From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Sun Aug 17 2003 - 04:33:00 BST
Bo,
> > so further work does
> > need to be done, and that is to work out how the reverse is also >true,
which leads to Coleridge's Law of Polarity: although there is >only one
Power (that is, monism), it always manifests in two forces >(which he calls
free life and confining form, or DQ and SQ) which >*cannot be separated*.
> Each force exists only because of the other, >even though they are
antagonistic toward each other. So subject is >totally dependent on object
and object is totally dependent on >subject, and so it is not idealism.
>
> I agree with all this, but to me it is re-inventing the wheel?
>
> > Assuming you except the above that Barfield and Coleridge are not
> > idealists, then...
>
> I except (accept?) whatever, but my point is that the Barfield and
> Cooleridge works are the same as what led P, to the MOQ. But as
> neither reached any MOQ-like solutions what is the point?
[yes, accept.] They did reach MOQ-like solutions.
[Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, p. 183-4, published 1971]
"And we should be drawing attention...in particular to the Triad:
Differentia, Concordantia, and Contrarietas, mediating descent from the
absolute to the relative. And we should no doubt be showing how this points
us back to the whole long line of "Christian Neoplatonism" -- Pythagoras,
Plato, Plotinus, Proclus and Porphyry, pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine, Scotus
Erigena, the Florentine Academy and a host of others. It is a line with
which Coleridge was, from an early age, well acquainted. But here [in an
appendix on Bruno and Coleridge] we are limited to investigating the special
importance he atached to Bruno.
"For it seems to be especially in Bruno that he located the link between all
that line and modern thought. Modern thought, that is to say, not as it is,
but as it might and should be. Modern thought, as it has in fact developed,
and particularly scientific thought, presupposes a "metaphysics of quantity"
by contrast with the "metaphysics of quality", which the whole line
presupposes and presents. Moreover, this metaphysic is inseparably bound up
with a critique of logic. Aristotelian logic and all developments from it,
being grounded on the understanding and the senses, inevitably end in
admitting only quantities as "real". But, since it is a matter of immediate
experience that the world consists of qualities as well as quantities,
modern thought will remain exiled from knowledge, unless it develops its own
metaphysic of qualities to supplement the other, which it has. And a
metaphysic of qualities will be one which *starts* from qualities as the
basic and constitutive principles of the universe, instead of from the
mechanical and ultimately quantitative process, to which the understanding
and the senses have succeeded in 'reducing' it."
>
> > The way beyond is what they call Imagination. Goethe is perhaps >the
best example of one who learned through Imagination rather >than through the
S/O form. It appears to be something like "thinking >with" rather than
"thinking about".
>
> OK then a Metaphysics of Imagination where the last static
> imagination is the S/O divide, but Quality is better!
Well, no. Imagination, to Coleridge, is in contrast to the "understanding
and the senses" referred to in the quote above. It is precisely not static,
but (in MOQ terms) involves DQ. For Coleridge, the S/O divide is a case of
the DQ/SQ divide, not a static idea. This is where Squonk is misguided in
saying "there are no subjects and objects in the MOQ". If that were so, the
MOQ would be useless, like theology would be if it left out sin. Where SOM
goes wrong is not in saying "there are subjects and there are objects" but
in not realizing that they are mutually dependent while being mutually
opposite (polarity), that they are the "two forces of one power" as
manifested in human minds at this time.
Pirsig is also wrong in trying to simply relegate the difference between
subject and object to different static levels. While experience does divide
into subject and object, it is also the case that thinking (and knowing)
reunite them to create a unity that is distinguishable from the original
Quality. That is, the S/O divide creates unity-in-individuality. Or rather,
it will, once we learn to transcend the S/O divide without eliminating it.
> > > > What I
> > > > (following Barfield following Coleridge following...Plato, with
> > > > modifications) am suggesting is that some rarified version of
> > > > those concepts and ideas creates the experience in the first
> > > > place.
>
> P. of ZMM arrived at the insight that Quality was the creator of the S/O
> (subjects and objects as it says there). His insight started on Barfield-
> like ideas I don't deny that, but B. did not suggest a new metaphysics.
> If you use Barfield as underpinning the MOQ's premises, fine, but I
> have the impression that you see him saying something deeper.
As I said (I think to Paul), Coleridge provides the metaphysics that
Barfield adopts and in some ways expands.
I also think that Coleridge's metaphysics is better than Pirsig's, for
precisely the things that are bothering you. Coleridge emphasizes the
distinction between thinking and thoughts, for example. He would not have
equated "static intellectual patterns of value" with "mind", or "thinking".
Basically, Coleridge has a full philosophy of mind and nature (and which
turn out to be the same) which Pirsig lacks, though the basics of it are
there in the DQ/SQ split. My assumption is that, in writing Lila, Pirsig did
not see the need to get to it, and in a way he was right. However, if one
does want to get to it, the tools and terminology aren't there -- hence the
debates here on the nature of the intellectual level, your distress at the
annotating Pirsig, etc. The tools and terminology can be found in Coleridge.
>
> > To go deeper into differentiating the static levels I think one does
> > need Peirce's 3-fold sign (that's Charles Sanders Peirce, not >William,
BTW),
>
> Charles it is. I only have the Danish Biologist Jesper Hoffmeyer's
> book so my translation back into English may not be correct, but
> Peirce's metaphysics (Primary Sign Subject(=interpreter)/Object)
> looks so like the early "trinity" version of the MOQ (Quality
> Subject/Object) that I jumped sky-high when I first came across it
>
> In the book it is not said how Peirce arrived at his SIGN insight, or if
> he saw it in contrast to any SOM - maybe you know - but the likeness
> between Sign and Quality is striking.
Yes, his theory is triadic, and his discussion of Thirdness (of which the
sign is his primary example) is anti-SOM. SOM assumes basic reality as
composed of Seconds (e.g., object seen by subject), but he argues that the
thirdness of the sign is irreducible to any combination of seconds, and
since signs clearly exist as thirds, SOM must be false.
>
> "Its a principle in physics that if a thing can't be distinguished
> from anything else it does not exist. To this the MOQ adds a
> second principle: if a thing has no value it isn't distinguished
> from anything else. Then, putting the two together: A thing that
> has no value does not exist."
>
> A thing that signifies nothing does not exist! Sign=significance=Value!
> Its plain! Sign is the creator of everything and Peirce might have
> developed his 3-fold sign metaphysics the same way as P. did.
> Dynamic (Primary) Sign/Static (Secondary) Sign and the known
> hierarchy.
>
> > As I said in my post about this, and as mentioned above,
> > *if* it works out (in particular, has nothing essential been lost in
> > discussing moral conflicts), *then* I see it as an advantage in that
> > it removes the difficulty of defining intellect, etc.
>
> If the above "development" of Peirce is made it fits perfectly with all
> levels intact. And it helps immensely in understanding the 4th level.
> What do you say?.
Well, in the past I have tried to put forward the view that "everything is
language", and that was based in part on Peirce. I see the levels as being
distinct because of the way we cannot discern all three levels, in fact, we
only see two in the biological level (lacking the interpretant), and one in
the inorganic (Object only). However, it does not distinguish between the
social and intellectual levels, and for that -- assuming one wants to go
this route, and DMB raises valid objections -- I see the difference being DQ
inside and not outside.
- Scott
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