From: Ant McWatt (antmcwatt@hotmail.co.uk)
Date: Wed Mar 16 2005 - 00:30:40 GMT
Ant McWatt had stated March 8th 2005:
According to your essay, Schleiermacher is making the case that mysticism
can bridge the gap between phenomena (the everyday world that is perceived)
and the Divine found in the noumenal.
Sam Norton responded March 12th 2005:
>That's not quite right, so far as I understand it (and I'm only just
>beginning to study Schleiermacher, so I could well be wrong). The 'divine'
>for Schleiermacher comes before the splitting up into phenomena and
>noumena; it is pre-intellectual, and those categories are intellectual
>applications.
Ant McWatt replies:
Sam,
Your description of Schleiermacher’s thought in your December essay clearly
indicates that he thinks that the Divine is found in the noumenal i.e.
“It immediately brought forth a response, which, whilst retaining the
Kantian epistemology, argued that in certain circumstances IT WAS POSSIBLE
TO HAVE A 'PURE' EXPERIENCE, I.E. TO EXPERIENCE THE 'NOUMENA'. This was the
Romantic movement, which argued that whilst reason cannot enjoy such a pure
experience, it was possible to circumvent the Kantian problematic through
the operation of the feelings, most especially through intense, visionary or
ecstatic experiences.”
“In the development of the Romantic understanding, a key thinker is the
theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834)…”
As such, the only reasonable conclusion to draw is that the “Kantian
problematic” has nothing to do with Pirsig’s notion of Dynamic Quality.
Hence, my “ice cream” analogy regarding your essay.
>Despite all that you and Paul and DMB have said I am unable to see the
>difference between this and how Pirsig describes DQ, but perhaps I am just
>a bear of little brain.
I guess it’s the SOM/Kantian element which you keep trying to impose on the
MOQ which is the problem rather than equating Dynamic Quality with pure
experience per se.
>In your lecture you quote Northrop quoting James, with reference to the
>'undifferentiated aesthetic continuum' and so on. This seems to me to
>confirm that there is a direct link from James to Pirsig (not an identity,
>I accept your point that James is still a bit SOMish…
OK.
>and that Pirsig takes things further) and that they are talking about the
>same thing, that DQ IS "pure experience", modified and adapted and
>improved,
I wonder if your theistic God could also be “modified and adapted and
improved”?
>but fundamentally and structurally still what James was talking about - and
>what Schleiermacher was talking about.
James, Schleiermacher and Pirsig may have all been referring to the
ineffable element of reality but it doesn’t follow that this element
correlates with the noumenal and, in consequence, the Kantian problematic or
SOM You’re adding 2 plus 2 together and making 5.
>[In Chapter 3 of your PhD thesis]… you say a few times "Pirsig introduces
>a new metaphysical system based essentially on Mahayana Buddhism" and
>similar expressions, which seems to imply that the problems now identified
>with the Jamesian approach have no purchase on systems based on Easter
>thought. Yet Pirsig also says that his view incorporates elements from
>James
Yes, Pirsig does incorporate some pragmatic and radical empiricism elements
of James’ work i.e. the MOQ is pragmatic in that the true is what proves to
be the good and radical in that mystic and artistic experiences are
considered valid empirical experiences. However, there’s absolutely no
requirement that SOM has to be taken on board along with these two elements.
>[Pirsig] states quite explicitly [that] "The Metaphysics of Quality is a
>continuation of the mainstream of twentieth-century American philosophy".
>What I want to know is whether all criticisms of that mainstream can be
>sidestepped by a claim that Buddhist thought is immune from contamination.
Yes.
>What is the relative status of these two elements? In other words, if I am
>making criticisms of the Jamesian strand, how dispensable is that strand to
>the MOQ as such? Or, put differently again, if (big if) I can show that
>Pirsig's use of, or inheritance from, the Jamesian strand doesn't work out,
>is the MOQ still distinguishable from Buddhism?
I suppose the MOQ can be loosely perceived as an updated Zen Buddhism i.e.
it agrees with most of traditional Zen Buddhist philosophy but also contains
further developments based on the theory of evolution and quantum mechanics.
I’m sure the Buddha would have approved.
Sam Norton further stated on March 14th 2005:
>I think the way that DQ is described within the system of the MOQ has great
>difficulties. I think Pirsig has retained influences from the empirical
>tradition that are no longer sustainable. I think that 'pure experience'
>doesn't do what he wants it to do, and that it is in many ways a confused
>notion in and of itself. The way out of this tension seems to me to be
>something along the lines of Scott's 'contradictory identity' which doesn't
>privilege DQ over SQ, and abandoning the language of empiricism that Pirsig
>has retained.
Ant McWatt notes:
I thought it was Nagarjuna’s idea of “contradictory identity” rather than
Scott’s? Anyway, the nihilistic part is examined in ZMM (i.e. Dynamic
Quality); the “double exposure” part is examined in LILA (i.e. static
quality patterns through Dynamic Quality). Moreover, the criticism of Zen
philosophy in being nihilistic is dismissed by D.T. Suzuki in Chapter 3 of
“An Introduction to Zen Buddhism”. For instance:
“When Zen denies, it is not necessarily a denial in the logical sense. The
same can be said of an affirmation. The idea is that the ultimate fact of
experience must not be enslaved by any artificial or schematic laws of
thought, nor by any antithesis of ‘yes’ and ‘no’, nor by any cut and dried
formulae of epistemology. Evidently Zen commits absurdities and
irrationalities all the time; but this [is] only apparently. No wonder it
fails to escape the natural consequences – misunderstandings, wrong
interpretations, and ridicules which are often malicious. The charge of
[Scott’s] nihilism is only one of these, [Sam’s Kantian problematic is
another].”
And:
“Mere negation, however, is not the spirit of Zen [though] naturally Zen
would proclaim ‘Not this, not that, not anything.’ But we may insist upon
asking Zen what it is that is left after all these denials, and the master
will perhaps on such an occasion give us a slap in the face, exclaiming,
‘You fool [Scott], what is this?’ Some [such as Matt K] may take this as
only an excuse to get away from the dilemma, or as having no more meaning
than a practical example of ill-breeding. but when the spirit of Zen is
grasped in its purity, it will be seen what a real thing that slap is. For
here is no negation, no affirmation, but a plain fact, a pure experience,
the very foundation of our being and thought.”
>I'd begin by saying that I think Pirsig is great, he's very lucid and
>stimulating to read, and I always feel refreshed whenever I return to what
>he has written (when I've had too much MD that is). I think ZMM is a work
>of genius; Lila I'm not so convinced by. In other words, I think that in
>Lila Pirsig reversed his decision in ZMM and decided to climb up the
>mountain of metaphysics.
As noted above and in my PhD, ZMM and LILA should be considered together as
following the circle of enlightenment starting from ‘the world of form’
(typically perceived dualistically, as in SOM) through to an understanding
of ‘formlessness’/‘Dynamic Quality’ (as seen in ZMM - 180 degrees
enlightenment). We then return full circle (360 degrees) with this new
understanding of Dynamic Quality into ‘the world of form’/static quality
patterns (as seen in LILA).
“In Buddhism, the world can be described in terms of ‘The First Principle’,
sometimes called ‘Formlessness’ or ‘nothingness’ or ‘freedom’ which
parallels the treatment of Quality in ZMM. The world can also be described
in terms of ‘The Second Principle’ of ‘Form’ or ‘order’ which parallels the
treatment of quality in LILA. In Buddhism, form and formlessness, freedom
and order, co-exist.” (Pirsig to McWatt, January 12th1999)
If Pirsig had just left it at ZMM (180 degrees enlightenment) then Scott’s
nihilist criticism may have had some substance to it – though even in ZMM,
Pirsig was employing the Northrop based notions of romantic and classic
quality – and Northrop certainly is no SOM philosopher.
>Secondly, I think the MOQ is a metaphysical structure that pre-dates
>Wittgenstein. I don't think it's possible to do metaphysics in quite the
>same way once Wittgenstein has been taken on board; it's 'status' is
>different. This is what I'm wanting to pursue with Anthony. In other words,
>I think that - because, so far as I know, he's never read any Wittgenstein
>- Pirsig is still employing some residual Cartesian assumptions about
>'philosophical psychology'. I think that the MOQ can survive the removal of
>these assumptions, I just think that the way the levels are understood will
>be modified (the social level will not be 'subjective' in any sense, for
>example).
When I put it to Gavin Gee-Clough (in January 2003) that Wittgenstein was
critical of Descartes’ views on the self, he noted:
“Wittgenstein was just a semanticist; a semanticist moreover who said that
semantics wasn’t all that useful. He hinted at other sources of meaning but
never really explored them – just said they were really important.
Wittgenstein was obviously a very conflicted guy – hardly indicative of
having broken out of SOM.”
I have taken Gavin’s word about this as he studied Wittgenstein as a part of
his philosophology degree and like David B and Paul, I usually find Gavin’s
thoughts helpful in clarifying the MOQ. However, if you can cite particular
passages by Wittgenstein (NOT secondary sources) that indicate that Pirsig
is “using residual Cartesian assumptions” then I’ll certainly look at them.
Finally, do remember that unlike other modern philosophies formulated in the
West, the MOQ is guaranteed 100% SOM free. If you look closely at LILA you
will see that anyone who can clearly prove otherwise will be given a free
Honda CB750 signed by Robert Pirsig himself. I just don’t believe anyone
has successfully put forward a good enough argument to claim a free
motorbike yet!
Best wishes,
Anthony.
www.anthonymcwatt.co.uk
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