From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Fri Mar 04 2005 - 20:30:45 GMT
Hi Wim, DMB, all, (NB Matt you in particular might appreciate something
here)
I've been away on a conference this week, so sorry for the late response.
> You doubted 26 Feb 2005 22:53:39 -0000 whether you had argued that
> "emotion"
> rather than "feeling" be understood as a broader term for "primary
> discernment of value", at least at the upper three levels.
<snip>
This is very interesting, in that you have drawn out a consequence from my
position that I hadn't thought fully through myself. I'm still not sure if
it works completely, but it does tie in strongly with the Damasio research.
That is, when a decision is made, it is made on the basis of - at least in
part - an emotional assessment (indeed, his argument is that a decision is
impossible without this emotional input). As a decision is a discernment of
value, this would seem to imply that, at least so far as our decision-making
goes, emotions are indeed a primary discernment of value. As you say, this
doesn't work well at the lowest level, which is why I think we need to be
cautious, but it's very interesting. I'll ponder it further.
> You asked:
> 'How do we know that when, eg, we use "experience" in this broader way,
> we're not simply letting language "go on holiday" and mislead ourselves
> into
> thinking that we know more than we actually do? That is, we have a pretty
> good idea of what "experience" means in the normal course of events, but
> what does it mean when it is being used in this extended, "broader",
> sense?'
>
> Well, it obviously means "primary discernment of value" then.
My point is that it is then doing something different to what the word
'experience' normally does. Which is fine, it's just that we need to be
aware that we are using it in a different way, and be alert to any
unconscious transfers of association from the primary context to this more
MoQ-specific context. Most particularly, 'experience' carries lots of SOM
("objective") baggage; talk of 'primary discernment of value', I would
argue, involves a certain assessment, which is different.
> Finalley you asked me:
> 'Does blushing have a biological pattern as part of its overall
> explanation?'
>
> The ability to blush does, the pattern of blushing in specific kinds of
> social situations doesn't.
So you are saying that you can have a full description of blushing without
reference to the biological components? Not sure that makes sense to me.
Onto DMB's rather amusing missive.
> dmb says:
> My impression from the article was that emotions are BOTH cognitive AND
> physiological, depending on the KIND of emotions being discussed and which
> school of thought was doing the talking. My impression was of a debate in
> which both sides make some pretty damn good points and are both at least
> partly correct.
That's right. I should have said "some" emotions are cognitive etc. The
point being that a reduction of all emotions to the feeling level (ie the
biological level) is untenable. I'm quite happy to accept that some emotions
*are* purely biological, eg fear of a tiger. Once it is accepted that at
least some emotions can't be reduced to the biological level, however, and
are therefore not equivalent to 'feeling' in the MoQ, then we have the
interesting question about how to classify them.
Now to the amusing bit.
> dmb replies:
> Emotions are intentional in the sense that they are about some aspect of
> the
> world? Again, I have a different impression. It seems that for Nussbaum
> all
> emotions are about the ego of the emoter, if you will. I think she is
> saying
> that all emotions are egocentric. As she puts it in "Upheavels of
> Thought",..
>
> "I do not go about fearing any and every catastrophe anywhere in the
> world,
> nor (so it seems) do I fear any and every catastrophe that I know to be
> bad
> in important ways. What inspires fear is the thought of damages impending
> that cut to the heart of my own cherished relationships and projects. What
> inspires grief is the death of someone beloved, someone who has been an
> important part of one's own life. This does not mean that the emotions
> view
> these objects simply as tools or instruments of the agent's own
> satisfaction: they may be invested with intrinsic worth or value. They may
> be loved for their own sake, and their good sought for its own sake. . . .
> [Nonetheless], the emotions are in this sense localized: they take their
> stand in my own life, and focus on the transition between light and
> darkness
> there, rather than on the general distribution of light and darkness in
> the
> universe as a whole."
Now, does anyone else have the impression from this that DMB has a) read the
Nussbaum book, and b) took down his copy to type in this particular
reference? After all, it's what might be expected when someone says "I have
a different impression.... I think she is saying...." Given that I've been a
fan of Nussbaum for quite a while, and have mentioned her before, I was
struck by the way that DMB referred to her here, as if he was familiar with
her work - which I found surprising, as that hadn't come up before.
So I did a quick Google search on one extract from that quotation.
And Lo!
And Behold!!
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0210/reviews/oakes.html
The reviewer writes this: "For Nussbaum, all emotions are egocentric. As she
puts it..." and then gives the exact same quotation from Nussbaum that DMB
used.
Now, I could be making 2+2 = 5 here, and falsely impugning DMB's integrity.
If so, I apologise.
Should we have a rule against 'passing off' other people's opinions as our
own though?
Just a thought <grin>
> dmb continues:
> "My own cherished relationships and projects." See, this is the ego-self,
> the Ayn Randian self, that Pirsig views as a kind of fiction. I suspect
> that
> trying to fit such a thing into the MOQ may be one of those square
> peg/round
> hole things. As Maxwell pointed out, she's working within SOM here. Big
> time. At the very least we would have to make some serious adjustments to
> discuss it. I don't want to be a party-pooper, but it might even be doomed
> from the start.
This is what makes me think DMB hasn't read Nussbaum. To accuse her (simply)
of working within SOM is pathetic. But Matt has already made that point
eloquently.
> dmb says:
> I think two different ideas are getting squished together here. When we
> say
> that DQ is the primary empirical reality, it is an assertion about the
> MOQ's
> epistemology and not about the relative value or worth of DQ. When we say
> DQ
> is the primary empirical reality, the word "primary" means first in a
> sequence, the most basic kind, the starting point. It does not mean DQ is
> better than sq, more important than sq or anything like that. I think we
> all
> can recall Pirsig's repeated insistence that both are vital and necessary.
> Seen this way, there is no conflict between the idea that DQ is primary
> and
> the idea that DQ and sq are "a contradictory identity".
Your point only holds true if you take time to be an absolute and not itself
a high quality intellectual pattern. That's not very mystical of you David
;o)
This could be a major point, so I'm going to go off and look at Anthony's
PhD where he talks about just this subject.
Regards to all, hope you have a great weekend.
Sam
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