From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Thu Dec 30 2004 - 17:02:32 GMT
Hi Ham
Ham said:
I've been hanging in here, quietly awaiting your Pirsig exposition which
has
now apparently been preempted by your collaboration on Anthony McWatt's
PhD
thesis. Since that appears to be available only as purchased hard copy,
I'm
somewhat confused as to precisely what new insight is available and
where it
may be found.
Paul:
There is no new insight. What I have produced is a straight-forward
exposition of Pirsig's system. I did this by first organising all of the
material I have collected (from ZMM, LILA, LILA'S CHILD, SODV, AHP
Lecture and correspondence) into a logical order and then by adding my
own words to add context and link the material together. It just needs
tidying up a little and referencing so you can have a copy when I finish
it.
Ham said:
I'm in complete agreement with the premise that, in the metaphysical
sense
at least, "out there" and "in here" are irrelevant qualifications.
However,
I think we have to be careful how we define the cause of this polar
phenomenon. Isn't it "rationality" rather than "imagination" which
constructs physical reality externally to the self?
Paul:
Well, I would say it's intellect that constructs external reality. If
you feel the need to divorce imagination from rationality then go ahead.
Ham said:
Also, I'm not sure what
you mean by "the distinction between 'out there' and 'in here' is not a
fundamental unquestionable reality." Are you saying that the
distinction
itself is not unquestionable, or do you mean to suggest that such a
divided
reality is questionable? Could you kindly clarify that assertion for
me?
Paul:
Okay, that was sloppy writing, I'm afraid I've been a little rushed
lately. What I was saying was that, in terms of philosophical discourse,
the conceptual distinction between 'out there' and 'in here' should not
be taken as a starting point, which it often is.
Ham said:
I have a problem with "being" as the primary source, as you probably
know.
Whatever has being is a specific finite entity; that is, a "being" is
differentiated from non-being or "nothingness", as well as from any
other
being....I have the same problem with your positing of 'sense data' as
the a priori source.
Paul:
I am using the term sense data for the generalised 'something' which is
sensed. It can also be called sense experience or just experience. I
don't mean anything subjective/objective or mental/physical. Those
distinctions are applied later and are nowhere to be found in the front
edge of the experience itself.
Ham said:
Data of any kind are specific, like any kind of being.
Paul:
I disagree, perhaps sense data has too much SOM baggage but I am using
it as a simple reference to something sensed. Once differentiated, it is
this or that and not just pure sense data. It is then intellectualised
sense data with properties and so on i.e. intellectualised into objects
of some kind.
Ham said:
As your statement
implies, the "something that is there" cannot be sense data but "refers
to
the source of this sense data, prior to differentiation". I see nothing
illogical about calling the source Dynamic Quality, so long as it is
non-differentiated.
Paul:
What I am saying is that Dynamic Quality is sensed, therefore, prior to
any intellectual differentiations being made, pure sense data is Dynamic
Quality i.e., pure sense data is pure undifferentiated value. It is the
negative aesthetic value that is immediately sensed in the hot stove
example in LILA. This is really not as complicated as I appear to be
making it. I think introducing the word 'source' has complicated things
and I know how philosophically important it is to you to have a source
in there somewhere. You could say that undifferentiated sense data
(conceptual nothingness) is the source of differentiated sense data i.e.
things.
Ham said:
> "...propositionally speaking, experience is sense data but the sense
> data has already been preselected by quality.
I don't understand what this means. If Quality is a "selector" of
specifics, it is an agent and not the Source of experience.
Paul:
For experience to have a source there has to be something which cannot
be experienced, i.e., something *outside of* experience that is causing
it. The MOQ denies this proposition.
The differentiation of otherwise undifferentiated sense experience is
made on the basis of Quality. The differentiations are static patterns
in an otherwise undifferentiated Quality. The undifferentiated Quality,
i.e. minus static patterns, is referred to as Dynamic Quality.
Pirsig:
> We are trained to think of
> this sense data as coming from objects but the whole idea of objects
is
> arrived at from primitive value judgments of the sort newborn infants
> have before they have any idea of such a thing as an object and long
> before they have an idea of such a thing as mind. The MOQ says it is
the
> unnamable source of these valuations that comes first, not mind or
> matter. It calls this unnamable source "Dynamic Quality" for purposes
of
> intellectual reference, but carefully avoids defining it." [Pirsig to
> McWatt, 1999]
Ham said:
Why must the primary source be "unnamable" (especially given the fact
that
you've named it DQ)?
Paul:
Names generally define things and the 'primary source' is no thing.
Ham said:
Why isn't Value itself the experiential source?
Paul:
You make a distinction between experiential reality and non-experiential
reality which I deny. Also, rather than being the source of experience,
value is postulated as pure experience itself.
Ham said:
Is not Value the object of one's "valuation"?
Paul:
It is the primary source of them. Pure value is Dynamic Quality;
valuations are static patterns of quality. The process of valuation is
generally a combination of Dynamic Quality and static quality. It starts
out very Dynamic but depends more and more on static patterns as they
become more dominating.
Ham said:
Considering that there is no "out there" or "in here", is there a
distinction to be made between sense-data and sense-experience?
Paul:
I don't think so.
Ham said:
Also,
inasmuch as all experience is differentiated, how can either data or
sensation(s) qualifiy as the undifferentiated Source?
Paul:
Because not all experience is differentiated, although almost all of it
is.
Regards
Paul
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