Date: Sat Feb 12 2005 - 20:35:17 GMT
A: Is feeling "sensation" - and if so, is it therefore the empirical ground
for the MoQ? My impression is that it is. In support of that, see this quote
from the annotations:
Mark 11-02-05: Sensation is not, 'the empirical ground for the MoQ' because
DQ is the empirical ground for the MoQ.
This is supported by the quote Sam provides us with: (my additions)
we can have a limited knowledge of the Absolute (DQ) by conceiving it on an
analogy (an analogy is a static intellectual pattern) with the basic
sentient experience (biological experience of DQ) which underlies the emergence of
distinctions between subject and object and between different objects
(static patterns.) In
this sense the experience in question can be regarded as an obscure, virtual
knowledge (a statically patterned biological repertoire of experience) of
reality which is the 'presupposition' of metaphysics (a statically patterned
intellectual repertoire of experience) and which
the metaphysician tries to recapture at a higher level (tries to capture
'DQ' in static patterns - which cannot be done, but one may try). [[This is
excellent statement of the MOQ position.]] (Because the MoQ is a
'contradiction in terms' in that is employs DQ as part of it's structure.)
B: If feeling is sensation in this way, and feeling is biological quality,
does this skew the MoQ, ie does it make the biological level foundational??
Mark 11-02-05: No. See above. (An example: The suggestion that a document
should be 'sexed up' is using analogous experience of DQ at the Biological
level to indicate shortcomings at a higher level. The blinding light of DQ can be
C: In the context of the 19th Century Idealism which Copleston is
discussing, how is "feeling" related to the Romantic movement's conceptions,
especially Schleiermacher's understanding of it as the pre-rational
'immediate self-consciousness' and ground of religion. (I think that they
are the same thing, and that there is the direct descent from this to
Pirsig, but I accept that this is controversial. People might want to avoid
this element for a while).
Mark 11-02-05: DQ can be experienced in four ways: Inorganically,
Organically, Socially and Intellectually.
Thus, one may use descriptions of experience of DQ at the Biological level
as analogies for descriptions of experience of DQ at the Intellectual level. In
this sense, Organic, Social and Intellectual experiences of DQ indicate the
D: How can we distinguish "feeling" from emotion? I have said before that I
think that the field of 'emotion' is a blind-spot in the MoQ, and Pirsig
often seems to have uncritically accepted an enlightenment bias against
emotion. But it seems to me fairly well-established now that emotions are,
at least in part, cognitive in character, so that enlightenment bias is
unsustainable. If so, in what way are "feelings" - understood as biological
Quality - to be distinguished from "emotions" - understood as, at least in
part, a pattern which operates on the intellectual level?
Mark 11-02-05: One may distinguish feeling from emotion in much the same way
as one may distinguish a star fish from a Dolphin - they are both species of
the same level of evolution, but at differing sophisticated configurations.
That's probably enough for now.
Mark 11-02-05: Thank you.
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