MF Discussion Topic for February 2005

Date: Sat Feb 12 2005 - 20:35:17 GMT

  • Next message: David Buchanan: "RE: MF Discussion Topic for February 2005"

    Hello everyone,
    Sam asks:

    A: Is feeling "sensation" - and if so, is it therefore the empirical ground
    for the MoQ? My impression is that it is. In support of that, see this quote
    from the annotations:

    Mark 11-02-05: Sensation is not, 'the empirical ground for the MoQ' because
    DQ is the empirical ground for the MoQ.
    This is supported by the quote Sam provides us with: (my additions)

    we can have a limited knowledge of the Absolute (DQ) by conceiving it on an
    analogy (an analogy is a static intellectual pattern) with the basic
    sentient experience (biological experience of DQ) which underlies the emergence of
    distinctions between subject and object and between different objects
    (static patterns.) In
    this sense the experience in question can be regarded as an obscure, virtual
    knowledge (a statically patterned biological repertoire of experience) of
    reality which is the 'presupposition' of metaphysics (a statically patterned
    intellectual repertoire of experience) and which
    the metaphysician tries to recapture at a higher level (tries to capture
    'DQ' in static patterns - which cannot be done, but one may try). [[This is
    really an
    excellent statement of the MOQ position.]] (Because the MoQ is a
    'contradiction in terms' in that is employs DQ as part of it's structure.)

    B: If feeling is sensation in this way, and feeling is biological quality,
    does this skew the MoQ, ie does it make the biological level foundational??

    Mark 11-02-05: No. See above. (An example: The suggestion that a document
    should be 'sexed up' is using analogous experience of DQ at the Biological
    level to indicate shortcomings at a higher level. The blinding light of DQ can be

    C: In the context of the 19th Century Idealism which Copleston is
    discussing, how is "feeling" related to the Romantic movement's conceptions,
    especially Schleiermacher's understanding of it as the pre-rational
    'immediate self-consciousness' and ground of religion. (I think that they
    are the same thing, and that there is the direct descent from this to
    Pirsig, but I accept that this is controversial. People might want to avoid
    this element for a while).

    Mark 11-02-05: DQ can be experienced in four ways: Inorganically,
    Organically, Socially and Intellectually.
    Thus, one may use descriptions of experience of DQ at the Biological level
    as analogies for descriptions of experience of DQ at the Intellectual level. In
    this sense, Organic, Social and Intellectual experiences of DQ indicate the
    absolute, God.

    D: How can we distinguish "feeling" from emotion? I have said before that I
    think that the field of 'emotion' is a blind-spot in the MoQ, and Pirsig
    often seems to have uncritically accepted an enlightenment bias against
    emotion. But it seems to me fairly well-established now that emotions are,
    at least in part, cognitive in character, so that enlightenment bias is
    unsustainable. If so, in what way are "feelings" - understood as biological
    Quality - to be distinguished from "emotions" - understood as, at least in
    part, a pattern which operates on the intellectual level?

    Mark 11-02-05: One may distinguish feeling from emotion in much the same way
    as one may distinguish a star fish from a Dolphin - they are both species of
    the same level of evolution, but at differing sophisticated configurations.

    That's probably enough for now.

    Mark 11-02-05: Thank you.

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