite overwhelming - where does that leave
Pirsig and the MoQ?
dmb says:
I don't think these dominos tumble in the order you suggest for the reasons
outlined above. And I'm a bit baffled by the claim that "the grounds for
doing so are quite overwhelming" and you're being awfully vague about "the
academic community". May I assume that you mean theological circles?
Sam wrapped it up:
For the links
between the MoQ and Schleiermacher's project seem profound, even down to
some of the language used.
Is it accurate to describe the MoQ as simply a redescription of
Schleiermacher's scheme, that is, is
not Dynamic Quality merely a Kantian 'pure experience', and the levels of
Static Quality merely a
redescription of phenomena? If not, why not? This is not to suggest a direct
borrowing, only to
point out that Pirsig's work - probably via William James - has inherited a
conceptual shape from
Schleiermacher, and that conceptual shape is very largely discredited within
the academic community.
dmb says:
Well, yes, its pretty clear that Schleiermacher, James and Pirsig are all
talking about the same experience, but this is not particularly modern, does
not begin with Schleiermacher and doesn't rest upon Kant's epistemology.
You gotta remember Kant's place in history. He was writing and thinking in
an atmosphere of materialism, objectivity, the mirror of nature, realism,
rationalism and all those various permutations of SOM. Kant was no mystic
and so his conception of the nomena is not like the "nothingness" of the
East or like Pirsig's DQ. Rather it is more like the assertion that there is
an objective, divided reality out there, but we can never really know it.
The mystic, by contrast, says that we can not only experience reality
directly, but also that we ARE that reality. In Kant's view there is an
impossble gulf between phenomena and nomena, between subjects and the
objective world and never the twain shall meet. Philosophical mysticism
asserts that this is the illusion to be overcome and there is no gulf at
all. See?
Eyes shape and divide the world. Cultures and ideas shape and divide the
world. The mystical experience removes those shapes and divisions, not to
get a clear picture of things, but to dissolve things and see the undivided
reality. Its not a matter of a subject getting an unfiltered picture of the
objective reality because those are among the divisions that are dissolved,
see? That's where the loss of ego comes in, see? And this is where concepts
fail because concepts are all about definitions and divisions, see? How's
that for starters?
dmb
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